The collapse of palatial society in LBA Greece and the postpalatial period by Middleton, Guy Daniel
Durham E-Theses
The collapse of palatial society in LBA Greece and
the postpalatial period
Middleton, Guy Daniel
How to cite:
Middleton, Guy Daniel (2008) The collapse of palatial society in LBA Greece and the postpalatial period,
Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/2900/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Office, Durham University, University Office, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
T~e Collapse of Palatial Society in 
LBA Greece and the Postpalatial 
Period 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the 
author or the university to which it was 
submitted. No quotation from it, or 
information derived from it may be 
published without the prior written 
consent of the author or university, and 
any information derived from it should be 
acknowledged. 
Guy Daniel Middleton 
PhD 
Durham University 
2008 
1 3 NOV 2008 
Volume I 
Contents 
Contents 
Volume I 
Abstract iii 
Acknowledgments iv 
Abbreviations vi 
List of figures vii 
List of tables X 
Introduction 
1. Mycenaean Greece and the collapse 9 
2. Collapse theory 53 
3. Theories of Mycenaean collapse 98 
4. The processes of collapse 177 
Volume II 
5. Settlements and population mobility in the Postpalatial period 222 
6. Postpalatial rulership, elites and social structure 292 
7. Conclusions 355 
Bibliography 390 
ll 
Abstract 
Abstract 
This thesis offers a contextualised approach to the collapse of the Mycenaean 
palace societies of mainland Greece, c.1200BC, and aspects of Mycenaean 
society in the postpalatial (LHIIIC) period. It seeks to provide a fuller 
understanding of how these palace societies collapsed by considering them in 
the context of general theories of collapse, by examining and critiquing specific 
theories developed to account for the Mycenaean collapse, and by identifying 
and using as analogues social processes at work in other historical societies that 
experienced collapse, namely the Hittites, the Western Roman Empire and the 
Maya. These processes were affected by a range of other factors, which may 
or may not have contributed to collapse at any given time, and which depended 
on individual and group motivations, contemporary conditions, and unique 
socio-historical circumstances. Some collapse theories, in particular those that 
rely on migration, are dismissed, as is the possibility of creating a generalised 
theory of collapse. In this way, while no single novel theory of Mycenaean 
collapse is developed, it is hoped that a more convincing picture of collapse, as 
a process grounded in active social relationships, is given. 
It is argued that collapse affected palatial areas and occurred over a period of 
time, but that areas without palace societies did not collapse, although they 
were affected by changing circumstances. In this context, settlement and 
mobility, as well as aspects of rulership and social structure in the postpalatial 
period are explored, and a main concern is to emphasise the differing nature of 
the evidence from areas that had been palatial and areas that had not been. 
This provides a more balanced view of postpalatial Greece, highlighting 
aspects of continuity from non-palatial areas as well as areas that had had 
palaces, and modifying a view that continuities should be sought merely from 
the archaeologically more prominent palatial Mycenaean society. It is hoped 
that a more nuanced view is offered of how continuities from palatial era 
society should be considered, and that the study may further throw some light 
on aspects of Mycenaean society before the collapse. 
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Introduction 
Introduction 
This thesis deals with the destruction and disappearance of the palaces and 
palace societies of Late Bronze Age or Mycenaean Greece c.l200BC and 
aspects of continuity and change in the subsequent Postpalatial period of the 
twelfth and eleventh centuries (LHIIIC). For reasons set out below, it is 
primarily concerned with mainland Greece and the islands but not with Crete, 
which deserves separate treatment. 
Much scholarly attention has been devoted to understanding the precise nature 
of the events and processes at work in this period and it may rightly be 
wondered why another study is necessary. In fact there are several reasons for 
attempting this. The archaeological evidence itself continues to increase, 
providing more data and allowing more precise interpretations, and existing 
data continue to be refined and interpreted. New sites or further work at 
known sites can radically alter our understanding of the period, as has been 
proved at Tiryns, Kanakia and Mitrou. Theoretical approaches also change. 
Migration theory is now largely discredited in Aegean archaeology, as is the 
status of later Greek myths as historical evidence for the LBA and postpalatial 
period. The simple equation of pots and peoples has been rejected and the 
more complex relationships of people and groups with, and their active use and 
manipulation of, material culture are now admitted. Changes in the way 
collapse is understood as a political and social process, reflected in material 
culture, within diverse and dynamic living societies have forced a move away 
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from monolithic and simplistic theories of collapse. People and groups are 
more often seen as active social participants with diverse motivations rather 
than passive victims and instances of collapse can often be seen as periods of 
social reorganisation involving the formation of new groups and the active 
formation of new identities. These changes suggest that there is scope for 
further examination of this period. 
This thesis was directly inspired by two things. The first was my introduction 
to Mycenaean Greece during the' 2ih British School at Athens Undergraduate 
Summer School, and our visits to Thebes, Orchomenos, Gla, Mycenae, Tiryns 
and Pylos. What had happened to cause the destruction of these sites and what 
happened to the society that built them? How were they connected to the more 
familiar classical Greece I had studied and the Greek myths I had grown up 
with? The second was my reading of a paper by Bryan Ward-Perkins (1997): 
'Continuitists, catastrophists and the towns of Post-Roman North Italy'. This 
paper explored the difficulty in evaluating continuity or discontinuity at urban 
sites and showed how a variety of very different interpretations could be 
constructed. These often depended on the approach taken to the evidence 
whether archaeological, textual or a combination and where the emphasis was 
placed, and the nationality and intellectual tradition as well as the theoretical 
position of the scholar. It was startling to see how such different historical 
reconstructions could be created and this had obvious implications for 
interpreting and understanding the collapse of Mycenaean Greece and what 
followed it, already burdened by a wealth of competing theories. The 
combination of this new realisation of the fragility and malleability of 
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historical interpretation, together with a wish to understand how the palaces of 
Mycenaean Greece had met their end and what happened afterwards, led to this 
research. 
A constant emphasis in this thesis, where analysis of the Greek material itself 
or theories based upon it is attempted, is the difference between palatial and 
non-palatial areas. Of course the term postpalatial has a chronological and 
social meaning, but it is applied to areas that never were palatial and in this 
way is misleading. Although there were interconnections between palatial and 
non-palatial areas, these never directly experienced the collapse of the palatial 
system and so the situation in these regions was different. While the notion of 
core and periphery has become popular in Aegean archaeology and some have 
begun to consider how these differences affected postpalatial 1 ih century 
Greece (e.g. Eder 2006), it is still common to find a basic assumption that even 
in non-palatial areas some aspects of lib century culture should be traceable 
back to palatial forms. This is notable in the discussion of rulership and the 
origins of the bas ileus of later Greece. While culture, material and otherwise, 
is not bounded by political borders and non-palatial areas shared aspects of 
material and doubtless non-material culture with palatial areas, it is not 
necessary to suggest that supposedly peripheral regions should rely merely or 
simply on the emulation of their palatial neighbours. Their inhabitants should 
be credited with a more complex agenda suited to their local circumstances, 
making active use of culture as it suited them, and after the palaces collapsed 
they no-doubt went on doing this. 
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Something must be said about the approach taken in this thesis. In the first 
place, I do not seek to offer a completely novel or original theory of the 
Mycenaean collapse or to prove that one of the existing theories is correct and 
all the others are wrong. It is likely that arriving at the truth of what actually 
happened is an impossible task. Nor do I seek to exhaustively list, catalogue, 
describe and compare the material culture of LHIIIC Greece and this is not a 
traditional survey based thesis. 2 Rather, I hope to offer a balanced and 
objective approach to Late Mycenaean society and to critically analyse the 
major collapse theories placing them in the context of general collapse theory 
and recent developments in Mycenaean archaeology. I hope to be able to show 
why some theories have more validity than others, and that in many cases there 
are in fact serious problems with the evidence. I take a broad interdisciplinary 
approach that includes historiography, social archaeology, the archaeology and 
history of parts of the Near East, Mesoamerica and Europe, as well as 
discussion and interpretation of Mycenaean archaeology itself. It is hoped that 
by using these in combination a fuller understanding of the LBA Greece, the 
Mycenaean collapse, and the postpalatial period can be achieved. 
Historical Analogy 
This thesis will make use of historical analogy to suggest problems that may 
have faced the Mycenaean palace societies and contributed to their collapse. 
These are drawn from three areas: the Hittites, the Classic Maya and the 
Western Roman Empire. Something must be said about the applicability and 
relevance of such analogies. In the first place, these societies all experienced 
2 This approach has been very recently taken for LHIIIC Middle by Marina Thomatos (2006). 
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collapse and all have been well-studied both individually and in general works 
on collapse. Of primary importance is the level and range of literary and 
textual evidence available from all three societies, which allows a far greater 
insight into the processes at work within them, as well as specific events and 
problems that they encountered. Since the Homeric poems and evidence from 
Greek myth cannot be regarded as filling this gap, and in the absence of 
equivalent evidence from Mycenaean Greece itself, analogy is a better method 
for illustrating potential difficulties facing the palace societies. 
Of the societies chosen here, two differ greatly in size and complexity from the 
Mycenaean palace societies, and only the Maya polities could offer an 
equivalence of scale, with independent, linked, and competing polities, on 
differing scales, within a zone of shared culture. Because of this, the Maya 
kingdoms perhaps offer the best direct parallels for the Mycenaean palace 
states in terms of how they may have interacted, although that is not to say that 
they collapsed for the same reasons. Nevertheless, these differences are 
unimportant here, since the features they are used to demonstrate are ones 
common to relationships between two central powers, central and local powers 
and within central powers themselves. The commonality of such features 
between societies makes the argument for the applicability of analogy stronger. 
Although the cause of the Hittite collapse is as problematic as that of the 
Mycenaean palace states, it occurred nearby and at around the same time, 
although possibly for quite different reasons. The approach taken here is not 
concerned with explaining that collapse, but with using the evidence to 
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illustrate actual difficulties that existed in successfully maintaining the integrity 
and existence of a LBA kingdom. While the collapse of the Western Roman 
Empire happened much later, and in a very different setting with its own 
unique characteristics, it is the relationships between groups that is of interest. 
Through these relationships, illustrated by textual evidence and archaeology, 
the process of collapse and transformation can be observed as one in which 
people made active choices in response to specific phenomena. 
Thus historical analogies are not used here to attempt to prove that the 
Mycenaean palace states collapsed for the same reasons as the Hittites, the 
Maya or the Western Roman Empire. The reasons for these collapses remain 
contentious, and it is not the purpose of this thesis to seek to explain them. 
Rather they are used to illustrate real and common problems faced by polities 
that collapsed, and which, although we cannot see them clearly, seem unlikely 
not to have affected the Mycenaean palace states. In all these cases, peoples, 
cultures and events may be historically specific and unique, but the similarity 
in processes, rooted as they are in quite basic human relationships and 
motivations, remain similar and make analogy a useful tool in fleshing out the 
late palatial period and the collapse of the Mycenaean palace states 
Crete 
Crete must be considered as somewhat different to the rest of Greece, since it 
had developed its own palatial culture much earlier which itself eventually 
seems to have influenced or been adopted as an influence in areas of 
Mycenaean Greece (Wardle 1994, 204-217; Rutter 2001, 145-146). This 
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palace system came to an end in uncertain circumstances (Rehak and Younger 
2001, 440-441 ). It seems that, in circumstances accompanied by widespread 
destructions, Knossos became the single palace centre in LMII where 
previously various centres had existed and some suggest Mycenaean 
involvement in this, although other reasons are equally plausible (Rehak and 
Younger 2001, 440-441; Bennet 1990, 209). Mycenaean administrations using 
Linear B existed at Knossos and Chania in LMIII, although the dating of these 
is uncertain, with some placing the Knossos tablets earlier (LMIIIA1) and/or 
later (LMIIIA2-LMIIIB early), and the Chania tablets in LMIIIB. The final 
destruction of the palace at Kllossos is thought by Popham to have occurred in 
early LMIIIA2, the standard interpretation, later in LMIIIA2, though others 
place it in early in LMIIIB (Hood 1978, 25, 243 n.14; Rehak and Younger 
2001, 384 n.5, 441-444, 452). The Linear B at Chania belongs in LMIIIA2-
LMIIIB, possibly outlasting Knossos as a palace centre (Rehak and Younger 
2001, 451; Dickinson 1994, 76). 
While this evidence does show a Mycenaean presence in Crete and the 
existence of polities that may have been independent or linked to mainland 
palaces, the continued presence of local Minoan traditions into the postpalatial 
period suggests that 'to term it 'Mycenaean' is incorrect' (Dickinson 1994, 76 
and 2006b, 116). Since what happened on Crete c.1200 and in the twelfth 
century deserves more detailed treatment than can be offered here, it will not 
be a focus of this work. 3 
3 Recent discussions include Dickinson 2006a; Wallace 2003; Rehak and Younger 2001, 458-
464, 471-473; Hatzaki 2000; Nowicki 2001, 2000, 1998; Haggis 2001, 1993. 
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Plan of the thesis 
Chapter 1 attempts a brief introduction to Mycenaean material culture, and to 
interpretations of Mycenaean society necessary to understand what collapsed, 
and to set in context the postpalatial society. A limited survey in order to 
clarify the extent and chronology of the collapse is offered. Chapter 2 reviews 
developments in general collapse theory as drawn from recent and major 
publications. It further examines recent discussion of specific examples of 
collapse to identify current trends in interpretation. Chapter 3 critically 
examines theories of the Mycenaean collapse, concentrating on major styles of 
interpretation and ending in a discussion of the present consensus. Chapter 4 
uses recent discussions of the Hittite, Maya and Roman collapses and 
continuities to suggest possible analogies for processes at work in LBA Greece. 
Chapter 5 examines the evidence for migrations and population mobility in 
postpalatial Greece, discussing settlements and sites, and noting the 
contribution of survey. Chapter 6 deals with changes in rulership and social 
structure in the postpalatial period, emphasising distinctions between areas of 
Greece that had palaces and non-palatial regions. The conclusion attempts to 
draw together the preceding discussions. 
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1 Mycenaean Greece and the collapse 
Introduction 
This chapter has two aims. The first is to offer some context to the subsequent 
discussion of collapse theory and aspects of continuity and change that form 
the bulk of this thesis. This is both necessary and desirable, since notions of 
how and why collapses occur often proceed from conclusions of how societies 
operate. In order to do this an outline of Mycenaean Greece in the palatial 
period (c.1400-1200BC) will be offered. However, it would be misleading to 
suggest that scholars agree on all aspects of what exactly Mycenaean Greece 
was, and how it worked. In fact, there remain many significant areas of 
disagreement, ranging from the degree of centralisation and power of the 
'palaces', the nature and extent of international trade and diplomacy, to 
whether the population at large, or just the rulers, were 'Greek'. These issues, 
where relevant, will also be dealt with in connection with particular collapse 
theories themselves (chapter 3). Initially then, some brief defining points 
based on Mycenaean material culture will be discussed. This will be followed 
by some comments on palaces and non-palatial regions and their interrelations. 
This allows a better assessment of collapse theories and a better understanding 
of the collapse itself. 
The second aim of this chapter is to review the evidence for destructions and 
abandonments and their chronology and synchronicity, as well as to consider 
some of the problems of demography. Destructions occurred sporadically in 
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various phases, but it is the destructions and abandonments around the end of 
LHIIIB2, c.1200BC, which are identified as the physical indication of the 
collapse, and marked the end of palatial society in Greece. Many of the issues 
raised here will be discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters. 
Mycenaean culture 
The Mycenaean region is usually agreed to be more or less that of classical 
Greece, especially the southern and central mainland (Figure 5.1; Shelmerdine 
2001a, 330 and Fig. 1; Mountjoy 1999, 13; Dickinson 2006a, 24-25 and Fig. 
2.1 ), although this also reflects modem political issues and the history of 
research in the area. However, defining Mycenaean material culture is no easy 
matter since 'there is not a single feature that could be considered typical of 
Mycenaean material culture that is equally prevalent in every part of the 
Mycenaean region, except the decorated pottery, and even this has a much 
wider range in some regions than others' (Dickinson 2006b, 115; Mountjoy 
1999, 15). Aside from the pottery, another common Mycenaean feature is the 
widespread use of chamber tombs and large tholoi 'for ruling families', 
although again there were regional differences (Mountjoy 1999, 822). 
Some areas that had once been considered something less than Mycenaean, 
such as Phocis and Locris, produced their own decorated and plain Mycenaean 
pottery and had chamber-tomb cemeteries; they also used sealstones, and so 
should be considered Mycenaean (Dickinson 2006a, 24-25; Mountjoy 1999, 
739-747). Other areas, such as inland Thessaly and Aitolo-Akamania may 
have been more mixed, although that says nothing about the ethnicity of the 
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inhabants (Dickinson 2006a, 25). In Aitolo-Akarnania there was more 
imported Mycenaean pottery although many types were not present and many 
sites had no Mycenaean pottery (Mountjoy 1999, 798). In Thessaly there 
seems to be a more Mycenaean area in the south-eastern coastal area and 
south-eastern plain, where chamber-tombs and large tholoi are found, and these 
areas seem to have had the most contact with southern Greece (Mountjoy 1999, 
822). Even so, it is perhaps not necessary to look for too much uniformity and 
standardisation. Cavanagh and Mee (1998, 77) note that although tholoi and 
chamber tombs become common in LHIIIA-B, 'pit and cist graves were still 
common' and 'if we examine regional preferences, we find that there is no 
consistency. The impression of uniformity is in fact a mirage.' 
Terminology may imply a homogenous population of 'Mycenaeans' across 
Greece, but this is not necessarily the case (Davis and Bennet 1999, 113). As 
Dickinson (in Barber 1999, 139) has pointed out, 'Mycenaeans are not a 
people. They are just what we call a culture.' The spread of Mycenaean 
pottery style and burial forms does not require any change of population, and 
certainly need not indicate anything about language or ethnicity of those who 
used them. Further, while an early form of Greek was the written language of 
the Linear B tablets, it may not have been the only language spoken even at the 
sites where it was used. In the linguistically diverse Maya cultural zone, 
Southern Classic Maya became a prestige language used widely by scribes at 
many sites, even where it was not spoken (Coe 1999, 38). Thus, even these 
apparent similarities may mask potential diversity, and a more localised world 
could be envisaged. It is 'perfectly possible that Greek only became virtually 
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the exclusive language of the southern Aegean in the course of the Postpalatial 
Period and EIA, not only in Crete but elsewhere (as must also have happened 
in the Greek-speaking parts of Cyprus)' (Dickinson 2006a, 53). 
Palaces, territories and non-palatial areas 
A general division between palatial and non-palatial areas of Mycenaean 
Greece is commonly made, although this is undoubtedly an oversimplification 
of what may have been a far more complex situation and set of relationships 
between sites of differing power, reach and influence. While efforts have been 
made to create a political geography of Mycenaean Greece (e.g. Cherry and 
Page, in Renfrew and Bahn 1996, 196; Galaty and Parkinson 1999, 5 Figure 
1.1 ), often inspired by the Homeric Catalogue of Ships, a category of evidence 
inadmissible in this context (Dickinson 1999b ), or from the archaeology, it is 
unclear whether any clear or meaningful political boundaries could be 
reconstructed for Mycenaean Greece as a whole; to do so would also ignore the 
likelihood of a dynamic situation. Part of the problem lies in the understanding 
and definition of what palaces were, their relationship with both local and more 
distant territories, and with other major centres, as well as the relative status 
and organisation of different parts of Greece. Since this thesis makes use of 
the distinction between palatial and non-palatial areas as being of importance 
in understanding the changes around 1200 and after, the subject warrants 
discussion here. 
A first point should be made about the term 'palace'. This has become the 
standard way of referring to the particular structures discussed below, generally 
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agreed to be the most significant central places of particular regwns and 
communities in terms of their social and political prominence (Galaty and 
Parkinson 1999, 5). At least some of them seem to have been the seats of 
kingly figures, although central places in different regions undoubtedly differed 
in scale and importance, as well as in layout and design. To some degree, the 
term palace may be an unfortunate one, since even the most impressive sites 
are small, especially as seen in comparison to Cretan palaces and palace 
complexes of the Near East. It is at least clear that palaces had a variety of 
functions, including being a royal residence, administrative centre, and focal 
point for ritual and feasting, as well as centres for craft production and storage 
and a flow of goods in and out. One particular difficulty is in deciding whether 
smaller centres, which shared some of the functions of larger centres, should be 
termed palaces, a problem which to some degree is one created by the 
terminology, and where any boundary should be drawn. As will become clear, 
some sites are more easily defined as palaces, whereas others may be better 
termed local centres, although this differentiation should be considered as 
primarily one of scale and complexity. 
Palaces can be defined by several criteria, but perhaps the most useful is the 
presence of a literate bureaucracy using Linear B, which certainly means 
Mycenae and Tiryns in the Argolid, Thebes in Boeotia, and Pylos in Messenia. 
As can be seen, there were relatively few of these major palace centres. 
However, inscribed sealings have also been found at Midea, indicating that it 
was an administrative centre of some kind, while uninscribed examples have 
come from the Menelaion, uniquely of a non-Linear Busing centre (Dickinson 
13 
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pers.comm.). Pottery painted with Linear B signs has been found at Mycenae, 
Tiryns, Midea, possibly the Menelaion, Eleusis, Thebes, Orchomenos, and Gla, 
but where this is imported it need not imply literacy at the site (Shelmerdine 
2001, 357). 
At least some of the major palaces, clearly Tiryns, Pylos and Mycenae, seem to 
have contained megaron units, which formed their architectural and ideological 
focus (Shelmerdine 2001 a, 350; Kilian 1988b; Wright 2006, 25). These units 
tended to be large, and could be ashlar-faced; they were divided into a porch, 
vestibule and throne room with a large circular hearth in the centre, surrounded 
by four columns; at Pylos and Tiryns a throne was present in the middle of the 
right-hand wall, which in Mycenae no longer exists due to the collapse of part 
of the building; they had plastered, sometimes decorated floors; access was 
restricted to a doorway from the vestibule; there were two columns in the 
porches and the walls were decorated with frescoes (Rutter 2000a). Of those 
sites, the architectural arrangements of the citadel and palace complex at 
Tiryns, and in particular the labyrinthine route into the heart of the upper 
citadel where the megaron lay, may be the most impressive in terms of visual 
impact and complexity. Pylos appears somewhat small in comparison, 
although size is not necessarily a good indicator of power, and the city, and/or 
palace complex, may have appeared more impressive than the remains suggest, 
at least in comparison to other sites in the region. 
At Thebes, where the modem city makes systematic excavation very difficult, 
the House of Kadmos was a major building, thought to be part of the palace; as 
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well, workshops and rooms containing Linear B indicate that a palace existed, 
but ceremonial rooms and the hypothetical megaron are not known, and the 
palace may have differed architecturally from the megaron type (Dakouri-Hild 
2001, 105). Thebes may have had circuit walls of a non-cyclopean kind 
(Shelmerdine 2001, 350 and n.l28; lakovides 1999a, 199), and it seems that 
Pylos may have had a circuit wall and monumental gateway, but the linear 
feature identified is of uncertain date (Shelmerdine 2001a, 378). The citadels 
of Mycenae, Tiryns, Midea and Gla also made extensive use of impressive 
cyclopean building techniques in fortifications, and a network of roads and 
bridges has been identified around Mycenae (Loader 1998, 27). Athens had 
notable cyclopean style fortifications, but the Acropolis was so extensively 
reused that the existence of a palace there is not certain. Teikhos Dymaion and 
Krisa were also well fortified, although they have nothing resembling a 
megaron or palace complex, but fortifications are absent from the Menelaion, 
Dimini and Orchomenos (Dickinson 2006a, 25). It seems that impressive 
fortifications and building styles were not restricted to palaces, but equally that 
not all sites, even ones of importance, appear to have had such features. At all 
sites where significant building took place, the ability to mobilise and organise 
labour, as well as design and plan sometimes complex or large-scale projects, 
is indicated. 
Orchomenos is a more difficult site to interpret, for while there is a very 
impressive tholos tomb, and the remains of fresco decoration, no megaron or 
palace complex is known, and no Linear B tablets have been found (Dickinson 
1994, 78, 91). It is often suggested that the power at Orchomenos was of 
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similar status to rival palatial Thebes, and undertook the large and complex 
project of draining the Copais Basin to create new farmland, having the fortress 
of Gla constructed there to dominate the area and store the produce grown. At 
Gla, there is also no classic megaron unit, although it is also sometimes thought 
to have been a palatial site (Shelmerdine 2001a, 340). This citadel housed a 
number of impressive structures including a pillared hall and an 'L' shaped 
residential building with a megaron-like structure at the north-west comer 
(lakovides 1983, 91-107). Unique examples of stucco work on the walls of 
many rooms sometimes includes relief decoration, and stucco fluted half-
columns were also found attached to a wall in the east wing (Iakovides 1983, 
10 1). All this, as well as the impressive walls, would seem to suggest a high 
status site. 
Iakovides (1983, 1 07) thought this 'mansion' to be a rather impersonal 
barracks or communal residence, a specialised administrative headquarters, 
rather than a royal palace and the capital of a province. Linear B tablets, which 
could throw light on the relationship between Orchomenos and Gla, have not 
been found at either site, and were not certainly in use at either. This recalls 
the difficulty in defining palaces by too strict criteria, for it suggests that non-
literate centres could nevertheless be powerful, although we should also 
remember that we may not have all the evidence and Linear B may well have 
been used, but just not found, at Orchomenos, and other sites. In this regard it 
should be noted that archaeology alone is not enough to recognise a palatial 
territory, such as Messenia and the parts of Boeotia linked to Thebes, and non-
palatial and palatial territories do not look different in themselves. Based on 
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present evidence it is impossible to conclude definitively whether Gla was an 
independent centre or, as is more often thought, was attached to Orchomenos. 
At Dimini in Thessaly, a building complex with two megarons, A and B, has 
recently been identified as a palace or administrative centre (see figure 6.11; 
Adrimi-Sismani 2006). Megaron A seems to have had a central hearth, and to 
have been fronted by a courtyard, and was flanked by storerooms and 
workshops, while Megaron B is somewhat different and appears to be 
associated with a shrine and altar. While the megarons seem comparable to 
those at major sites, particularly Megaron A, it seems there were no throne 
emplacements, and the 'palace' complex seems integrated into the town, rather 
than separated from it, as at Mycenae and Tiryns. Furthermore, the site has not 
revealed any Linear B tablets, although instances of Linear B have apparently 
been found on site and in the area, which hint at the existence of some literate 
population. One unusual example incised on a kylix sherd from Megaron B, 
and on a stone object, thought to be a weight, from Megaron A (Adrimi-
Sismani 2006, 468, 474). A possible Linear B 'inscription', which would be 
unique, has been found on the lintel of a tholos tomb in the region, north of 
Volos at Kazanaki (AR 2005, 59-60). It seems fair to conclude that the site was 
certainly of some importance and that there was a palace of some kind, which 
was presumably interacting with the other palaces and major sites to the south. 
But on the current evidence at least, it may not have had a literate bureaucracy, 
although what may be the casual use of Linear B incised on a kylix is 
interesting. It should be borne in mind though, that it need not have been a 
local who made the markings. 
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At Kanakia, on Salamis, an important 13th century complex has been 
identified, but no Linear B has been found (AR 2001, 14-15; AR 2002, 15; AR 
2005, 10). Although it has inevitably been hailed by some as 'the palace of 
Ajax', the complex is somewhat irregular, and while there were many rooms 
indicating storage and production, and even megarons apparently like those at 
Midea have been identified, it is difficult to conclude that this was a true palace 
rather than an important local centre; there is no evidence of special 
architecture or decoration that might make the buildings more noteworthy. The 
site was not insignificant though, with links overseas, and was perhaps as 
important as the Menelaion (Dickinsonpers.comm.). 
The Linear B texts allow some insight into the way that palaces bound 
territories and different locations together. The Pylos tablets, which mention 
some 4000-5000 people, and name c.240 sites in two provinces and 16 districts 
in the south-western Peloponnese, demonstrate that the palace had real reach 
into the surrounding regions, in terms of both information and the movement of 
goods (Palaima 2004a, 269). This seems to apply to Thebes as well (Palaima 
2004a, 270). Texts from Pylos and Thebes show that animals could be sent to 
the centre from outlying territories for feasting on a large scale (perhaps 1000 
or more people, on occasion), while centres sent offerings to outlying shrines 
(Palaima 2004b ). Some animals were transported over 50km to Thebes, and 
across the Euboean Gulf from Karystos and Amarynthos on Euboea, while 
Amarynthos received wool from Thebes {Palaima 2004b, 226). This testifies 
to a degree of integration that denotes significant interrelationships across 
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sometimes large distances. Thus Pylos evidently had a defined sphere of 
interest in Messenia, and Thebes had interests in southern Euboea and Boeotia, 
and perhaps even Aegina (Aravantinos 1995, 616-617; Shelmerdine 2001a, 
345 n. 94, 356; Hope Simpson 2003, 234). The interrelations of the sites in the 
Argolid, where fewer Linear B tablets have been found, are not well 
understood, although Mycenae is usually accorded primacy. The situation may 
have been complex and dynamic. 
While the texts allow a limited picture of the potential network of complex 
relationships that existed within Mycenaean palace societies, this kind of 
society was not present in all areas of mainland Greece, as noted above. In 
some areas, literate palace societies did not develop, even though significant 
local centres existed, as at the Menelaion, Dimini, Krisa, Teikhos Dymaion and 
Kanakia. It could be suggested that, if it were not for the discovery of texts at 
the major palace sites, it would be difficult or even impossible to deduce the 
existence of palace societies from the archaeology alone, and therefore to label 
some areas non-palatial is begging the question. The problems with 
Orchomenos and Gla were noted above. However, areas like Elis or Achaea 
reveal no significant or comparable sites: Teikhos Dymaion is not particularly 
big and seems to have had no lower town. The fortification of Krisa was 
evidently organised by a power of some kind but there is no palace or similar 
building, and there is no other identified power-base nearby. Indeed, it seems 
flawed logic to assume that all areas of Greece should have developed a palace 
society, since it is evident that societies of greater and lesser complexity, and 
different organisation, could exist alongside each other contemporaneously, as 
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in LBA Anatolia, and Archaic and Classical Greece, with its mix of ethnos and 
polis states. 
Given that there was in all likelihood a mixture of differently organised 
societies in LBA Greece, all of which could be called Mycenaean, through 
their use of Mycenaean material culture, it is necessary to consider how they 
related with one another. The Linear B texts reveal very little about the 
interrelations of the palaces themselves. Shelmerdine (2001, 356) notes the 
possible significance of the term reconstructed as Lakedaimonios huios ('son of 
Lakedaimon'), and three examples ofthe ethnic term lakedaimonios, on tablets 
from Thebes. While interesting, concluding anything about interregional 
relationships from this evidence is problematic, due to the assumption that it 
relates to the area of later known as Lakedaimon. It is likely that, as in other 
areas such as the Near East, systems of alliance, dependence, and rivalry 
existed between sites of differing significance. These can be envisaged as 
existing between palace centres themselves, and between palace centres and 
other sites, and it should be remembered that those at the centre of individual 
palace societies may have engaged in an 'international' society that stretched 
across Greece and perhaps further (see below), but also that they will have had 
a concern for the local situation. 'Politics' will have meant maintaining a 
balance in various spheres of activity. Furthermore, important figures and 
communities in non-palatial areas could equally have played a part in this 
world. It is perfectly plausible that dynastic marriages, hostage taking, and so 
on, played a role in articulating relationships and relative status, while guest 
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friendship rituals are possibly hinted at by some Linear B texts which refer to 
perfumed oil and textiles as xenwia (Shelmerdine 2001, 354). 
Regarding the relationship of palatial and non-palatial areas on the mainland, 
Eder has recently argued (2007, 4) that patterns of seal distribution illustrate 
widespread regional communications throughout Greece, which is surely 
correct. She has further argued that in fact 'groups of seals link the regions of 
northern, central and western Greece on various levels more or less directly to 
the palatial centres' and that these non-palatial regions were in fact 'controlled 
and exploited by the Mycenaean palaces' (Eder 2007, 5,10). However, this 
position may be somewhat extreme; Eder is perhaps overemphasising the 
power of the centres, their role in controlling trade, and the dependency of 
peripheral zones on centres for manufactured goods (Eder 2007, 2). It seems 
certain that there were links between such areas, though these could equally be 
seen as mutually beneficial and negotiated, rather than always exploitative and 
negative. The realities will undoubtedly have included a variety of scenarios 
and these presumably could have been different at different times. 
The development and organisation of Mycenaean palace societies 
Having broached some of the difficulties in defining and identifying palaces, 
their territories and non-palatial areas above, it remains to say something more 
about the development and organisation of the palace societies. It is likely that 
the process of their expansion, development and maintenance, and the 
relationships that this involved, were of importance in their collapse, as is 
discussed further in chapters 3 and 4 in particular. It should be stated initially 
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that, despite a recent comment by Postgate (Voutsaki and Killen 2001, 160) 
that, from the perspective of a Near Eastern specialist, the similarities between 
the Linear B tablets from different sites and periods would be taken as 
indicative of a unified authority, there is no evidence of a unified Mycenaean 
empire, or hegemony based at Mycenae (Thomas 1970; 1995, 354). The 
current consensus suggests there were a variety of independent polities that 
shared aspects of a common culture (e.g. Dickinson 2006a, 27-29; Wright 
2006, 25). 
Palace societies emerged in some parts of Greece by LHIIIA and continued to 
exist throughout LHIIIB (c.1400-1200). These had developed from smaller 
and less complex societies, often characterised as chiefdoms, and thus a 
distinction between earlier chiefdom type societies and later state-like societies 
is often suggested, although there is some dispute the precise nature of palace 
societies (Shelmerdine 2001a, 349; Small 1999). Bennet (1995 and 1999) has 
proposed an outline of the expansion of one palace site, Pylos, in its immediate 
area and through Messenia, as it came to dominate an area of approximately 
2000km2, incorporating and outstripping its local rivals. The extension of 
control over the site Nichoria, a local centre in its own right some distance 
away, may be indicated by the abandonment of the LHIIIA1 megaron (Unit 
IV -4a), which went out of use in LHIIIA2, the abandonment of a long used 
tholos tomb, also in LHIIIA2, and the construction of a new one (Bennet 1995, 
598-599). Similar patterns of development could be expected for other palace 
centres. 
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The creation of larger palace-based polities in some areas would have involved 
some reordering of society, perhaps often at the level of local elites or 
influential figures, and witnessed the creation of a paramount figure, the 
wanax, with wider influence, at its centre. Undoubtedly, as regions came under 
the influence of emergent centres, local communities would have been forced 
to accommodate them in some way, and this would have stimulated changes 
both at the centre and periphery. It is likely that a variety of strategies were 
used in the expansions of local centres into more regionally influential sites 
(and presumably between major sites in different regions) including diplomacy, 
negotiation and alliance, though warfare may also have played a significant 
role (Acheson 1999, 100-102). 
Since this process affected many individual communities across different parts 
of Greece, it is impossible to generalise about the way in which it was 
undertaken, but it need not be assumed always to have been a negative 
relationship from the point of view of smaller of peripheral sites. Even 
regarding Roman imperialism, it should be remembered that pre-existing local 
power structures often continued into the empire, albeit with the addition of a 
new upper tier, and much of the central governance was reactive rather than 
proactive. Thomas's comment that 'self-government continued at the king's 
command' seems appropriate, especially given more recent interpretations of 
the significance of Linear B, discussed below (Thomas 1995, 349). Indeed 
smaller sites could have sought out links with more powerful centres for many 
reasons, including gaining advantage over rivals. In any case, since the palatial 
regions were bound together by a variety of social ties, stemming from a range 
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of relationships, it would be expected that these could play a role in their 
collapse (Wright 2001 ). 
There is some debate about how palace societies were organised in terms of 
their place in the social, political and economic landscape of LBA Greece. 
Positions differ from a very minimal view of the influence of palaces and their 
integration of territories, with palaces characterised as rather superficial 
phenomena, 'clumsily grafted' onto a warrior society, and which did not 
control territories but rather focused on controlling trade routes (Sherratt 2001, 
238; Small 1999), to views usually derived from interpretations of Linear B 
tablets which suggest that they were almost totalitarian regimes (Deger-
Jalkotzy 1996, 724-725 and 1998 a and b; Betancourt 1976 and 2000). The 
minimalist picture, while rightly grounding interpretations of the scale LBA 
societies in Greece in an archaeological reality untainted by the influence of the 
Homeric epics, surely underestimates the impact of the palaces, with their 200 
year history, and development of networks and relationships in their regions. 
The evident reach of the centre into other communities shown by the Linear B 
tablets, albeit primarily from Pylos but more recently also from Thebes, should 
not be over interpreted, but nevertheless, interest in trade routes would surely 
be followed by at least a degree of interest in territories. 
On the other hand, interpretations of Linear B and its significance have 
matured since the early days of its study. It is quite clear that the palaces' 
interests, as recoverable from the tablets, were specific and selective and that 
most economic activity went on outside their bureaucratic interest (Halstead 
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1992, 1999a and 1999b ). Although some commodities flowed in to the 
palaces, they do not seem concerned with their production and collection 
(Halstead 1999b, 36), even with regard to pottery production (Whitelaw 2001) 
and there may have been no general taxation, although evidence is admittedly 
limited (Dickinson 2006a, 41). They also do not seem to have acted 'as a 
central clearing house for all goods and commodities manufactured' in their 
territories, as has sometimes been thought (Dickinson 2006a, 37). 
Although palaces undoubtedly will have acted as economic stimuli, and their 
very presence may have stimulated population growth and increased more 
complex kinds of social interaction, their direct influence may have been felt 
'by most inhabitants of the territory only intermittently and indirectly' and 
need not be seen as unduly exploitative or harsh (Palaima 2004a, 269-270; 
Dickinson 2006a, 38). Areas closer to the palace may have naturally been 
more easily influenced and better integrated into palace systems, but there may 
have been no really significant integration or overt control of outlying areas 
with which palaces were sometimes certainly connected. Such styles of 
dominance are recognisable in other cultures, such as the Maya, where the 
expansion of some centres into 'galactic polities,' i.e. major centres that won 
allegiance and tribute from other centres, did not involve direct rulership from 
the paramount centre (Demarest 2004, 215-217). 
Linear B does reveal something about the social hierarchy that existed in at 
least some palace societies. The wanax appears as the most prominent figure. 
He had the largest landholding, unique 'appointment authority' and was 
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involved in religious, economic and military affairs (Palaima 2006, 64-68). A 
figure called the lawagetas seems to have been second to the wanax although 
the precise role and relationship of this person to the wanax is unclear (Bennet 
2006, 192). Sometimes these figures are associated with 'secondary' megarons 
at palace sites, but this is speculative, given that precise functions and 
relationships are unclear. Another group related to the palace were the eqeta, 
who may have been related with the military sphere and could have been 
members of an aristocracy, the companions of the king. There seems also to be 
some distinction between members of the palace based hierarchy and those 
whose authority may be locally based, as has been suggested for the qasireu 
(Palaima 2006, 68). However, since Linear B tablets only reveal the selective 
interests of the palaces, any suppositions about less well-known figures are 
questionable, and it may be that they reveal little or nothing about local elites 
or prominent families that existed, as opposed to the roles of people in the 
specific context of the palace. That such individuals and groups did not exist is 
highly implausible. 
Wright (2006, 37) summarises the importance of palaces in their communities 
as the 'focus of political, economic, social, ideological, historic and myth-
historic practices and beliefs... a cultural cloak that the ruling elite wrap 
around themselves and in which they symbolically envelop their retinue, 
clients and commoners.' This was achieved through the active use of palaces 
as places of participation, and perhaps of exclusion, that would create and 
reinforce relationships between elites (Palaima 2004b ). 
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Palaces, then, did not control all aspects of life in the regions where they 
existed, but equally they can be expected to have had a significant impact in 
tenns of affecting the material and non-material culture of the regions of which 
they were a part. It seems that over time, particularly powerful individuals and 
groups in different regions saw it as valid and useful to compete and engage 
with each other in the construction of particular architectural fonns (the 
palaces), and in the use of particular fonns of culture (e.g. Linear B), which 
represented a particular lifestyle, and this in itself shows the significance of the 
palaces as an expression of social behaviour. Nevertheless, whilst the Linear B 
tablets, palaces, citadels and associated burials at some sites are the most 
visibly impressive remains of palatial society, most of Greece may not have 
been organised along the same lines as palace societies. 
Non-palatial societies 
Many areas of the Mycenaean world did not become palace states in LHIIIA-
B, rather 'less organised principalities, close in nature to their early Mycenaean 
predecessors, may have been nonnal in many regions' (Dickinson 1994, 78). 
Even sites such as the Menelaion and Kanakia may better fit this category. 
These areas of non-state fonnation must be considered as important as palatial 
regions in gaining a holistic and more accurate view of the diverse Mycenaean 
world. In the north, west and central Peloponnese, for example, the areas of 
Achaea, Elis and Arcadia, as well as areas north of the Gulf of Corinth, there is 
no evidence of anything approaching a palatial building complex, although 
Teikhos Dymaion and Krisa were discussed above. This has led to these areas 
being tenned peripheral to the core of the palatial zones (Eder 2007, 1-2), and 
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while this is a valid archaeological distinction, it does not mean that the 
population of these areas can be forgotten or sidelined in favour of palatial 
areas. 
Vermeule (1960a, 1) wrote that 'the Greek mainland is also dotted with less 
significant towns and villages whose role was not so direct and grand in the 
formation of policy or style, but whose remains can in some ways be more 
precisely suggestive for ordinary Mycenaean patterns of existence and for the 
course of history as it affected the common population.' Indeed, these regions 
and many of the Aegean islands (Cyclades, Dodecanese ), which were also 
Mycenaean (Deger-Jalkotzy 1998b, 105), should not be considered secondary 
to the major sites, which archaeologists have not surprisingly focussed on. The 
variability of socio-political evolution is itself a factor to be taken into account 
when considering any period of LBA Greece. Even within one culture zone, in 
this case the Mycenaean, it is not unusual to expect a variety of structures to 
coexist at different levels of complexity. 
The northern Peloponnesian region of Achaea, for example, was long 
considered an underpopulated backwater of Mycenaean culture (e.g. Vermeule 
1960a). For some time, few sites were known, but continued work increased 
their number to 70 in 1979, and pushed the chronological range back to the 
formative LHI -11, although later sites predominate (Papadopoulos 1979). It is 
now thought to have been densely populated in Mycenaean times, with 
scattered settlements and associated cemeteries (Papazoglou-Manioudaki 1994, 
199). While burials provide most of the evidence, as they do for pre-state 
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periods in palatial areas, there are notable settlement sites at Teikhos Dymaion 
and Aigeira, which have their floruit in the postpalatial period (SCIEM 2000). 
Achaea possesses early Mycenaean tholos tombs at Kallithea and Klauss, 
perhaps for local rulers, as well as many warrior burials from LHIIIC at 
Kallithea, Klauss, Lousika and two at Krini. A tomb at Krini was in use from 
LHIIIA to mid-LHIIIC, with late warrior burials, which suggests a continuity 
of stratified burials (Papazoglou-Manioudaki 1994, 199). 
The western regions of the Peloponnese, Achaea and the Ionian Islands in 
particular, as well as the Aegean islands, have often been fitted into a 
traditional culture-historical narrative that links their late Mycenaeanisation 
with supposed refugees fleeing from destroyed palatial states, and sometimes 
these narratives are linked with myths and bigger population movements 
(Vermeule 1960a, 18-19; Barber 1999, 137). However, it could more plausibly 
be suggested that these regions existed in pre-state conditions alongside palatial 
states and underwent their own continued developments and transformations. 
The evolution of socio-political complexity does not necessarily lead from 
chiefdom to statehood in all cases, or at the same time, and proximity to states 
or more complex societies does not in itself necessarily stimulate similar 
developments in all areas. Wright (1990, 48) has suggested that the formation 
of palace centred society on the mainland 'was much delayed with respect to 
the initial period of stratification observed during the Shaft Grave period.' 
This is an equally valid perspective concerning developments elsewhere and at 
different times. Rather than simplistically associating changes in Achaea or the 
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Aegean islands with palatial collapse elsewhere, i.e. through the supposed 
influx of refugees, they can be considered in light of the local regional 
development of complexity. That said, the spur to increased complexity in 
Achaea and the north-western Peloponnese, as well as the Ionian and Aegean 
islands may have been associated with changing patterns of trade, which 
themselves may have had something to do with palatial collapse (Sherratt 
2001), and this is discussed in more detail in chapter 3. Non-palatial Achaea 
enjoyed a period of prosperity during LHIIIC in stark contrast to postpalatial 
Messenia, suggesting divergent and asynchronous trajectories of development 
that could have had a variety of complex reasons (Papazoglou-Manioudaki 
1994, 200; Eder 2006, 559). 
A total landscape 
It may be best to consider Mycenaean Greece as patterned by spheres of 
influence dominated either by larger or smaller political units of greater or 
lesser complexity and reach, interacting and competing in different ways, 
rather than by fixed territorial entities with permanently defined boundaries. 
The strength and influence of palaces in particular regions may have waxed 
and waned, depending on the interrelations between central and local elites, the 
strength of individual rulers, and other factors, at any given time. Such 
fluctuations may, to some degree, be represented by at least some of the 
destructions visible in the archaeological record (see below). This is true both 
of the palaces own immediate region and more distant areas that may appear 
non-palatial. There are likely to have been many traditional relationships that 
developed over time, perhaps even between distant areas, that Linear B does 
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not mention, but which may underpin those that scholars are aware of, while 
new relationships would have been negotiated continuously (Palaima 2004a, 
300-301 ). 
Clearly, significant local sites, while smaller and less visibly complex, should 
be considered in a similar way, although they are even more difficult to discuss 
than palatial areas. Non-palatial areas and sites should not be considered as of 
secondary importance, but as peopled by equally active agents who played a 
role in the life of LBA Greece, and will in some areas at least have interacted 
with palace people. We cannot be certain what forms these relations had, but 
again, a variety of situations and relationships could be envisaged. 
It is extremely difficult to amve at any complex understanding of the 
Mycenaean societies operating in the later thirteenth century, but some 
sensitivity to variation in a total landscape is necessary. In this view, it still 
seems appropriate to make a broad definition between palatial and non-palatial 
areas and not to assume that all societies, even when they make look similar, 
operated in the same way, 
The Ahhiyawa question 
Another complex problem, connected with the status and activities of mainland 
palaces, the Aegean islands and parts of coastal Anatolia, which must be 
mentioned here, is that of Ahhiyawa. Since 1924, it has been suggested, on the 
basis of the similarity with the Homeric use of the terms 'Achaeans' for 
Greeks, that a kingdom called Ahhiya/ Ahhiyawa, with its own Great King, 
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mentioned in Hittite letters, refers to a Mycenaean Greek kingdom (Bryce 
1998, 59-60). Although this remains controversial, it seems to have become 
cautiously accepted, in part due to the increasing evidence for Mycenaean 
culture in western Anatolia, the region of contact between the Hittites and 
Ahhiyawa (Mee 1998, 142-143; Mountjoy 1998; Niemeier 1998 and 1999; 
Hope Simpson 2003). As Bryce notes (1998, 61), 'if the Ahhiyawa-
Mycenaean equation is not valid, then we must accept that there were two 
discrete Late Bronze Age civilizations with remarkably similar names, making 
their presence felt in the same region and in the same period ... it is difficult to 
write this off as coincidence'. 
The location of the centre of Ahhiyawa is significant for understanding the 
potential reach of palaces, and palatial relations with non-palatial regions, 
specifically the Aegean islands, since it is evident that 'islands', arguably the 
Dodecanese, and Millawanda, identified as Miletus, were at times under the 
influence, or even control, of the kings of Ahhiyawa from c.1300 (Niemeier 
1998; Bryce 1998, 210; Hope Simpson 2003, 217,223, 228-231). The many 
competing theories have been outlined in detail by Niemeier (1998; Figure 
1.1). 
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Figure 1.1 Hypothesised locations of Ahhiyawa. Source: Niemeier 1998, 20 Figure 3 and 
22 Figure 4. 
Mountjoy (1998, 33-45) has recently supported the idea that Ahhiyawa was a 
kingdom based on Rhodes, and including most of the Dodecanese and parts of 
mainland Anatolia. However, as yet, there is no evidence of a significant 
centre on Rhodes or Kos, which constitutes an argument against this 
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identification, and Hope Simpson (2003, 231) also doubts that they would have 
'constituted a sufficient power base for a Great King of Ahhiyawa.' 
As for the mainland, Thebes has been considered a possible location, which 
could now be considered more likely, since it evidently had interests beyond its 
own immediate territory (Hope Simpson 2003, 234). Hope Simpson (2003, 
236), however, doubts that Thebes should be ranked a 'Great Power' since it 
had a nearby rival at Orchomenos, although this ignores the possibility that 
Theban interests lay primarily overseas and to the south-east, rather than in 
expanding its home territory at the expense of its neighbour. Pylos is not 
usually considered as an option, although its small size and location in western 
Messenia should not immediately dismiss it. The existence of naval forces, 
indicated by references to rowers on the Linear B tablets, and the presence of 
people from south-western Anatolia must be taken seriously as evidence of a 
definite connection between Pylos and the eastern Aegean, the precise 
mechanisms of which remain unclear (Niemeier 1998, 40). 
The most preferred option, however, remains Mycenae, since with its evident 
wealth and cultural prominence it may be considered a special case (Hope 
Simpson 2003, 233-234; French 2005). Although the nature of relations of the 
sites within the Argolid is unclear, it may be that Mycenae was the dominant 
site in a network of interconnected polities, and it has been suggested that these 
reached out across the Aegean to influence the Dodecanese and south-western 
Anatolia (Hope Simpson 2003, 229). On Rhodes, the high proportions of 
pottery coming from the Argolid in LHIIIA2/B may reflect this, although 
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Argive pottery need not equate with Argive political control, nor imply any 
mass migration from one region to the other (Georgiadis 2004, 64). 
Voutsaki has argued for a special relationship, perhaps even in a political or 
military sense, between the Argolid and Rhodes (2001, 210-211; Sherratt 2001, 
222 n.17). Again it is important to consider the nature of control. Sherratt 
(200 1, 222-223 n.17) doubts that tight control could have been exercised at 
such a distance and suggests a more reciprocal relationship, and this seems 
more likely. Hope Simpson (2003, 230) also rightly notes 'the problems 
involved in managing, and even in maintaining, this and any other extended 
kingdom.' Such problems are demonstrated in Hittite letters relating to 
Ahhiyawa, which suggest that members of the king's family would have 
played a role in 'ruling' these distant places, although with a necessary and 
perhaps high degree of autonomy, which Miletus also had (Bryce 1998, 61, 
322; Gurney 1990, 40-41 ). 
Destructions and abandonments 
This section will give a survey of the evidence for destructions and 
abandonments from LHIIIA1 onwards, after a brief discussion of some 
chronological and terminological issues. Destructions occurred at many sites 
both major and minor throughout the palatial and postpalatial period and are 
often taken as evidence of warfare, although accidents and deliberate 
destruction for replanning are also possibilities (Dickinson 2006a, 42). Due to 
the problems of arriving at an accurate absolute chronology, it is difficult or 
impossible to give precise dates for these events, and this outline will follow 
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the relative chronology offered by ceramic classification. However, sometimes 
is difficult to be certain which particular destruction or phase a source is 
referring to, owing to sometimes vague language and the different terminology 
or phasing between sites, and the different lengths given to phases (for a 
discussion, see Mountjoy 1999, 38-41, Table II). In the later phases of LHIIIC 
there are fewer known settlements, and thus the situation is unclear, but by this 
time many of the LHIIIB settlements had been abandoned, and whatever 
settlements there were must have been smaller and main sites certainly less 
impressive, with some population groups gathered at certain centres, and others 
perhaps spread thinly across the land (see chapter 5 'The contribution of 
survey', for further discussion). 
Although the destructions associated with the collapse of Mycenaean palace 
society are traditionally those which occurred at or near the end of LHIIIB2 
ceramic phase, usually placed 'at or near the end of the 131h century BC' 
(Rutter in Deger-Jalkotzy and Zavadil 2003, 255), or c.1190/1180 (Mountjoy 
1993, 4 Table I; 1999 16-18 and Table I; Shelmerdine 2001a, Table 1), 
Mountjoy (1997, 110; 1999, 36-36, 75, 152-153) has identified a transitional 
LHIIIB2/LHIIIC Early phase in pottery at many sites including, lria, Tiryns, 
Korakou, Athens, Thorikos, Ayios Kosmas, Eutresis, Thebes, the Menelaion, 
Pylas, Nichoria and Midea. Wiener (in Deger-Jalkotzy and Zavadil2003, 246) 
has followed this, suggesting that LHIIIB production in the Argolid largely 
ended around 1215 followed by 'about a decade for IIIB-IIIC Transitional' and 
he suggests that 'the destructions of the Mycenaean palaces when IIIB-IIIC 
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Transitional pottery is in use may occur at an earlier date than is generally 
supposed.' 
Demakopoulou (2003, 91) has resisted this classification of destruction 
deposits at Midea and prefers late LHIIIB2. In fact, she sees no evidence for a 
stratigraphic LHIIIB-LHIIIC Transitional phase at any site and she cautions 
against creating new phases based purely on pottery developments rather than 
stratigraphy. Mountjoy's transitional pottery appears in both destruction and 
post-destruction deposits at Mycenae and possibly Tiryns (Dickinson 2006a, 
44). Although Wiener has taken the Transitional phase to equate to a 
chronological phase, Demakopoulou (2003, 91) notes that this is not 
necessarily implied by changing shapes and decoration. Rutter's approach (in 
Deger-Jalkotzy and Zavadil 2003, 255) is to define the end of the LHIIIB 
period by 'the major destruction-by-fire horizon that is such a pronounced 
feature of the stratification at the principal Argive citadels of Mycenae, Tiryns 
and Midea,' and for him any pottery that follows must be defined as LHIIIC 
'no matter how many LHIIIB2 survivals it may include.' He rejects the use of 
the 'cumbersome and potentially misleading 'Transitional LHIIIB2-LHIIIC 
Early" and retains the term LHIIIC Phase 1. This is followed by Gauss (in 
Deger-Jalkotzy and Zavadil2003, 253). As for the early appearance of LHIIIC 
features, Demakopoulou (2003, 91) suggests that pottery types 'hitherto 
assigned to LHIIIC Early, actually appeared earlier than had been believed, 
evidently in the latest LHIIIB2 period' and really some overlap is only to be 
expected since these are modern definitions imposed on a continuous tradition. 
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There remains the problem of relating the widespread destructions that mark 
the end of the palatial period and beginning of the postpalatial period to each 
other. Jung (in Deger-Jalkotzy and Zavadil 2003, 254) suggests that 'this 
revolutionary change ... should be recognised by a change of chronological 
labels' and this is certainly helpful. He makes the assumption that the palaces 
of the Argolid 'met their fmal destruction at approximately the same time' but 
cautions that 'to assume that all Mycenaean palaces of the Aegean and even 
other sites in remote regions (Kastanas) were destroyed within a short period of 
time, i.e. more or less contemporarily ... is surely an oversimplification', albeit 
one that would make the synchronisation of chronology easier to deal with 
(Jung in Deger-Jalkotzy and Zavadil 2003, 254). However, even to assume 
simultaneity for the destructions within the Argolid, based merely on 
proximity, may be begging the question, and perhaps unduly favours certain 
interpretations of their cause (this is discussed in more detail in chapter 3). 
Dates of individual destructions themselves are also sometimes problematic. 
The destruction of the palace at Pylos has been placed early in LHIIIB, mid-
LHIIIB late and at the end of LHIIIB and LHIIIC (Popham 1991; Mountjoy 
1997, 1 09). This difficulty follows from using pottery style to date the 
destruction, since at Pylos the more easily dated painted vessels are rare and 
seem to have features of LHIIIA2, LHIIIB and LHIIIC Early. A similar 
difficulty seems to be apparent at Nichoria, where the 'later part of the LHIIIB 
sequence ... diverges considerably from that of the Argolid', although a late 
LHIIIB2 date is likely, and Transitional LHIIIB2-LHIIIC types were present 
(Thomas 1994, 167). At Thebes too a similar problem has been encountered. 
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This is due to the difficulty in understanding the relationship of buildings on 
the acropolis, which could be either two contemporary or successive palaces 
(Demakopoulou and Konsola 1981, 25-26; Shelmerdine 2001a, 340). It seems 
that several destructions affected Thebes from LHIIIA onwards (Dakouri-Hild 
2001 ), but also it is argued that some of the Linear B tablets belong to LHIIIB2 
(Shelmerdine 2001a, 373 n.276) and that the final destruction belongs to the 
end of this phase (Dickey 2005). The final destruction of the palace at Thebes, 
followed by some LHIIIC reoccupation, should fall at the end of LHIIIB2 or in 
Transitional LHIIIB2-LHIIIC, with the Pelopidou Street archive dating to that 
phase (Shelmerdine 2001,356,373 and n.276). 
Nevertheless, some progress seems to have been made. Mountjoy (1997; 1999, 
36) argues that the palace at Pylas was destroyed somewhat later than Mycenae 
and Tiryns, since it contained material of her Transitional phase, and this has 
been accepted by Rutter and Jung (in Deger-Jalkotzy and Zavadil 2003, 254-
255), and seems correct. Further, a destruction of 'whatever in the way of a 
Mycenaean palatial establishment may once have existed on the Athenian 
Acropolis' has been argued to be roughly contemporary to that at Pylas (Rutter 
in Deger-Jalkotzy and Zavadil 2003, 255). These took place after the 
destructions in LHIIIB2 of Mycenae, Tiryns and Midea. Rutter (in Deger-
Jalkotzy and Zavadil 2003, 255) further notes that 'there is every reason to 
believe that the Menelaion in Laconia, Thebes and Orchomenos in Boeotia, 
and Dimini in Thessaly will tum out to have fallen victim to similar disasters 
within the time period marked by the destructions ... at Mycenae, Tiryns, 
Midea, Pylas and Athens.' Indeed, Adrimi-Sismani (2006, 474) has recently 
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confirmed a Transitional LHIIIB2-LHIIIC date for the destruction of Megarons 
A and B at Dimini. 
It may be that what has seemed to be an apparent simultaneity in the major 
destructions has been given too much significance, for example in Kilian's 
hypothesis (1988a, 118, 134, 137, Fig. 10) that earthquakes were responsible 
for widespread and simultaneous destructions. Destructions dated to either 
side of adjacent ceramic phases could have taken place closer together than 
destructions within a given ceramic phase. Even within the Argolid, to assume 
that a single earthquake could have simultaneously devastated every major site 
is questionable, since very local geological characteristics, as well as the 
orientation of individual buildings, will have affected the potential 
destructiveness of any seismic activity. Nevertheless, some scholars, such as 
French, do see this as possible for the destruction of Mycenae, Tiryns and 
Midea (see chapter 3). 
It is tempting and perhaps inevitable to assume that since the destructions 
appear to have been close together, and were undoubtedly significant events, 
they must therefore have been connected, and this chronological perception 
affects any collapse hypothesis. Thus Rutter (in Deger-Jalkotzy and Zavadil 
2003, 255) states 'the fiery catastrophes that marked the end of most 
Mycenaean palatial centres were not strictly contemporary, but rather extended 
over two ceramically recognisable subphases. This fact should neither surprise 
us nor cause us to alter our definitions of what we agree to be ceramically 
differentiable slices of time.' Even so, it must be recognised that these 
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destructions could have taken place over a period of some 25 years or more 
(Popham 1994, 281). 
Destructions 4 
LHIIIAl (1400-1375BC) 
Tiryns: House 49 in the west Lower Town; Mycenae: Ramp House; Phylakopi: 
Megaron; Kea: Houses A, AB, C and F; The Menelaion: Mansion 2; 
Nichoria: large building; Krisa: Building F; Athens: indicated by domestic 
pottery dumped in wells; Korakou; Pylos; 
At the end of LHIIIA1 there were several destructions at major sites, often 
following new construction, although these did not lead to the total 
abandonment of the sites (Mountjoy 1993, 11-13). At Mycenae the Ramp 
House was reconstructed, indicating some kind of prior disturbance. In the 
Lower Town at Tiryns, House 49 was abandoned and not rebuilt. The 
dumping of domestic pottery has also been taken to indicate disturbances at 
Korakou, where LHIIB pottery was dumped into the East Alley. This also 
occurred at Athens, where pottery of LHIIB/LHIIIA 1 was dumped into nearby 
wells, although normal clearing may be a perfectly valid explanation. In 
Lakonia, Mansion 2 of the Menelaion was abandoned in LHIIIA 1 and there is 
no LHIIIA2 pottery, although there is some from elsewhere on site and it was 
later reconstructed to a new plan in LHIIID, so the whole site may not have 
been abandoned (Catling 1977, 32; Dickinson pers. comm ). The large building 
at Nichoria in Messenia was also abandoned. At Pylas, there was a destruction 
4 This outline and approximate dates follow Mountjoy (1993, 11-25, 140), with additions. 
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at the palace. In Phokis, Krisa, a floor deposit of LHIIIA1 pottery in Building 
F suggests a disturbance. On Kea, at Ayia Irini several houses were destroyed, 
as was the large building beneath the megaron at Phylakopi that may belong to 
this phase (Renfrew 1978). 
LHIIIA2 (1375-1300BC) 
Mycenae: Pillar Basement/Palace; Tiryns; Thebes: House of Kadmos (?) 
Later building overlying earlier structures makes it difficult to draw 
conclusions about construction sequences during this phase (Mountjoy 1993, 
15). At the end of LHIIIA2 the Pillar Basement and possibly the palace was 
destroyed, perhaps by earthquake (Mountjoy 1993, 15; French 2002, 59-61). 
Houses outside the citadel such as Petsas' House, the Second Cyclopean 
Terrace House, the House of the Wine Merchant, and the House of Lead 
(Atreus Ridge) were also destroyed at this time. Buildings at Tiryns were 
remodelled at this time. It is also possible that the House of Kadmos at Thebes 
was destroyed late in LHIIIA2 or early in LHIIIB, while other parts of the 
Kadmeia were in use later (Dakouri-Hild 2001, 101, 106-107). At Pylas, the 
palace was remodelled during LHIIIA2 or early LHIIIB 1. At Mitrou, in the 
Euboean Gulf, there may be a destruction horizon at LHIIIA2 early, which may 
be significant in explaining the lack of evidence for LHIIIB occupation, 
although there is occupation from LHIIIC onwards, including a megaron 
(Building B) (AR 2006, 64-65). 
LHIIIBl (1300-1225BC) 
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Zygouries; Mycenae: Cult Centre, East Wing buildings, House of Oil Merchant 
and houses on Atreus Ridge such as Panaghia Houses I and II. - Earthquake 
evidence of body; Tiryns: early in IIIB 1 and mid-IIIB 
During LHIIIB destructions occurred at many sites (Mountjoy 1993, 19). In 
the Citadel at Mycenae, the newly constructed Cult Centre, Great Stair and 
East Wing Buildings (including the House of Columns and the Artisan's 
Quarters) were destroyed at the end of LHIIIB 1. Outside the citadel, the 
Panayia Houses I and II were destroyed in mid-LHIIIB, perhaps by an 
earthquake, since the body of woman crushed by falling stones was found in 
the doorway of Room 5, House I (French 1996, 51). At Tiryns there were two 
destruction phases, one early in LHIIIB 1 and the other mid-LHIIIB and, as at 
Mycenae, bodies were found under buried a wall of the early LHIIIB Building 
X (Kilian 1996, 65). There was also a destruction at the end of LHIIIB 1 at 
Katsingri in the hinterland ofTiryns (Kilian 1988a, 133). Zygouries has been 
thought to have been destroyed around this time (Mountjoy 1993, 20, 161) but 
there is a small amount of LHIIIB2 pottery present (Rutter 2000b) and reported 
activity in LHIIIC Middle (Morgan 1999, 365-366). Rutter further comments 
that both Zygouries and Tsoungiza appear to have become less intensively 
occupied after LHIIIBl, although again there was some LHIIIC Middle 
presence (Morgan 1999, 365-366). French suggests that Zygouries was 
destroyed earlier than Mycenae, and the destruction by fire was centred on a 
major building: the so-called Potter's Shop (Dickinson pers.comm.). At 
Thebes, there were destructions in several areas, the Arsenal, the Loukou plot, 
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the Lianga-Christodoulou complex and the Koroupouli workshop, which have 
been dated to the end of LHIIIB 1 (Dakouri-Hild 2001, 106-1 07). 
End LHIIIB2/beginning LHIIIC Early (1225-1190BC) 
Mycenae; Tiryns; Pylas; The Menelaion; Midea; Korakou; Thebes; Athens: 
north slope houses; Dimini: Megaron A, B and associated workrooms and 
storage areas (not earthquake (478) + IIIC early reoccupation, Adrimi-Sismani 
2006, 468, 474); Pefkakia: settlement destroyed and abandoned (Adrimi-
Sismani 2006, 476). 
The widespread destructions and abandonments that took place c.1200 mark 
the collapse of the palatial system of the previous two centuries. In the Argo lid 
and Carinthia there were destructions at Mycenae, Tiryns, Katsingri, Korakou 
and Iria (Katsingri: Kilian 1988a, 133; Korakou: Mountjoy 1993, 20; Iria: 
LHIIIC Early according to Rutter 2000b ); in Lakonia at the Menelaion; in 
Messenia, at Pylas; in Achaea, at Teikhos Dymaion; in Boeotia and Phokis, at 
Thebes, Orchomenos, Gla (lakovides 1990, 61 0) and Krisa, while the 
following sites appear to have been abandoned without destructions: Argolid 
and Carinthia: Berbati, Prosymna, Zygouries, Gonia, Tsoungiza; Lakonia: 
Ayios Stephanos; Messenia: Nichoria; Attica: Brauron; Boeotia and Phokis: 
Eutresis (Shelmerdine 2001a, 373 n.275; Morgan 1999, 365). At Korakou 
there was a major LHIIIC phase, including the multiphase House P (Dickinson 
pers.comm.). Thomas and Conant (1999, 16) note that while many buildings of 
the citadel at Mycenae were destroyed, the Granary, the North-east Extension 
and even the palace may have escaped destruction. At Dimini, megarons A 
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and B and their associated workshops and storerooms were destroyed at this 
time, as was the nearby coastal site of Pefkakia (Adrimi-Sismani 2006, 468, 
474, 476). The North Slope Houses at Athens may also have been destroyed 
(Mountjoy 1993, 20). 
LHIIIC Early (c.1190-1130) 
During LHIIIC Early there were further destructions at vanous sites. At 
Mycenae, Phase IX floor deposits were covered by fallen boulders, perhaps 
from an earthquake (French 1999, 223). Settlement in the Lower Town at 
Tiryns has at least 5 phases down to LHIIIC Middle (Maran 2002, 223). Phase 
2 is characterised by courtyard houses, which were destroyed by fire at the end 
of LHIIIC Early and some of which show curvature in the walls, which may 
indicate earthquake damage (Maran 2002, 223; Kilian 1996, 63). At Lefkandi 
the settlement (Phase 1a) was destroyed by fire, the destruction deposit being 
part of the subsequent Phase 1b (Popham and Milburn 1971, 333-334). On 
Salamis, the important site of Kanakia, with its corridor type building 
(Building 1A) paralleling others from Mycenae, Tiryns, Thebes and Dimini, 
suffered destructions and was permanently abandoned sometime during 
LHIIIC Early (Lolos 2003, 107-108). In Lokris, the site ofKynos, storerooms 
were destroyed perhaps by an earthquake, possibly indicated by later shifting in 
the walls (Dakoronia 1996, 41 ). 
LHIIIC Middle (c.1130-1070) 
At the end of LHIIIC Middle the Granary and possibly the Palace at Mycenae 
were destroyed by fire but the houses over the former cult area were not 
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harmed. In the Lower Town of Tiryns there were three destructions in this 
period, the middle one reportedly an earthquake. The final destruction at the 
end of LHIIIC Middle occurred on the Citadel and destroyed House W in the 
Lower Town. The new buildings at Lefkandi, constructed on a new aligmnent 
after the LHIIIC Early destruction were partially destroyed (Phase 2a) and 
restored (Phase 2b) but their end is uncertain (Mountjoy 1993, 140). At Kynos, 
the repaired storeroom was again damaged by fire and the site may have 
suffered a tsunami, possibly following an earthquake, reportedly not unusual 
for the area (Dakoronia 1996, 42). The buildings were repaired and used in 
LHIIIC Late and Submycenaean. 
LHIIIC Late (c.1070-1050/30) 
At Lefkandi, recent excavations seem to indicate that, contrary to what had 
previously been thought, there was no decline or abandonment of the 
settlement in the LHIIIC Late phase (Phase 3) (Lemos 2007a). Indeed, it 
seems the site was used continuously into Submycenaean and into PG. 
As this compilation of data shows, the number of destructions that occurred 
over time indicates that such events were not unusual in the Late Mycenaean 
period. However, it should be noted that the term 'destruction', can be a 
loaded one, and as noted above, buildings can be destroyed for many reasons, 
and destruction could be considered a nonnal event in the history of site use. 
Dumps of earlier material could be part of normal clearing for continued use of 
parts of a site, and partial site destructions, especially when a site has not been 
fully excavated, are difficult to interpret but need not have been catastrophic or 
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representative of hostile actions. The notable feature in terms of identifying 
the collapse of palatial Greece is that, following the destructions around the 
end of LHIIIB2 or in the Transitional LHIIIB2-LHIIIC Early phase, particular 
important sites identified as palaces were not reconstructed in the same fashion, 
or to the same extent, whereas previously they had developed in a palatial 
tradition, for example with successive megara. 
Population decline 
One of the most notable features of the postpalatial period is the apparently 
drastic drop in population. This is reflected in the number of datable sites able 
to be plotted onto distribution maps between LHIIIB and LHIIIC (see chapter 
5, Figure 5.1; Popham 1994, 282-283; Osborne 1996, 20-21). Snodgrass 
(2000, 364) noted around 320 sites occupied in the thirteenth century but only 
some 120 for the twelfth, and Desborough (1972, 18) thought the population 
reduced to a tenth of what it had been by the end of the twelfth century. 
Similarly high estimates have recently been made by Morris and Tandy 
(Dickinson 2006a, 93). Survey data, which plays a role in· determining 
population is discussed in more detail in chapter 5. Whether these estimates are 
accurate, how rapidly any reduction occurred, and whether it should be 
interpreted as catastrophic are unclear. 
Des borough ( 1972, 240) noted that 'to suppose a complete blank in habitation 
would be unnecessary and unrealistic.' Some have suggested that fewer sites 
may indicate a transition to pastoral nomadism, in which the population would 
be difficult to detect, but this seems unlikely (Dickinson 2006a, 94). This 
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argument, when not based on questionable assumptions about Dorians and 
their lifestyle (see chapter 3), is based on the apparent increase in cattle bones 
at Nichoria, but this has also been interpreted as due to elite activity or could 
simply be a local phenomenon due to the good pasture available; otherwise the 
crops grown in the postpalatial period seem to be essentially similar to those 
raised in the LBA (Foxhall 1995, 244-245, 248). Undoubtedly some of the 
reduction in sites can be ascribed to the nucleation of people at certain sites, 
but this could not compensate entirely for the supposed demographic changes, 
since most remaining sites are no bigger than in earlier phases (Dickinson 
2006a, 63). Conversely, there may also be problems in identifying small sites 
that would represent a scattered population, but there is no evidence for the 
existence of such small sites (Dickinson 2006a, 93-94). 
There may be problems with the evidence itself and the occurrence of other 
small 'dark ages' testify to this. One notable example is the sixth century 
hiatus on Crete, where temples became disused, monumental architecture and 
sculpture were largely absent, and pottery and other arts decrease in quantity, at 
least in so far as they are less archaeologically visible (Prent 1996-1997, 36). 
Many settlement sites appear to have 'skipped' this century, although the 
presence of legal inscriptions testifies to the existence of organised societies 
(Prent 1996-1997, 36, 45). Despite continuities as the archaeology becomes 
visible again, 'several distinctive characteristics of the preceding age were lost' 
(Prent 1996-1997, 45). Evidently people were present, however visible or 
invisible they are to archaeologists. 
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Ward-Perkins (2005, 142) strikes a cautious note concerning population 
decline after Roman collapse in the west, suggesting that 'we cannot take the 
apparent lack of post-Roman sites at face value, as unequivocal evidence for a 
cataclysmic collapse of population in post-Roman times. But of course the 
same evidence does not compel us to assume that population levels remained 
constant.' This applies equally to the situation in postapalatial Greece and 'it is 
very dangerous to assume that the extremely marked drops in the number of 
identifiable sites... represents a proportional drop in the population' 
(Dickinson 2006a, 70). 
Nevertheless, it seems that although as Osborne (1996, 19) suggests 'there was 
no wide-scale abandonment of the Greek peninsula' it is hard to dismiss the 
idea that the there was population decline, and indeed this is to be expected in 
the aftermath of the destruction of major local sites, which probably had 
promoted some degree of stability and population growth over and above 
subsistence levels (Dickinson 2006a, 70). Indeed, the palatial region of 
Messenia appears to have experienced the most severe depopulation, with very 
little visible activity in LHIIIC (Mountjoy 1999, 301; Dickinson 2006a, 55, 
90). Some other areas, either non-palatial regions or those more distant from 
palace centres seem to have fared somewhat better with little or no apparent 
population decline, and in Achaea and the Ionian islands an increase of 
population is often suggested (Foxhall 1995, 244; Dickinson 2006a, 64). The 
situation was different from region to region, and it may be that what we are 
often discussing is actually the tendency of groups to utilise particular aspects 
of material culture that remain visible to archaeologists. While this in itself 
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marks an important difference in habits, it is difficult to talk with any certainty 
about population levels. 
Population decline itself could have had many natural and anthropogenic 
causes, although mass emigration has been rejected here for many reasons (see 
chapters 2, 3 and 5) and has been rejected by Snodgrass (2000, 365) and others. 
In a discussion concerned with Archaic Greece, but possibly relevant here, 
Vink (1996-1997, 9) has shown that during their peak period of founding 
colonies, archaic Corinth and Eretria also produced their biggest settlement 
assemblages. Argos did not found colonies but experienced a decline in 
settlement remains, and at Athens too, settlement did not seem affected by the 
founding of colonies (Vink 1996-1997, 9). Declining settlement evidence need 
not therefore suggest mass emigration and significant settlement evidence need 
not preclude emigration. However, ancient claims that colonies were founded 
by individual cities are probably unreliable, since they appear to be later 
constructions with a political bias, and the archaeology indicates a more 
complex picture (Osborne 1996, 8-17). 
Warfare may be a better explanation, since it can explain the destruction and 
abandonment of settlements and the relocation of population (Vink 1996-1997, 
10). According to Vink (1996-1997, 3 Fig. 1, 15), the continuity demonstrated 
in settlement assemblages at archaic Corinth, which contrasts with 
discontinuities at Argos, Athens and Eretria, may be explained by the fact that 
it seems not to have been involved in a war. Warfare and instability may also 
render agriculture, or habitation of certain areas, difficult or dangerous. That 
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warfare or conflict on some level was normal in the LBA, and perhaps became 
endemic, at least in some areas, may possibly be suggested by the destructions 
outlined above. Changing settlement patterns can also be explained by 
economic changes (Vink 1996-1997, 15), and changing social practices can 
also cause a population decline, as can factors such as plague. The political 
fragmentation of collapse must in itself have been an important factor affecting 
population levels. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has attempted to giVe a brief outline of the culture and 
archaeology of late Mycenaean Greece m the palatial period. Particular 
attention has been paid to the palatial culture that developed and the socio-
political complexity of different regions in Greece. Communities in LBA 
Greece, while sharing aspects of material and presumably also non-material 
culture, chose to organise themselves in different ways. While in a few areas it 
is evident that quite powerful local kingdoms with literate bureaucracies and 
links overseas developed, and that the palaces at their centres made efforts to 
integrate outlying sites into their sphere of interest, there appears to have been 
a mix of more and less significant local centres throughout Greece. While 
buildings at sites such as the Menelaion and Kanakia are not regarded as true 
palaces, presumably they shared at least some of the 'central place' functions 
of palaces, while sites like Krisa and Teikhos Dymaion also may have 
functioned as the royal or chiefly centres of a different kind. In areas such as 
Elis, there is no positive evidence (as yet) for any major local centre of any 
kind (Dickinsonpers.comm.). It is plausible that the bigger and more complex 
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polities may have sought to extend their reach across the Aegean, although the 
existence of 'diplomatic' links between Mycenaean kingdoms and the Great 
Kingdoms of the east, the Hittites, and to a greater degree Egypt, remain 
largely speculative. 
The frequency of destructions has also been touched upon, and a list of LBA 
destructions given. While destructions were normal, and need not indicate 
anything other than rebuilding, the widespread destructions of major centres, 
palatial and non-palatial, around c1200 does suggest that they were in some 
way targeted. Finally, the apparent decline in population after c1200 was 
discussed and some possible causes outlined; further discussion of survey 
evidence is given in chapter 5. 
Inevitably many of the issues touched upon in this chapter are controversial 
and difficult to offer firm conclusions about. The approach taken here 
therefore has been very deliberately not to attempt to suggest more certainty in 
conclusions than the evidence itself warrants. While this may be frustrating, 
caution is thought preferable to overconfidence. 
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2 Collapse theory 
Introduction 
The collapse of societies has long been of interest to scholars, historians and 
the wider public, although Yoffee (2006, 132) notes that many of the beliefs 
people have had about collapse are extremely questionable, in particular those 
based on long held notions about the organic growth, maturity and decline of 
societies. Undoubtedly the increased close study of the collapse of societies 
has brought about a new recognition of its complexity. Archaeologists and 
social scientists have also committed more effort to researching collapse and 
this is marked by the increasing number of both general studies of theory and 
specialised studies of a variety of regions, not least the LBA Aegean. This 
chapter will examine the nature of collapse theory in recent archaeological and 
historical writing by critically reviewing key publications and attempting to 
discern trends in recent thought on collapse. Both general works on collapse 
and works referring to specific examples will be considered. This offers a 
broader theoretical context for the discussion of the collapse of palatial 
Mycenaean society, which follows in chapter 3, as it will be seen that many 
themes are of direct relevance. 
Notable publications in the recent discourse on collapse that will be reviewed 
here are as follows: Tainter (1988) The Collapse of Complex Societies, which 
offers a general theory making use of evidence from a number of societies, 
Yoffee and Cowgill (1988), The Collapse of Ancient States and Civilizations, 
an edited volume containing papers on theory as well as specific case-studies 
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of collapse in Mesopotamia, of the Maya, Teotihuacan, the Roman Empire and 
the Han dynasty, Ponting (1996), A Green History of the World: The 
Environment and the Collapse of Great Civilizations, and Diamond (2005) 
Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed, which makes use of 
various historical societies, as well as contemporary data. Most recently, 
Y offee (2006) has returned to the subject of collapse in Myths of the Archaic 
State: Evolution of the Earliest Cities, States, and Civilizations. 
While the above publications have been selected as significant contributions to 
the general theory of collapse, it is also possible to examine recent publications 
in specific areas that offer useful comparative models for the Mycenaean 
collapse and which also help to identify changing trends in the archaeology and 
theory of collapse more generally. Since a study of any particular collapse may 
be assisted by an interdisciplinary approach considering other examples of 
collapse, it is considered useful to review some of the most recent studies. 
These concern the collapse of the Western Roman Empire, for which there are 
three recent publications, Heather (1995 and 2005)5 The Fall of the Roman 
Empire: A New History, and Ward-Perkins (2005) The Fall of Rome and the 
End of Civilization, and the collapse of the Lowland Classic Maya. The Maya 
collapse has produced an enormous literature, but three recent publications are 
worth considering here: Lucero (2002), Gill (2000) The Great Maya Droughts 
and Webster (2002) The Fall of the Ancient Maya: Solving the Mystery of the 
Maya Collapse. Both of these fields are relevant here, not for direct 
5 Heather's 2005 book sets in a wider context his views on the collapse of the western Roman 
Empire already presented in an important article in 1995. 
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similarities between material or other aspects of culture, but because of the 
approaches taken to their collapse. 
Tainter 1988 
Joseph Tainter's Collapse of Complex Societies (1988) is a frequently cited 
volume in publications concerning collapse (Diamond 2005, 420). Tainter 
(1988, 4) defines collapse first of all as 'a rapid, significant loss of socio-
political complexity' and is thus concerned with collapse as a political process, 
albeit often one with consequences in other areas, such as economics, art and 
literature. He distinguishes collapse from weakness or decline by its rapidity, 
taking no more than a few decades, with a substantial loss of socio-political 
structure. Societies that experience collapse must have been developing 
towards or have achieved a level of complexity for one or two generations. 
Complexity is regarded as a variable on a scale and is indicated by reference to 
such things as size, specialisation of groups and individual roles and the 
mechanisms of integrating these (1988, 23). He usefully identifies (Tainter 
1988, 4) a number of manifestations of collapse that may be evident to 
differing degrees in collapsing and collapsed societies, and these will be 
returned to in the concluding chapter: 
• A lower degree of stratification and social differentiation 
• Less economic and occupational specialisation, of individuals, groups 
and territories 
• Less centralised control; that is less regulation and integration of 
diverse economic and political groups by elites 
• Less behavioural control and regimentation 
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• Less investment in the epiphenomena of complexity, such as 
monumental architecture, artistic and literary achievements etc 
• Less flow of information between individuals, between political and 
economic groups, and between a centre and its periphery 
• Less sharing, trading and redistribution of resources 
• Less overall coordination and organisation of individuals and groups 
• A smaller territory integrated within a single political unit. 
Tainter's task is to identify a general explanation of collapse, since it is a 
recurrent feature of human societies ( 1988, 5). In order to do this, he selected 
20 case studies ranging from the Western Chou, the Western Roman Empire, 
the Mycenaeans, Minoans and Hittites, to New World societies, including the 
Lowland Classic Maya, and some African examples (1988, 5-18). Brief 
narratives of their collapses are given and some general features of pre- and 
post-collapse disintegration are usefully noted (based on Renfrew 1979). As 
descriptions of potential scenarios, these seem applicable to various example of 
collapse, including the Mycenaean, and include: 
• Breakdown of central authority and control before collapse, signalled 
by revolts and provincial breakaways. Declining government revenues 
may result in an ineffective military. Foreign challengers become more 
successful. The population become more disaffected as the hierarchy 
seek to meet new challenges by mobilising resources. 
• Following disintegration, central direction fails and the centre loses 
prominence and power. It may be ransacked and abandoned. Smaller 
petty states emerge in formerly unified territories, of which the former 
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capital may be one. These states may contend for domination entailing 
a period of perpetual conflict. 
• Law and the protection of the populace are eliminated and lawlessness 
may prevail for a time before order is ultimately restored. Monumental 
construction and publicly supported art largely cease to exist. 
• Remaining populations in urban or political centres reuse architecture 
though there is little new construction and this is mostly concentrated 
on adapting existing buildings. Larger rooms may be subdivided, 
flimsy facades built and public space converted to private. Previous 
forms of ceremonialism may be continued although this is attenuated 
and former monuments are allowed to decay. Residents may use upper 
rooms and allow lower ones to deteriorate. Monuments may be used as 
sources of building materials and when buildings become 
uninhabitable, the residents move rather than reconstruct it. 
• Palaces and central storage facilities may be abandoned, along with 
centralised redistribution of goods and foodstuffs, or market exchange. 
Long distance and local trade may be markedly reduced and craft 
specialisation end or decline. Local self-sufficiency meets subsistence 
and material needs. Local styles in widely circulated goods such as 
pottery also become more common due to decreased regional 
interaction. Portable and fixed technology (e.g. hydraulic engineering 
systems) reverts to simple locally, rather than centrally, maintainable 
forms. 
• There is often rapid reduction m population, whether as cause or 
consequence. Both urban and rural populations decline and many 
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settlements are abandoned concurrently. The level of population and 
settlement may decline to that of previous centuries or millennia (after 
Tainter 1988, 19-20). 
These points are descriptive rather than explanatory, and Tainter's general 
thesis for explaining collapse can be encapsulated in the following key points 
(1988, 194). Societies exist as problem solving organisations that require 
energy for their maintenance. Increasing complexity carries with it increased 
costs per capita, while increasing investment in socio-political complexity as a 
response to problem solving often reaches a point of declining marginal 
returns. At some point maintaining or increasing complexity become 
unsustainable and collapse to a simpler level follows. In essence then, 
Tainter's explanation is an economic one. 
While Tainter's book remains an often-cited work on collapse (e.g. recently by 
Dickinson 2006a; Diamond 2005; Demarest et a/. 2004a), contains much 
useful discussion, and presents useful summaries of the indicators of collapse, 
it has not been received uncritically. Bowersock (1991) does not find its 
arguments persuasive for vanous reasons. In particular the accounts of 
individual societies and Tainter's reliance on older modem historical sources 
rather than archaeological evidence for his description of the Roman Empire, 
used as a major example of his theory of declining marginal returns (Tainter 
1988, 148-152), are problematic. As a result, there are factual errors and 
questionable generalisations, and these must affect any evaluation of his 
general thesis. This is also the case in his description of Mycenaean society, 
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which is extremely brief and general, and relies on older sources and 
perspectives. It also contains the basic error that settlement increased in the 
south-west Peloponnese after the collapse; this should surely read north-west, 
on the assumption that there was some movement into Achaea (Tainter 1988, 
10-11). 
Blanton ( 1990) is also critical of Tainter's conclusions, as well as other specific 
points. He suggests (Blanton 1990, 422) that some examples given by Tainter 
actually run counter to his thesis, and this in what Bowersock (1991, 120) 
suggests is the most original chapter of the book. For Tainter's examples of 
declining marginal returns in agriculture (Tainter 1988, 96-97), he also notes 
an over-reliance on one not unbiased publication, and a failure to mention 
conflicting data (Blanton 1990, 422). The shrinkage to survivors in post-
collapse societies is also questioned and it is noted that in fact in the Valley of 
Oaxaca, 'regional boundaries were more open during periods of relative 
political decentralization' (Blanton 1990, 422). 
In fact, Tainter's own description of China following the Western Chou 
collapse ( 1988, 6) also seems fairly positive, 'the period of conflict produced 
some of China's major philosophical, literary, and scientific achievements ... In 
addition to many technical and economic achievements, Chinese political 
thought in its classical form emerged during the worst of the breakdown'. It is 
also unclear from this example how rapid the process of collapse was, since 
weakening control is observed by Tainter over two centuries from 934BC 
ending in the death of the last Western Chou emperor and the sacking of his 
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capital in 771 BC (Tainter 1988, 6). However, according to Tainter, collapse 
should take place within a few decades (1988, 4), to distinguish it from the 
vague and difficult concepts of weakness and decline, yet this is unclear here. 
Furthermore, complex political organisation still existed smce, as Tainter 
himself points out, the Chou capital was moved east and the Eastern Chou 
dynasty resided there for over 500 years, although he observes that 'Chinese 
unity effectively collapsed' (Tainter 1988, 6). This example of collapse seems 
to rest entirely on the notion of the political unification of some regions under 
the Chou and its later breakdown, but this may in any case have been 
overstated. Higham ( 1996, 60) states 'the Zhou, even during the apogee of 
their power, never directly controlled the area nominally within their 
boundaries. Rather, great overlords who acknowledged the supremacy of the 
central ruler, exercised considerable local sway which, as the Eastern Zhou 
progressed, saw the development of increasingly independent states.' Of 
course, for Tainter collapse is, in the context of his book, solely a political 
phenomenon, but it seems clear at least that the identification of a collapse is 
sometimes a question of perspective or degree. 
As noted, Tainter's approach is essentially that of an economist, and both 
Myers ( 1989, 1 065) and Bowersock (1991, 119) observe that it follows the 
processual approaches of Renfrew and Sabloff. He focuses on internal 
mechanisms of change, and argues that economic explanations come closest to 
success in explaining collapse (Tainter 1988, 90). He dismisses mystical 
explanations out of hand, those that rely on intangibles or biological analogy, 
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but allows some partial merit to those that rely on resource depletion, new 
resources, catastrophes, insufficient response to circumstances, other complex 
societies, intruders, conflict/contradictions/mismanagement, social dysfunction, 
and chance concatenation of events, so long as they can be subsumed into a 
more general explanatory framework (Tainter 1988, 90). Diamond (2005, 420) 
notes that Tainter remained sceptical about collapse due to resource depletion 
because he thought people were unlikely not to adequately manage their 
enviromnental resources. However, individuals and groups do in fact make 
bad decisions, which may have serious effects on society, and this is in fact a 
well-known and widely discussed phenomenon in organisational theory 
(Diamond 2005, 420).6 Despite this favour shown towards economic 
explanations, claimed as 'structurally and logically superior' (Tainter 1988, 
90), Blanton (1990, 422) notes that 'in the numerous instances of collapse ... 
there is not one calculation of an average or marginal product. Instead, 
declining marginal returns to 'investment in complexity' are invoked simply 
when convenient, based largely on circumstantial evidence'. 
While Tainter should be commended for attempting to collate data from and 
compare the collapses of many societies, it is perhaps inevitable that for 
specialists his accounts will be unsatisfactory, and this casts doubt on his 
general thesis. Any attempt to produce a monolithic and universally applicable 
explanation of collapse is perhaps misguided, and does not pay attention to 
locally specific and unique situations. Furthermore, the insistence on the 
6 Sutherland 2007 (especially 70-72) presents a wide-ranging discussion of irrationality. 
Although archaeologists and historians often argue for, or attempt to interpret evidence as 
reflecting rational behaviours, individuals and groups often act irrationally for a number of 
reasons. Environmental mismanagement is only one of many such behaviours. 
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primacy of economic explanations may reflect a modem concern, and is not 
universally accepted. It must also be said that Tainter's hypothesis suffers 
from an overreliance on process and structure, as opposed to personal agency 
and individual decision making, which cannot be easily dismissed as key 
factors in the operation of societies, as well as unique historical circumstances. 
Similarly, the specific processes of collapse, how a society actually breaks 
down to a simpler level, seem secondary to advancing the particular thesis. 
Nevertheless, the work remains a stimulating contribution to collapse theory, in 
particular in its summaries of the features of collapse, and contains much that is 
of value in stimulating further thought. 
Yoffee and Cowgill1988 
This edited volume contains eleven essays, five of which are case-studies on 
Mesopotamia (Adams 1988; Yoffee 1988b), Mesoamerica (Culbert 1988; 
Millon 1988), the Roman Empire (Bowersock 1988) and China (Hsu 1988), 
while the others are theoretical and deal with the notion of collapse (Y offee 
1988a), the role of barbarians (Bronson 1988), the role of organisation 
(Kaufman 1988), continuity (Eisenstadt 1988) and a review chapter (Cowgill 
1988). This publication, like that of Tainter (1988) is aimed at an academic 
readership yet rather than aim to produce any unified or general theory of 
collapse the focus on case-studies and theoretical issues contributes to the 
discourse on collapse. Indeed, Myers (1989, 1066) notes of Tainter (1988) and 
Yoffee and Cowgill (1988) that 'the current state of the discipline seems to 
favor the more modest aims of case studies.' 
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Two chapters in particular highlight the difficulties of understanding collapse 
(Y offee 1988a; Cowgill 1988). The concept is usefully divorced from 'the 
death of great traditions (civilizations)' which should be 'dissociated from the 
failure of ancient states' (Y offee 1988a, 18). Thus there is an implicit 
acknowledgment of certain kinds of continuity despite collapse, and the 
volume focuses on political fragmentation (Y offee 1988, 15). The collapse of 
great traditions is considered to be rare, and is exampled by Mesopotamia, 
which experienced several political collapses following brief periods of unity. 
Collapsed societies such as those of the Lowland Classic Maya were part of 
great traditions which still exist in some areas, despite numerous political and 
other changes. Rather than offer a detailed review of each chapter, it is perhaps 
of most use to select aspects of Bronson's chapter on the role of barbarians in 
the fall of states, Kaufman's comments on collapse as an organizational 
problem and Eisenstadt's contribution on collapse and continuity for comment. 
Barbarians 
Bronson discusses the role of barbarians in collapses and adopts a usefully 
vague definition of states as 'any organization that exercises major political 
authority in a relatively centralized and institutionalised form over a relatively 
large and contiguous population,' which is therefore widely applicable and 
contrasts with his 'barbarians,' who are simply members of non-state political 
units in contact with states (1988, 196, 200). He also offers a definition of 
collapse that does not include coups or dynastic changes nor gradual shifts in 
socio-political habits or the ethnic make-up of elites, but is made up of 
necessarily rapid, simultaneous and substantial changes in such features 
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(Bronson 1988, 197). While admitting that states may fall for internal reasons, 
Bronson disputes the necessary relation of declines with falls, since often the 
definition of states in decline is quite subjective and his caution of the danger 
of circularity in arguments for decline and fall is important. Did all states that 
collapsed experience decline first? It may certainly be tempting for historians 
to identify a decline where a subsequent collapse is apparent, but whether this 
was in fact the case is often unclear. 
Bronson ( 1988, 198-200) rightly notes the difficulty of identifying decline and 
its causes. Particularly valuable are his comments on the evident corruption, 
inefficiency and manifold shortcomings of bureaucracies and governance 
during periods when no decline is identified, for example Restoration Britain. 
Signs that can be taken to indicate decline can thus equally be present in rising 
states, on their way to dominance. In particular, these factors are difficult to 
quantify and not clearly connected to collapse (Bronson 1988, 199). This 
sounds a note of caution against essentially economic theories of collapse, like 
that of Tainter (1988), in that what may seem like 'waste in government' or 
other seeming inefficiences may not even be relevant. 'Explanations that focus 
on bureaucratic bloat are also... suspiciously relevant to modem partisan 
political beliefs and should be received with caution on those grounds alone' 
(Bronson 1988, 199). 
More significant for Bronson (1988, 199) are the importance of successful 
military campaigns, and perhaps the avoidance of unsuccessful ones, and the 
effects of these on increasing and reducing resources. As for internal causes of 
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collapse, he notes that these include economic recessions, revolution and civil 
wars (Bronson 1988, 200). External reasons include environmental and 
epidemiological factors, as well as warfare. In Bronson's (1988, 213) view, 
barbarians are not the main cause of collapse, which he argues probably derive 
from internal factors and the actions of other states. 
Moving on to his essential argument about barbarian involvement, Bronson 
(1988, 201) suggests that it is inherently plausible that barbarians could have 
played a role in the collapse of states because they have so often been 
associated with them: 'large numbers of barbarians are much more likely to be 
conspicuously present at the time of death than either natural catastrophes or 
demonstrably unusual levels of inefficiency and corruption.' However, it is not 
clear whether this is always a cause rather than an effect of collapse, and in fact 
a range of scenarios is possible. To this end, he suggests four self-explanatory 
analogies for barbarians: 1) vultures, 2) jackals, 3) wolves and 4) tigers. Of 
these, only the tigers unilaterally cause the demise of states. Many examples of 
successful barbarian groups are discussed by Bronson and their potentially 
complex and successful organizational capacity and military skills and abilities 
is well emphasised (Bronson 1988, 202-213). It is clear that barbarians could 
field large armies, as well as be a match for the armies of states, although while 
Bronson correctly considers the conventional wisdom that 'the theoretical 
advantage of centralized over noncentralized polities is neither invariable nor 
insuperable' to be wrong, there are some problems with his argument. 
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He contends that it is cheaper for barbarians to assemble an army than for 
states (Bronson 1988, 204). While states have a variety of costs and expenses 
to account for, a barbarian war chief, on the other hand 'has none of these 
concerns. His initial expenses are minimal and the cost of maintaining his 
army non-existent' (Bronson 1988, 204). However, this surely underestimates 
the practical and logistical difficulties that would be encountered, especially by 
large groups, and the failure of a leader to ensure the well being of his group 
would undermine his authority. Dickinson (2006a, 4 7) has noted a lack of 
historical analogies for large groups of pirates able to live by raiding alone. A 
lack of institutionalised power structures could also provide an added 
destabilising factor for chiefs to contend with, and they might have greater 
problems ensuring loyalty while they were away. Furthermore, the other 
factors Bronson adduces are more concerned with advantages that barbarians 
may have had in defending themselves against states, rather than in attacking 
them, and there is a rather dubious focus on acephalous barbarian societies, 
which in any case he resolves in favour of the advantages centralised states 
probably had in mobilising resources for their defence (Bronson 1988, 205). 
Another major problem is the rather sweeping characterisation of barbarians as 
raiders, who are 'poor and aggressive' which is 'a logical consequence of their 
outside status' (Bronson 1988, 200). This conjectures a psychological 
motivation for barbarian behaviour based not on barbarians' self-image but on 
an externally ascribed identity, one which is essentially a modem convenience 
following ancient habits. This kind of view follows from classical portrayals 
of barbarians, which owe as much or more to defming the in-group rather than 
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realistically describing different peoples. It is doubtful that entire populations 
of barbarians viewed themselves only in comparison to those in state societies. 
This follows also for the notion that barbarians were somehow inherently 
warlike or aggressive in a way that those in states were not. Inhabitants of 
states like Sparta were trained and prepared for war and even in Athens most 
male citizens would have served in a military capacity at some point. But 
neither barbarians nor citizens need have been necessarily aggressive in any 
unusual sense. This, and many other characterisations of barbarians, seems 
rather based on notions culled from literary stereotypes. Also, while it is quite 
clear that the article mainly refers to the Western Roman empire and its 
barbarians, it seems that it presents no widely applicable general model, since 
there are too many specific variables concerning the nature of individual states 
and their neighbours. The only fair conclusion is hardly a surprising or novel 
one, that neighbouring populations of differing levels of complexity and/or 
lifestyle may have engaged in different levels of mutual raiding and warfare 
when it seemed appropriate to do so and this may have caused or contributed to 
collapse in some cases. 
Organisation 
Kaufman ( 1988, 219) follows up one of the points made by Bronson (1988), 
noting that the 'disintegration of overarching governmental organizations was a 
prominent feature of the process' of collapse and thus may have been a cause 
of collapse, although admitting that this is difficult to identify or to 
differentiate as cause or effect. In the first place, Kaufman (1988, 220-223) 
describes the role that government, or the organising power, would have played 
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in the daily life of individuals and society and emphasises the role of local 
figures: 'in ancient polities most regional and central officials were in all 
likelihood distant, dimly perceived figures, while community leaders were 
familiar, lifesized individuals.' Nevertheless, more centralised institutions 
played a key role in fostering the development of local areas in a diverse range 
of roles, from infrastructure projects such as dams, roads and irrigation to 
maintaining some level of security for agriculture, trade and communication to 
take place (Kaufman 1988, 220). The maintenance of these systems benefited 
the population at large and at all levels (Kaufman 1988, 221). An interesting 
point is made that, although central and local authorities would need to work 
together on specific projects, individuals: 
would not usually see direct evidence of the central structures and 
might therefore have regarded most of the governmental services and 
constraints he encountered as local. And indeed, local leaders may well 
have had broad discretion in spheres not of concern to the central 
authorities (Kaufman 1988, 221). 
This surely reflects a reality in the way that many ancient 'governments' 
operated, with a set of specific reactions, demands and targets, rather than 
broad policies, and on a much smaller scale. Indeed, it is unfortunate, if a 
necessary inconvenience, that some word other than government could not 
have been employed. 
Organisational problems would have led to various scenarios, which are classic 
statements of collapse theory (Kaufman 1988, 221 ). The pattern usually 
involves some kind of problem, e.g. with water, which leads to decreased 
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productivity and a decrease in revenue. This in tum leads to increased taxes or 
demands for production and labour so that the central authority can maintain its 
revenue and try to solve the problem. Productivity and revenue may increase, 
but the cost is a greater burden on the workforce and their increased 
resentment. If revenue does not increase and the problem is not solved, the 
central authority continues to experience difficulties that, in tum, make it less 
able to cope with further difficulties. In this scenario a spiral into catastrophe 
is envisioned, with each problem setting off other problems in tum that may 
lead to conflict between local areas themselves and between local and central 
authorities (Kaufman 1988, 222). This is reminiscent of Bronson's (1988, 197) 
analogy of a collapsing society as a broken machine, flying apart. 
Furthermore, it is argued that this would probably cause a breakdown of 
security, with neighbouring peoples and states 'tempted to invade and seize 
territory, making war a normal state of affairs in the border regions,' and these 
themselves will have had a knock-on effect both on agricultural production and 
exchange, thus Bronson's scavengers could play a role (Kaufman 1988, 222-
223; Bronson 1988, 213). 
As for causes, Kaufman (1988, 223-230) identifies both exogenous and 
endogenous factors. These are familiar enough, with exogenous factors 
including natural disasters, environmental problems, factors outside their 
boundaries, such as trade partners finding new resources, or the disruption of 
trade through war. Endogenous factors include problems in the internal 
dynamics of political structures, such as divisions between or within factions. 
These could operate on different scales, resulting in civil war or weakness and 
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inability to govern effectively. Cleavage could also occur between central and 
local authorities. Since central authorities relied on the cooperation of local 
authorities, their decision to opt out of the system would have been serious. 
Indeed, these are plausible interpretations of the failure of the imperial system 
in the Western Roman Empire (see below and chapter 4). In fact, Kaufman 
(1988, 230) is describing a systems collapse: 'any of the factors could have 
occurred independently in the first instance, but once it did, its effects rippled 
through the polity in question, tripping other factors until they were all 
activated and reinforced each other.' This inevitably suggests that polities that 
may appear to be quite resilient, stable, and long lasting, may actually have 
been quite fragile systems, and also that chance may have played a 
considerable role in their long-term survival (Kaufman 1988, 233). This 
fragility applies more to the 'overarching political entities' rather than the 
component parts that comprised them, which may have been more 'unified and 
durable,' due to the increased damage that cleavage could cause to the system 
as a whole (Kaufman 1988, 234). 
Collapse and Continuity 
Implicit in Kaufman's argument is that local organisations are more stable than 
supra-local power structures and this suggests that collapses may entail a 
degree of continuity, at least in the fact that some social relationships will 
continue. Despite the fact that many relationships may be broken, particularly 
on a supra-local level, this is certainly often the case. Eisenstadt (1988, 243) 
has offered a particularly interesting discussion, concentrating on the social 
process at work in collapse, which he suggests 'presents ... not only the end of 
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social institutions, but almost always the beginning of new ones.' In fact, 
collapse can be seen as the reformulation and restructuring of social boundaries 
(Eisenstadt 1988, 23 7). 
Emphasised in this study are the nature and dynamism of social processes and 
social systems, which are neither static nor natural, and are always 'in the 
process of being constructed' (Eisenstadt 1988, 237). Within any given 
society, the population may be involved in a variety of different systems, 
political, economic, social and ideological, and while these systems are 
connected they may change in different ways and at different speeds 
(Eisenstadt 1988, 238). These may be bound together through mechanisms of 
social control and integration 'by a combination of organizational structures 
(e.g. bureaucracies, legal symbols) and systematic restructuring - through 
processing of socialization, communication, and public and semi-public rituals' 
(Eisenstadt 1988, 239). Elites are characterised as 'institutional entrepreneurs' 
who 'compete to articulate the interests of the various groups, and so to 
mobilise their resources (Eisenstadt 1988, 240-241 ). 
This setting of social processes is also a venue for competition and conflict, 
which is inherent because of the individuals involved and the variety of 
'principles of cultural orientation' within it (Eisenstadt 1988, 241 ). Eisenstadt 
(1988, 241) thus identifies the possibility that 'antisystems' may exist or arise 
and that these may sometimes be focussed around secondary elites. The 'Stoic 
resistance' in imperial Rome may constitute one kind of anti system while 
emergent Christianity may represent another kind. These do not necessarily 
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present problems, they could in fact act to galvanise an elite system, but they 
may 'constitute, under propitious conditions, important foci of systemic 
change' (Eisenstadt 1988, 241). This can happen when power shifts occur or 
demographic patterns change, or through contacts with other external groups, 
such as barbarians or trading partners. What actually happens is not reducible 
to a pattern but depends on each specific society. Prime amongst Eisenstadt's 
(1988, 242) concerns, therefore, is that 'the investigation of collapse in ancient 
states and civilizations really entails identifying the various kinds of social 
reorganization in these types of societies and so viewing collapse as part of the 
continuous process of boundary reconstruction.' 
Discussion 
The three chapters discussed above present some very useful ideas for 
considering collapse. In particular, it is useful to highlight the nature and 
interaction of elites and governance and to set this within a dynamic social 
context that accepts a degree of faction, divided loyalties and competing 
motivations as normal (Wright 2001). The possible existence or development 
of various kinds of antisystem and their possible effects should also be borne in 
mind. It is also useful to note how problematic the notion of decline actually 
is; in particular it is difficult to identify without a degree of subjectivity or 
circular arguments. It is significant that what are sometimes identified as 
features of decline may be present in successful societies, or societies that do 
not or at least have not yet collapsed. 
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It is clear however that while these chapters sometimes seem to suggest 
generally applicable models for or descriptions of collapse, in fact this is rather 
difficult given the variety of specific factors involved, and indeed this is 
recognised by the authors. While processes and even causes and effects may 
appear to be superficially similar in any specific examples of collapse, they 
may actually have been very different in terms of what was experienced by 
people at the time. Attempting to create general models may thus be unwise 
since from the perspective of archaeology and history they tend to ignore the 
specific and real experiences of individuals and groups, which culture specific 
research rightly retains as its focus. 
Ponting 1996 
Ponting's book is aimed at the general public rather than a scholarly audience 
and its aim is to look at world history from a 'green' perspective ( 1996, xiii). It 
does not claim originality and, as with Tainter ( 1988), suffers from the author's 
reliance on secondary material referring to various societies and periods from 
remote prehistory to modem times. As a result, there are many generalisations 
that scholars may find questionable, such as the reliance on forced labour to 
create the great monuments of antiquity, such as the great pyramids of Egypt 
(Ponting 1996, 269). An example, pertinent to the Aegean and Egypt, concerns 
the Sea Peoples (Ponting 1996, 86). It is argued that a fall in food production, 
caused by lower Nile flood levels after c.1150BC caused political and social 
problems due to difficulties in supplying food to non-producers, the army in 
particular. This occurred at a time when Egypt was under external pressure 
from the Sea Peoples, who were attempting to settle in the Delta. However, the 
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Egyptians defeated the Sea Peoples attacks, so the specific point that Ponting is 
trying to make is unclear. It cannot be doubted that food shortages have caused 
problems in many societies, but before a generalised model can be created the 
extent to which particular societies were made up of dependent non-producers 
requires more detailed analysis. In the LBA Aegean, as in many other 
preindustrial societies, it is likely that the greater part of the population were 
subsistence farmers. 
Ponting distances himself from the position of Tainter and emphasises the 
effects of resource depletion and environmental mismanagement. He cites the 
difficulty in balancing the need for production and the ability of the 
environment to sustain intensive agriculture over long periods (Ponting 1996, 
87). This imbalance, he argues, caused overstretch and, focussing on 
Mesopotamia, he follows a similar line to Tainter: 'the demands of an 
increasingly complex society began to overstretch the capacity of the 
agricultural base of society to support the large superstructure that had been 
erected. In the end, the unwanted, and unexpected, side effects of what at first 
appeared to be solutions to environmental difficulties became problems 
themselves' (Ponting 1996, 87). Responses to these problems seem to have 
involved internal revolt and strain as the elite attempted to siphon off more 
produce for themselves. Ponting (1996, 87) further comments that there were 
only a few cases of the collapse of whole societies, for example the Maya, or 
wholesale abandonments of land. However, few Mayanists would now be so 
sweeping in their view of the Maya collapse, and Ponting's views follow 
Culbert (1973 cited in Ponting's Further Reading, 409; see also Culbert 1988), 
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who argued for overstretch and the failure to maintain an appropriate 
population-subsistence balance, thus increasingly intensive agriculture failed to 
cope with unexpected stresses. 
While Ponting usefully sets out to use such examples to focus present day 
readers on the effects humans have on the environment, his conclusions as 
concern historical collapse are sometimes vague. He reminds us that 
environmental degradation may, but does not always, lead to social breakdown 
(Ponting 1996, 401 ). When it does happen, it may be prolonged and with 
regard to Mesopotamia, the example cited above, he concluded that 'the 
decline and eventual collapse ... came about gradually over at least a thousand 
years' (Ponting 1996, 40 I). It is difficult to understand in this case, over such a 
prolonged period of time, exactly how this is to be regarded as an example of 
collapse, and as noted above, it is difficult to accurately identify decline, as 
opposed to chronic corruption, inefficiency or irrationality ( c.f. Yoffee 2006, 
140-160). Although undoubtedly correct in focussing attention on the 
relationship between the environment and human societies, there is no 
generally applicable theory developed. 
Diamond 2005 
Diamond (2005) combines the approaches of Tainter (1988) and Ponting 
(1996) in producing a popular yet scholarly work that attempts to incorporate 
theory, as well as detailed and up-to-date case-studies of ancient societies, and 
that has an environmental focus. For Diamond, collapse means 'a drastic 
decrease in human population size and/or political/economic/social complexity, 
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over a considerable area, for an extended time' and amongst other societies, he 
cites the collapse of Mycenaean Greece as an example of a fully-fledged 
collapse (Diamond 2005, 3). Although the book was intended to focus on 
anthropogenically caused environmental damage, he admits that he knows of 
no 'case in which a society's collapse can be attributed solely to environmental 
damage: there are always other contributing factors' (Diamond 2005, 11). 
However, despite the comment that 'it would be absurd to claim that 
environmental damage must be a major factor in all collapses ... It's obviously 
true that military or economic factors alone may suffice' (Diamond 2005, 15), 
the arguments detailed in the book retain an environmental perspective to 
which other factors are connected. Accordingly, he devised a five-point 
framework of factors that may contribute to environmentally caused collapse 
(Diamond 2005, 11): 
• Environmental damage 
• Climate change 
• Hostile neighbours 
• Friendly trade partners (all of which 'may or may not prove significant 
for a particular society') 
• Societal responses to environmental problems. 
The first two factors essentially cover human caused environmental damage 
and natural climate change. The third suggests that 'collapses for ecological 
reasons or other reasons often masquerade as military defeats' (Diamond 2005, 
13). This may be because a weakened society is no longer able to feed an army 
to hold off its enemies and is defeated and collapses. Among possible cases 
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both the Western Roman Empire and the Mycenaeans are cited, though 
Diamond (2005, 14) draws no definite conclusions here. The fourth factor 
refers to the notion of interlinked systems, whereby if a friendly trade partner is 
weakened or becomes hostile, this will have a knock-on effect, especially if 
imports are essential for maintaining either physically or ideologically 
necessary systems. The fifth factor concerns society's responses to problems, 
environmental or otherwise, in which some societies respond successfully 
whereas others do not. This final factor, involving human choice and agency 
may be regarded as an improvement on theories that are restricted to processes. 
Although the case-studies are regarded by some as the most valuable part of 
the book (e.g. Tainter 2005) they are not entirely beyond bias. Since 
Diamond's intentions are to provide a warning to the modem world (Qirko 
2005), he tends to place more emphasis on incorporating research that supports 
this into his syntheses. Like Ponting ( 1996, 1-7), he begins his case-studies 
with the story of Easter Island (Diamond 2005, 79-119), an often used parable 
of potential global catastrophe through misuse of finite resources and failure to 
respond appropriately. Indeed, like Ponting ( 1996, 7), he makes this metaphor 
explicit (Diamond 2005, 119). Kirch (2005) agrees that the historical outline is 
fairly accurate and that Diamond is right to conclude that through population 
increase and clearance of woodland for agriculture, coupled with 
environmental fragility, 'the Rapa Nui gradually followed a pathway leading to 
societal terror and collapse not because they were 'eco-vandals' but because 
they lacked critical understanding of how their island's enviromnent functioned 
and thus failed to take steps which might have averted their fate'. This is 
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perhaps not surprising since Diamond makes use of Kirch and his colleagues' 
research (Kirch 2005). However, other perspectives on Easter Island are 
equally admissible. Rainbird (2002) sets Rapa Nui in the context of other 
Pacific islands, and argues that ecodisaster and collapse really took place after 
European contact, pointing to the evidence for successful subsistence strategies 
up until 1804. Nevertheless, the comments of Qirko (2005) are pertinent when 
he states that 'Diamond's own analysis makes it clear that, in many cases, 
societies are not choosing at all but, rather, are at the mercy of processes which 
they can have no awareness of control over.' Diamond's point of seeking to 
explain the role of choice is thus vague since it is not clear why some societies 
do succeed while others do not and what role choice plays in this (McElreath 
2005). 
Another criticism levelled by several scholars concerns Diamond's choice of 
the society as a unit of analysis (Demeritt 2005; Homborg 2005). Homborg 
(2005, S94) notes an absence of the role of cultural specificities and social 
structure, which must play a part in shaping historical processes and events. 
Cultural groups like the Maya are treated as units, where more rightly they 
were independent, if interlinked, polities within a culture zone, and it is unclear 
how or to what extent these units could choose without more reference to their 
internal dynamics (Demeritt 2005, S94). On a comparative level, it is also 
questionable as to how appropriate or useful analogies between Maya kings 
and modem American CEOs or the Bush administration can be, although they 
serve the author's purpose of engaging the reader (Homborg 2005, S94). 
Tainter (2005, S98) in particular criticises the book for a lack of argumentation, 
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especially when Diamond is unable to prove that the environment has been the 
central factor in societal collapses. This failure is significant, since it was the 
author's express aim. Apart from that, Diamond's contribution to the 
scholarship on collapse is perhaps most useful for its synthesis of recent 
research on collapsed societies and for its readability, rather than any real 
theoretical advance in this field. 
Yoffee 2006 
Y offee (2006) has contributed most recently to the literature on collapse and 
suggests specific ways in which collapse must be studied. He suggests that in 
studying the rise of societies, social change is seen as 'a succession of levels of 
holistic sociocultural integration' and collapse 'requires that levels be broken 
down into institutional groupings of partly overlapping and partly opposing 
fields of action' which allow for instability as well as stability in social 
institutions (Y offee 2006, 131 ). Thus, the forces that drive social integration 
must be seen as reversible and subject to flux and this concurs with the notion 
of social groups as potential cleavage points. Yoffee (2006, 132) notes that 
collapse theorists have challenged the view that human systems tend to persist 
or expand, and have argued that early states were not necessarily m 
harmonious adjustment, nor victims of extraneous disturbances or 
developmental deviations. 
These are valuable perspectives which emphasise that emergent and early 
states were not necessarily stable or long-lasting socio-political structures and 
equally that there was no necessary need for external factors to cause their 
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collapse or failure to endure indefinitely. He further emphasises that early 
states were little understood by their occupants and were far from perfect 
institutions; they functioned with 'a good deal of bungling and by generating 
considerable conflict' (Yoffee 2006, 132). Thus states could exist whilst 
exhibiting what some would identify as factors of decline. Furthermore, 
faction and conflict of interest must be seen as dynamic factors in the rise and 
collapse of societies, and the level of objective individual or group awareness 
of how societies functioned should not be overestimated. 
Perhaps most importantly, Yoffee (2006, 134) notes that when collapse occurs, 
it does not constitute 'a total institutional breakdown'. This conclusion he 
reaches by suggesting that a neo-evolutionary paradigm, one that suggests 
holistic changes to institutions in the rise of complexity, and therefore total 
collapse, is inadequate (Yoffee 2006, 134). Particular issue is taken with 
Flannery's (1972) notion of hypercoherence, where a centralized authority 
bypasses local authorities and creates new social possibilities. These 
mechanisms can become 'pathologies' that disrupt stable systems by creating 
special systems, which then cannot cope with the same success as the previous 
stable systems. Total failure through hypercoherence happens when any part 
ofthe system fails because all the systems are so 'integrally connected' (Yoffee 
2006, 135). Other similar notions are also dispensed with. 
On the other hand, Yoffee sees utility in Simon's notion of 'near-
decomposability' (Simon 1965). Complex systems, it is argued, are 
hierachically composed of many stable lower and intermediate level units that 
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have strong horizontal but weaker vertical connections. In collapse, it tends to 
be those more strongly linked intermediate and lower level, or localised units, 
that predated the novel higher-level units, which survive. Post-collapse 
continuity, or regeneration, not necessarily identical to the collapsed fonn, is 
clearly possible, since there are social units present that can form new 
hierarchical arrangements (Y offee 2006, 13 7). This perspective seems useful 
and plausible, as, in the absence of the total annihilation of the population, and 
thus every social system, there must be continuities, and these are bound, in 
some way, to involve existing relationships. 
In contrast to an explicitly systems based approach, which may tend 'to invite 
increasingly elaborate abstractions,' Y offee (2006, 13 7) suggests that our task 
in investigating collapse is 'to delineate the patterns of social roles and 
identities that were created, manipulated, reproduced and reconfigured in 
ancient states and to understand the circumstances in which identities were 
altered and even relinquished.' Thus his approach rightly takes more account 
of the actions and motivations of individuals and groups as well as accepting 
that times of collapse may be appropriate for changes in constructing identities 
and involves appreciating that there are inherent structural tensions within 
states, for example between rival factions. However, such investigations may 
encounter problems in terms of evidence, as is the case in postpalatial 
Mycenaean Greece, although it seems possible at least to observe some 
changes in material expression. 
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So for Yoffee, collapse is never total, rather it means 'a drastic restructuring of 
social institutions, usually in the absence of a political center' (Y offee 2006, 
134). This is seen within the context of early states as experiencing tension 
between centre and periphery. Centres seek to detach political action from 
peripheries, made up of aristocracies, kin groups, peasants, craftspeople and 
merchants, which try to retain local autonomy. At the same time, centres 
recruit from peripheries independently of traditionally ascribed roles while at 
the same time, in order to command resources, it must offer something to 
peripheries, for example juridical and cultural systems or increased territory or 
goods (Yoffee 2006, 138-139). Stability occurs when this balance is successful 
for each group but instability and collapse may ensue when this balance is 
disturbed. This may happen if peripheral needs or the needs of specific groups 
are not met and the centre is unable to secure resources from the periphery. 
Thus centralised institutions may collapse when no longer supported by the 
periphery. Yoffee (2006, 140) notes that one critical factor for stability is 'the 
transformation of a loyal and personally ascribed cadre of supporters into a 
bureaucratic hierarchy in which organizational self-perpetuation is subservient 
to the establishment of political goals'. However, success in creating such a 
system does not guarantee its maintenance in the long term, which must be 
achieved by creating widespread support for the system and constantly meeting 
a range of demands from different groups. 
Yoffee's views are certainly important for considering collapse, and although 
others have adopted different approaches, his may be considered as 
representing important progress. He does not advance any general theory to 
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explain societal collapses, but rather offers a useful way of approaching the 
phenomenon, in particular as a social process, whilst offering constructive 
contextualising ideas about the notion of ancient societies themselves. These 
ideas will be returned to in the subsequent chapters. 
Recent approaches to specific examples of collapse 
The section above has focused on notable contributions to the wider field of 
collapse studies. This section will briefly examine some very recent 
approaches to the collapse of the Western Roman Empire and the Lowland 
Classic Maya. 
The Western Roman Empire 
One trend in the scholarship of the end of the Western Roman Empire noted by 
Ward-Perkins (2005, 3-10) is the increasingly positive characterisation of the 
period, which has traditionally been defined by violence, decline and fall. He 
notes that Peter Brown, in defining the period of Late Antiquity, from the third 
to eighth centuries AD, suggested that catastrophe and decay could be omitted 
from the history of the period (Ward-Perkins 2005, 4). The language used to 
describe the period has also changed and terms such as decline and crisis, 
common in the 1970s, are now rare and have been replaced by transition, 
change and transformation. Although these are shifts in terminology, they 
undoubtedly affect perceptions of collapse and characterisations of historical 
processes and events. 
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The role of barbarians has also changed, with violence and disruption 
transformed into peaceful accommodation (Ward-Perkins 2005, 5). As 
representative of this, he cites Walter Goffart (1980, 35) in particular, who 
stated that 'what we call the Fall of the Western Roman Empire was an 
imaginative experiment that got a little out of hand.' He further notes that 
much of the violence and catastrophe once associated with the collapse has 
been erased by scholars who have expanded Goffart's views, with comments 
about barbarian settlement occurring 'in a natural, organic, and generally 
eirenic manner' (Mathisen and Shanzer 2001, 1-2, quoted in Ward-Perkins 
2005, 10). 
While rightly accepting that there are positive aspects to this revlSlomsm, 
Ward-Perkins seeks to challenge this position, stating that 'the coming of the 
Gennanic peoples was very unpleasant for the Roman population, and that the 
long-term effects of the dissolution of the empire were dramatic' (2005, 10, 
180-181). In order to do this, he demonstrates through texts, that violence and 
the threat of violence was a reality of the period (Ward-Perkins 2005, 13-31). 
He also successfully demonstrates a significant decline in material living 
standards, showing that the relatively widespread prosperity of Roman times, 
indicated by such things as the common use of roof-tiles, even on low status 
agricultural buildings such as sheds in Italy, disappeared in the fifth and sixth 
centuries, when only a few elite buildings used tiles (Ward-Perkins 2005, 95, 
109). Pottery in the west also shows an equivalent picture of declining material 
standards, especially when compared to the development and diffusion of new 
styles in the east (Ward-Perkins 2005, 88-93, 104-108). Handmade and badly 
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fired wares became the norm, even for elites, and pottery was no longer 
produced or traded on a large scale in Britain and Spain (Ward-Perkins 2005, 
1 04). Other examples also reinforce the picture of significant material decline. 
Ward-Perkins (2005, 117) suggests that the collapse meant no mere recession 
or reduction of the fourth century economy, but a qualitative change to a 'very 
different and far less sophisticated entity.' He further suggests that in many 
areas the level of complexity fell to a lower level even than in pre-Roman 
times, with only isolated examples amongst elite groups (Ward-Perkins 2005, 
117-120). None of this happened at one particular point of collapse, but at 
different times and rates across the Western Empire (Ward-Perkins 2005, 123). 
In North Africa and Italy there may have been periods of decline and recovery, 
whereas in Britain complexity seems to have reduced much more rapidly with 
the withdrawal of Roman power in the early fifth century (Ward-Perkins 2005, 
128). It seems that different trajectories were possible, and that decline need 
not have been inevitable everywhere. 
According to Ward-Perkins (2005, 136), the collapse of the ancient economy 
was due to overspecialisation, a complex and interlinked system that was 
fragile and not adaptable to change. Skilled manufacturers, a sophisticated 
network of exchange, and a large number of consumers were all necessary for 
the successful continuation of this system, as was the maintenance of an 
infrastructure of coins, roads and so on. Disruption of parts of this system and 
the end of security meant its failure and a reversion to local skills and self-
sufficiency. 
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This may also have had an effect on population (Ward-Perkins 2005, 138-139). 
Survey reveals a change from a densely settled Roman landscape to one that 
was only sparsely settled in post-Roman times and evidence also seems to 
show declining urban populations. Rightly, however, Ward-Perkins (2005, 
142) notes that survey evidence is not always a reliable guide to population, 
since settlements and buildings or signs of habitation may have become 
archaeologically invisible. 
He suggests that there was no inevitability about the fall of the Western Empire 
in the fifth century, and emphasises the number and scale of military 
expeditions, some of which were successful, but all of which show that major 
projects were still possible (Ward-Perkins 2005, 57-58). Had particular 
individual events turned out differently, the history of the period could have 
been very different. Nevertheless, this suggests a fragility to the overarching 
socio-political and economic system engendered by the empire. This fits with 
the notions of early states describe by Y offee, and mentioned above. 
Peter Heather (1995; 2005) has also focussed on the fundamental role of 
Hunnic and Germanic population movements and local reactions to them in 
causing the collapse of the Western Roman Empire. Like Ward-Perkins, he 
argues that this process was one that took perhaps a century to work through 
and affected different areas at different rates. He specifically develops three 
arguments (Heather 1995, 37). Firstly, he argues that the presence of the Huns 
on the fringes of Europe caused the Germanic invasions of AD376 and 405-08 
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and that this provides a coherent explanation of Rome's frontier problems at 
this time. He then links this with the eventual deposition of Romulus 
Augustulus, since the invasions and their after-effects eroded the power of the 
state in a variety of ways, both economically and in terms of prestige and 
loyalty to the state. When the state could no longer provide, local Roman elites 
sought to deal with the new political realities created by groups with different 
political agendas, siding with the new powerful military groups or asserting 
themselves militarily and politically (Heather 1995, 22, 37). The third aspect is 
the disappearance of the Huns as a political force, leaving the Western Empire 
without outside military assistance (Heather 1995, 38). 
Heather (1995, 38-39), in opposition to Tainter (1988, 128-152), thus sees the 
collapse of the west as a 'foreign policy crisis' that created a new and different 
internal political situation to which local elites accommodated themselves and, 
like Ward-Perkins, suggests that without these events, there is 'not the slightest 
sign that the Empire would have collapsed under its own weight'. Collapse in 
this case depended on the effect of particular historical events and the way in 
which people adapted to the results of these events. 
The Lowland Classic Maya 
Differing views of the Lowland Classic Maya collapse still abound, thus only a 
brief and selective overview of recent mono- and multi-causal approaches will 
be given here. What has particularly transformed the study of the Classic 
Maya is the decipherment of their writing system, which reveals a mass of 
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specific historical data that sheds light on political and military history and 
Maya culture and society (Fash 1994, 193-195). 
Lucero (2002) has focussed on the role of water control as a central aspect of 
political power in major Maya centres, with kings monopolising artificial 
reservoirs and water sources. She argues that a reduction in the amount of 
water as a result of climate change undermined the position of rulers and the 
institution itself, and that this caused the political collapse of regional centres 
(Lucero 2002, 820). Her argument is particularly interesting because it offers a 
model that explains the variability present in the Maya collapse. Major royal 
centres such as Tikal, Calakmul and Caracol relied heavily on artificial 
reservoirs while their elites projected their ability to guarantee water supply 
and used this to maintain their position and receive tribute (Lucero 2002, 818). 
When the water supply declined, much more intensively populated royal 
centres were abandoned, but this did not necessarily affect hinterlands, where 
subsistence practices were maintained. This decline of royal centres in tum 
affected secondary centres, whose rulers participated in regional politics by 
interacting with other rulers in alliances, marriages, exchange and warfare 
(Lucero 2002, 819). At this level, there were varying responses to the collapse 
of major centres; closely linked secondary centres were largely abandoned by 
the ninth or tenth centuries AD, while other secondary centres asserted their 
independence and even prospered and the hinterlands of some collapsed 
secondary centres also continued in use. Some major centres continued 
without royal ideology. Tertiary centres tended to survive the collapse of 
major centres (Lucero 2002, 820). 
88 
2 Collapse theory 
This argument usefully applies evidence of climate change or shifting weather 
patterns to political ideology, showing how changing circumstances may have 
affected the royal ideology of leaders at major centres and the knock-on effects 
of their collapse on smaller centres that were reliant on different elite 
maintenance strategies. It is notable that royal ideology at major centres and at 
some closely connected secondary centres, where it was most closely 
associated with water control, ended, while different royal ideologies 
sometimes continued at secondary centres, and hinterlands and some other 
centres continued without royal ideology. 
Lucero (2002, 821) also gives a modified picture of population change during 
and after the collapse, usually thought to have been a period of devastating 
decline and migrations. She suggests that, in the hinterlands, many people may 
have reverted to (or continued) building non-platform houses, invisible in the 
archaeological record, and that there may have been some migration. New 
forms of community level organisation developed, and various regions, such as 
Peten Itza Lakes area, remained inhabited, although with new traditions (Rice 
and Rice 2004). Furthermore, her approach is deliberately only intended to 
provide a 'general organizational framework' rather than a model which fits 
and explains all situations of political history (Lucero 2002, 814). 
Gill (2000) has focussed on megadrought as the single exogenous cause of the 
Maya collapse. He argues that a series of megadroughts, prolonged periods of 
severely reduced rainfall, can be associated with Maya collapses around 
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AD150-200, the Classic 'hiatus' of AD530-590, the Classic collapse of the 
seventh and eighth centuries and the postclassic abandonment around AD1450. 
In the Classic collapse, he envisions crops failing and even rivers and lakes 
drying up, 'when the rains failed, the reservoirs dried up, and the people had no 
water to drink' (Gill2000, 271). Much scientific evidence has been interpreted 
to suggest droughts associated with these collapses. Hod ell et a!. ( 1995) used 
temporal variations in oxygen isotope and sediment composition in core 
samples from Lake Chichancanab, Mexico, to construct a history of climate 
change in central Yucatan. They suggest that the period from AD800-1000 
was the driest period of the last 8000 years (Rodell et al. 1995, 393). More 
recently, data derived from the titanium content of sediments in the Cariaco 
Basin of the southern Caribbean has been interpreted to show an extended dry 
period, punctuated by more intense multi-year droughts around AD81 0, 860 
and 910 (Haug et al. 2003). 
However, this evidence is problematic in its explanation of the Maya collapse, 
since it ignores the complex link between large scale and local climatic events 
(Webster 2002, 243). The evidence is used to explain the collapse in the wetter 
more fertile and better watered southern lowlands, but cannot at the same time 
explain why areas much closer to the sources of evidence (central and northern 
Yucatan), much drier and more difficult to farm, appear to have prospered 
precisely at the time of the alleged drought (Webster 2002, 244-245). 
Webster (2002) accepts that drought may have played some part in Maya 
history, but in contrast to Gill, he offers an excellent multidimensional, multi-
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causal and thus more realistic view of the Maya collapse, or collapses, which 
occurred over a long period of some 200 years. He emphasises that the 
Lowland Classic Maya 'never embraced some monolithic political or cultural 
identity that was everywhere vulnerable to some sudden disastrous 
disruption ... ' and that 'the patterns of collapse or decline are so different from 
one place to another that no single, simple cause will ever explain what 
happened to the Classic Maya ... ' (Webster 2002, 294). This is supported by 
Demarest (2004) and others (see papers in Demarest eta/. 2004a). 
The interrelations between regiOns and sites are also highlighted, so that 
collapse becomes 'a communicable phenomenon: what happened to one 
kingdom or population or local ecosystem affected others in non-random ways' 
(Webster 2002, 294). Webster also notes, importantly, that conclusions about 
the Maya collapses are conditioned by the nature of the evidence at particular 
sites, which may or may not comprise epigraphic data, palaeoenvironmental 
data, settlement and architectural data (Webster 2002, 294). Thus any apparent 
explanation is affected by the data from which it is inferred and differences in 
evidence may obscure similarity in causes; meanwhile while similar data may 
lead to similar conclusions even though actual causes of collapse could have 
been different. This is a notion applicable in a wide range of collapses. 
Webster (2002, 327ff.) himself suggests that three factors in particular 
triggered collapse. The most important of these was the vulnerability of the 
Maya population to the deterioration of agricultural and other resources 
(Webster 2002, 328-337). While sometimes being reasonably productive 
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agriculturally, there were risks, bottlenecks and limitations, related to cultural 
and environmental factors. Webster (2002, 330) notes that several areas 
experienced deforestation and erosion and experienced periodic cycles of 
growth and abandonment before the Classic collapse and that mobility was an 
early solution to this. Assuming even optimal weather conditions and land 
quality, Maya agriculturalists could produce only small surpluses. A range of 
natural hazards such as climatic variation, drought, hurricanes, locusts and 
plant disease also prevented optimal conditions, though Webster (2002, 331) 
notes that as long as populations were relatively low, the Maya survived these. 
Agricultural intensification, the use of marginal land, increased land use and 
decreased fallow time, terracing and drained fields have all been suggested as 
solutions and adaptations, and Webster (2002, 335) suggests that what may 
have been successful short-term solutions to coping with population increase 
were unsuccessful in the long-term, increasing production shortfalls and 
decreasing environmental quality. This is somewhat similar to Culbert's 
(1988) notion of overshoot, where an increasing population creates increased 
pressure on resources and carries an inherent risk if factors such as climate, 
land quality or other environmental factors change. Inevitably some of these 
factors do change since human expansion affects its local environment. 
Webster's (2002, 338-343) second factor is warfare and competition. Evidence 
for the role of warfare in the Lowland Maya area has increased dramatically 
and displaced the once widely accepted notion of the peaceful Maya and 
warfare probably played an important role in the collapse of classic Maya 
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polities (Webster 2000, 112). Warrior ideology was central to royal ideology 
and more Maya fortifications are known than for Central Mexico, an area often 
considered 'warlike' (Webster 2002, 167, 224-228). Details of particular 
campaigns and the political events that they were embedded in are revealing, 
particularly about dynastic and inter-site relations and how these could cause 
instability and promote endemic warfare and collapse. Warfare seems to have 
provided political and economic benefits for rulers and to have concerned 
control over territory as well as more directly expressed elite concerns for 
tribute and elite prisoners. It is also possible, depending on the agricultural 
situation, that demands for foodstuffs were made between groups and this may 
have been a cause of warfare (Webster 2002, 341-342). The political 
landscape of the Late Classic Maya was thus extremely fragmented, made up 
of polities of varying sizes and influence. This fragmentation, and the often-
violent rivalries that resulted, may have contributed to restrictions in land use 
in border or disputed areas, disrupting agriculture and exacerbating population 
pressure in other areas. 
The third factor that Webster (2002, 343-347) cites is the failure of kingship. 
Like Lucero (2002), Webster notes the importance ofthe ritual role of rulers in 
maintaining 'balance, order, and success in all those aspects of life that affected 
his people, most importantly food production.' Such an ideology results in the 
cultural response of 'who' not 'what' is to blame (Webster 2002, 345). This is 
most clearly demonstrated at Copan, where royal ideology and kingship 
ceased, but noble families survived for a considerable time, some up to 200 
years (Webster 2002, 311, 345). In northern Maya areas kingship continued, 
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although the style and ideology of kingship was significantly different from 
that of Classic Maya (Webster 2002, 346). Webster (2000, 112) has associated 
the failure of classic kingship with increased warfare in the late Classic period. 
Webster successfully uses case-studies of individual sites to show different 
patterns of collapse at different sites and regions and with a range of causes and 
eschews a mono-causal and monolithic approach. Furthermore, he and Lucero 
convincingly show how problems could have had socio-political consequences, 
in particular on elite ideology, and take into account the variety of evidence, 
rightly suggesting that environmental factors may have been important in some 
instances but were not the exclusive or universal causes of collapse. 
Conclusions 
It is evident that collapse theories have undergone significant shifts, not least in 
the admission of the complexity of the problem. It is possible to identify some 
current trends. Monocausal explanations and explanations that fail to take 
account of individual and group agency are no longer widely accepted and 
there has been a failure to produce meaningful generally applicable explanatory 
models, as opposed to models which describe the effects of collapse. Gill 
(2000) is a notable exception to this trend in proposing a monocausal 
exogenous reason for the collapse of the Classic Maya, but his conclusions and 
the evidence on which they are based are widely disputed. While Tainter's 
work of 1988 remains widely cited, specialists have been largely critical of its 
specific conclusions, and this may be due to the attempt to create an all-
embracing collapse hypothesis. 
94 
2 Collapse theory 
That collapses share common traits is not surprising since they involve the 
fracturing of certain established socio-political and economic relationships, 
which may lead to the formation of new identities and relationships. It is likely 
enough that similar kinds of changes may be found in the material record of 
collapsed societies. Even so, some continuity may often be apparent, 
particularly amongst the population at large and more locally based elites, and 
this may be based on preexisting social relationships. 
Most pervasive in recent approaches to collapse is the rise of environmental 
considerations, especially climate change, whether natural or anthropogenic, 
although it has a long history in certain fields, particularly in Maya and even 
Mycenaean studies. A recent article even seeks to show that abrupt natural 
climatic events were the major cause of societal collapse in general, suggesting 
that only in the present and future will anthropogenic climate change come into 
play (Weiss and Bradley 2001). This may be the current fashion, as Webster 
(2002, 239) notes, owing to an increase in palaeoclimatological data and a 
current global focus on climate and environment abuse, although Diamond 
(2005), who sought, and failed, to demonstrate a strong link between collapse 
and the environment, admitted the importance of other factors. Barbarians also 
continue to play a role in collapse, but this is now seen as a more complex 
process of interaction between different groups at different levels in society. 
They are also seen as specific to particular collapses, rather than universal to 
all. Many scholars rightly focus on human systems, as well as responses to 
pressures environmental and otherwise. 
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Y offee (2006) stressed the importance of appreciating the fluidity of identity 
and maintaining a successful balance in societies between centre and periphery. 
He demystifies collapse and sets it firmly in the context of social change and 
group interaction. Such themes were discussed successfully by Heather (1995; 
2005) and Webster (2002). Heather (1995) noted the presence of new 
powerful groups within the Western Roman Empire, which led to new 
responses and behaviours amongst local elites, thus collapsing the centralised 
imperial system. Webster (2002) pointed to the failure of kingship and the 
social responses to that, which resulted in new political realities and ideologies. 
These are the kind of features of collapse and continuity identified by 
Eisenstadt (1988). Heather (1995; 2005) Webster (2002) and Yoffee (2006) 
offer multi-causal and integrative theories and explanations of collapse which 
rely on the interrelation of specific factors including individual and group 
motivations and the competition and tensions inherent in maintaining a 
particular system. 
Another important conclusion that can be reached concerns the time span in 
which collapses occur. Heather (1995) notes that the processes of the collapse 
of the Western Roman Empire took over a century to play out, while Webster 
(2002) sees the Maya collapse as a drawn out and varied process taking place 
over some two centuries, though more rapidly in specific regions or at 
individual sites. This inevitably suggests the awkward conclusion that collapse 
is often a process, something criticised by Bowersock (1991). While this may 
be conceptually difficult, we must remember that societies are not monolithic 
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or static entities, but comprise many dynamic groups and tensions. Instances 
of collapse are both events and parts of processes, since their effects cannot be 
separated from the societies they are embedded in. This exposes the difficulty 
in terminology noted by Cowgill (1988) and suggests that the ('negative') 
process of collapse, or political fragmentation, must be seen within a context 
that admits ('positive') change and transformation. While Ward-Perkins 
(2005) criticised the overly positive spin placed on the fall of the Western 
Roman Empire and successfully demonstrated that a much poorer material 
world followed, both he and Heather (1995, 38) note that this political 
fragmentation must be seen within such a context of transformation. 
Many of the themes and issues raised in this chapter will be taken up in chapter 
3, which will discuss and analyse theories of the collapse of the Mycenaean 
palatial societies, and chapter 4, where the Hittite, Maya and Roman societies 
will be used to offer analogies for processes at work in the Mycenaean 
collapse. It will be seen that similar problems of the interpretation of collapse 
confront Aegean archaeologists. 
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3 Theories of Mycenaean collapse 
Introduction 
Schliemann's description (1880, 56-57) of the history of Mycenae suggests 
some continuity between the Mycenae of Agamemnon and the classical polis 
that sent 80 men to Thermopylae and, with Tiryns, 400 to Plataea, before the 
population was dispersed by the Argives in 468BC. In archaeological terms, 
he argued that the 'Agora', the area now known as Grave Circle A, was kept 
clear until 468BC and that debris only started accumulating in it after this date 
(Schliemann 1880, 341 ). However, he followed Pausanias and Strabo in 
observing a decline in the fortunes of Mycenae after the death of Agamemnon, 
suggesting that only 'a fearful political revolution and catastrophe can have 
prevented Orestes from becoming king' (Schliemann 1880, 56). According to 
Pausanias, the causes of this could have been the Dorian invasion or, Strabo, 
the return of the Heraclidae. Schliemann (1880, 343-344) later emphasised his 
belief that the presence of royalty at Mycenae ceased at the Dorian invasion, 
which he suggested happened much earlier than its traditional date of 11 04BC. 
In this early interpretation of the history of LBA Mycenae, Schliemann 
attempted to combine the varied Greek traditions, from Homer to later classical 
travel writers, in which he placed great faith (Schliemann 1880, 334ff.), with 
archaeological evidence, to produce a meaningful narrative. Thus a picture of 
continuity and change was established. Such attempts have continued to this 
98 
3 Theories of Mycenaean collapse 
day, although, as it will be argued, they may, for several reasons, have proved 
misleading. 
As work continued revealing the Mycenaean culture of LBA Greece, it became 
clear that significant changes occurred in its later stages, indicated by a 
seemingly simultaneous series of destructions at major sites. In the 1890s, 
Tsountas (quoted in McDonald 1967, 106-107) could write: 
The palaces ... were destroyed by fire after being so thoroughly pillaged 
that scarcely a single bit of metal was left in the ruins. Further. .. they 
were never rebuilt;... How are we to account for this sudden and final 
overthrow otherwise than by assuming a great historic crisis, which left 
these mighty cities with their magnificent palaces only heaps of 
smoking ruins? And what other crisis can this have been than the 
irruption of the Dorians? And their descent into the Peloponnese is 
traditionally dated at the very time which other considerations have led 
us to fix as the lower limit of the Mycenaean age. Had that migration 
never been recorded by the ancients nor attested by the state of the 
Peloponnese in historic times [generally an area of Doric dialect], we 
should still be led to infer it from the facts now put in evidence by the 
archaeologist's spade. 
For Tsountas, Mycenaean influence continued in some ways, although the 
coming of the Dorians 'marks the beginning of a long dark ages,' from some 
time in the twelfth century (quoted in McDonald 1967, 108, 208, 209). Petrie's 
work in Egypt synchronised the destruction of the Greek palaces with the 
Nineteenth dynasty, and provided a date of around 1200, with a subsequent 
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'Dark Age' lasting until around 700 (Morris 1997, 97). This basic 
interpretation has in one form or another remained a commonplace of 
Mycenaean and Greek archaeology to the present day and forms an 
omnipresent backdrop to all theories of Mycenaean collapse (McDonald 1967, 
407-417; Eder 1998). 
The series of destructions and abandonments around 1200BC, already noted by 
Tsountas but now including sites discovered subsequently, mark what has been 
labelled the 'Catastrophe' (Drews 1993, 4) or most recently the 'Collapse' 
(Dickinson 2006a, 24). Destructions at major sites were accompanied by the 
loss of the limited literacy that was a feature of the palatial bureaucracies, 
which had fonned the 'organizing centres of this civilization' (Dickinson in 
Hornblower and Spawforth 1996, 1014), and other palatial features including 
the distinct architectural form of the palaces themselves and the frescoes that 
decorated them (Sherratt 2001, 214-215). Skills in creating jewellery, seal 
engraving and ivory carving, as well as the production of glass and faience 
objects seem also to have been lost (Deger-Jalkotzy 1998a, 122). These are 
taken to indicate the collapse of the palatial system. 
Nevertheless, it has become increasingly clear that despite these losses, there 
was no immediate 'dark age' and the culture that followed the collapse 
remained Mycenaean (Morris 1997; Rutter 1992, 70; Dickinson 2006b, 116; 
Thomatos 2006). Twelfth century Mycenaean society, though, was 
fundamentally different in many ways. Primarily, it lacked the degree of social 
complexity that the palaces had represented in some areas, although there was 
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much variation m developmental complexity throughout the Mycenaean 
culture zone (Dickinson 1994, 78; Deger-Jalkotzy 1996, 726-727) as well as in 
Mycenaean material culture (Rutter 1992; Dickinson 2006b, 115) during the 
palatial era. The clearly elite palaces, their organisation and structure, their 
ability to mobilise and command resources for large and impressive 
architectural works, and their influence over wide regions, had no comparable 
twelfth century successors. Other areas, however, did not have these systems 
to lose. 
Quite what the collapse meant for those who experienced it is difficult to grasp. 
A variety of perspectives is possible and much depends on the chosen context, 
for when considering such matters, it must be remembered that individual 
responses may have varied widely and any modem characterisation of the 
period is subjective. Much of course depends on the theory of collapse that is 
supported; social, physical and psychological responses to catastrophic 
environmental phenomena may have differed significantly from responses to 
invasion or internecine warfare. Although they may be difficult to avoid, it 
must be borne in mind that modem characterisations are limited, subjective and 
potentially misleading. 
Despite these problems, some scholars have ventured such comments about the 
collapse. Drews ( 1993, 3) maintains a negative view of collapse in the Aegean 
and around the eastern Mediterranean, suggesting that, it: 
was one of history's most frightful turning points. For those who 
experienced it, it was a calamity ... the twelfth century ushered in a dark 
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age, which in Greece and Anatolia was not to lift for more than four 
hundred years ... Altogether the end of the Bronze Age was arguably 
the worst disaster in ancient history, even more calamitous than the 
collapse of the Western Roman Empire. 
Others, for example Muhly (1992, 70) and Deger-Jalkotzy (1996, 728), have 
seen the collapse in a more positive light, and their views are more politicised. 
For them, the collapse removed what they characterise as a heavy-handed and 
stifling palatial bureaucracy. Others note that it at least allowed different areas 
to prosper (Sherratt 2001, 234-235). 
Rutter ( 1992, 70) states that 'despite some major shifts in how people were 
distributed in the landscape and what was probably a substantial decline in the 
overall population, the Aegean world weathered the actual palatial collapse of 
ca.1200BC well enough' and Thomatos (2006) has recently demonstrated this 
for the LHIIIC period, although it has been noted that perhaps the significance 
of these shifts for people can be underemphasised. Although positive aspects 
can be found, the negative aspects of such a disruption should not be 
underestimated, for the destructions and abandonments represent events that 
were experienced by people and surely represent death, violence and 
dislocation. 
Of course, the years before c.l200 may also have been difficult, depending on 
the specific causes of collapse. It is notable that while LHIIIC Middle is now 
seen as highpoint of postpalatial Mycenaean culture (Thomatos 2006), LHIIIC 
Early may have been a more troubled and unstable time, while attempts at 
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recovery and continued destructions and abandonments throughout the lih 
century are thought to mark it generally as a less stable and perhaps more 
militaristic period than before (Dickinson 2006a, 58-61, 69-72). It is likely that 
in some areas the significant destructions, movement of population away from 
previously occupied sites and changes in the structures and traditions of life 
resulted in negative psychological effects, which may have been exacerbated 
by living in the ruins of largely abandoned and run-down areas (Dickinson 
2006a, 66, 72). It is highly significant that the palace system that had operated 
for perhaps two centuries was not reconstructed, even in LHIIIC Middle, and 
Deger-Jalkotzy (1998a, 122) states that 'the Mycenaeans of LHIIIC were either 
not able or not willing to uphold the high cultural achievements of the 
preceding periods.' 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the main theories developed to account 
for the collapse itself. Several syntheses dealing with these exist, notably 
Drews (1993, 33-93), Rutter (2000b) Shelmerdine (200la, 374-376) and 
Dickinson (2006a, 43-57), but all support different reasons and differ in their 
final conclusions. Drews (1993, 97-225) sees changes in warfare as 
responsible, Rutter (1975; 1990) argues for invaders from outside the Aegean, 
Shelmerdine (2001a, 376) favours systems collapse, while Dickinson (2006a, 
54-56) notes a variety of likely factors that may have acted in combination. 
Explanations should seek to deal with several key questions that determine the 
nature of the collapse itself, primarily the cause of the destructions and 
abandonments, and why the palaces were not rebuilt and the system they 
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represented came to an end while much of Mycenaean culture continued 
(Shelmerdine 2001a, 376). The theories will be dealt with thematically here, 
since many authors have taken similar approaches, but even so these divisions 
are broad, since many explanations include reference to more than one factor 
and it is considered unlikely that one single factor was to blame. A degree of 
overlap may be inevitable. 
Economic Explanations 
Economic arguments for the collapse of palatial society have been and remain 
popular. A variety of approaches have been adopted and two main styles of 
argument appear. The first strand is based on external trade factors, the second 
on the internal organisational style of palace states themselves. To both these 
approaches other factors are usually added, such as the actions of particular 
groups, the climate or the occurrence of natural disasters. Often with these 
additions, an economic argument is extended into a hypothesis of system 
collapse, where problems in one part of society affect the whole, so this will 
merit discussion here. It may be noted initially that these approaches suggest 
that scholars hold quite different views of the palace societies themselves and 
their success, which inevitably affects any conclusions they make concerning 
the collapse. There is also a danger in arguing backwards from the collapse to 
suggest that it was somehow inevitable or probable, and fitting the available 
evidence into such a model. 
Vermeule ( 1960b) argued that the Aegean trade was disrupted in the late 13th 
century by the incoming 'Sea Peoples' and that this disruption, more than any 
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invasion or migration, was responsible for the collapse. However, this assumes 
that the palaces were reliant on international trade for their survival and that 
such a disruption occurred. While the palaces may have relied on controlling 
access to prestige items from overseas to reinforce their own position, it is far 
from certain that the 'Sea Peoples' of the Egyptian texts were active in the 
Aegean itself. The Aegean islands, arguably most vulnerable to such 
problems, do not provide the evidence of disruption that could be expected in 
such a scenario (Vlachopoulos 1998; see chapter 5 for a fuller discussion of the 
Sea Peoples and the Aegean islands). It is often argued that there was an 
Aegean component to the Sea Peoples, but the increased mobility, which is 
often suggested for post-collapse Greece and the Aegean, may be more a 
consequence of collapse than its cause (Sandars 1978, 200-201). 
Furthermore, if some part of the Sea Peoples were Greek, it is also unclear why 
they should have undertaken such a systematic destruction of the palaces, and 
why the palaces did not recover. While it is fair to imagine some battles could 
have been lost, elites were not above leaving their capitals and maintaining 
themselves elsewhere until it was safe to return, as the Hittite kings did (see 
chapter 4). Unless we imagine total annihilation, it is hard to credit this view. 
Although they are often characterised as 'aggressive, well-armed, efficient and 
ruthless raiders' (Popham 1994, 228), this owes much to the development of 
historical factoids about the Sea Peoples rather than the limited evidence itself. 
This traditional view of the Sea Peoples, their origins and role in the Aegean, 
based on difficult and often highly circumstantial evidence is highly 
questionable (Dickinson 2006a, 47). 
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Even if we accept the existence of piracy and raiding, neither of which are 
implausible, it has been noted that 'land-raiders and pirates in the Aegean and 
elsewhere have historically tended to operate in relatively small groups, whose 
basic tactic would be fast sweeps to gather up what could easily be taken, 
whether human captives, livestock or portable loot' (Dickinson 2006a, 48). 
Palaces would have been capable of mounting some defence, and naval 
arrangements of some kind at Pylos are hypothesised from the Linear B tablets, 
but would be expected anyway, and even the reference to enemy ships causing 
great destruction at Ugarit show that this happened because Ugarit's ships and 
military were in fact absent (Bryce 1998, 367). It is questionable to what 
extent such groups could have systematically disrupted trade to the extent that 
palace societies would have been unable to function. Even though the literary 
evidence highlights the existence of such groups at particular times and places, 
it might be expected that they were a normal and ever present feature, and in 
fact they would have been able to make a better living when trade was good. 
The view of sea borne opportunists in the Odyssey in fact suggests that there 
was perhaps sometimes little difference between traders and pirates (3.72-74). 
It seems unlikely that there was any unusual large-scale sea borne disruption 
within the Aegean, although Amarna Letter 38 shows that elsewhere in the 
Eastern Mediterranean there was sea borne raiding in the LBA (Moran 1992, 
111; Bryce 1998, 56 and n.24). Iakovides (cited in Rutter 2000b) 
acknowledged this and argued that it was this disruption of trade in the eastern 
Mediterranean that was responsible for the collapse of the palaces. If it is 
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accepted that Ahhiyawa was a Mycenaean kingdom, then there is some 
indication that the Hittites in fact tried to ban trade between a part of 
Mycenaean Greece and Assyria at some time towards the end of the thirteenth 
century (Bryce 1998, 343). Depending on the interpretation of this, and if such 
a ban were successful, it need not have affected the whole of Mycenaean 
Greece, nor trade that was in the hands of intermediaries. Indeed, many argue 
that the Mycenaeans themselves did not play a significant role in international 
trade, much of which may have been in the hands of Cypriots (Sherratt 2001, 
222-224). 
Sherratt (200 1; 2003) has recently made a similar case to Vermeule, though 
differing importantly in detail. She too suggests that palaces were dependent 
on international trade and their involvement in trade routes for their survival 
(Sherratt 2001, 226-227). Unlike Vermeule, however, she suggests that 
shifting trade routes brought about the demise of palaces. She argues that in 
LHIIIB Cypriot ships began to operate around the Greek mainland and into the 
central Mediterranean, and notes that Pylos may have been being actively 
bypassed in LHIIIB, seeking to retain its involvement in trade routes by 
extending its control over the Further Province at that time (Sherratt 2001, 23 2-
234). Smaller ships may have cut through the more established trade routes 
and created new non-palace focussed markets and mechanisms, all of which 
may 'have increased the edginess of the palatial authorities in general' 
(Sherratt 2001, 234). To this may be added an increasing tendency for import 
substitution: the local production of Mycenaean inspired pottery in Italy, as 
well as possibly Aegean inspired shifts in agricultural practices, Cyprus and the 
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Levant, as well as oil and textile production on Cyprus from LCIIC (Sherratt 
2001, 237; 2003, 40). In this scenario, 'the palaces (even those favourably 
placed in relation to continuing long-distance routes) simply became 
irrelevant. .. they disappeared - or at least were forced to abandon their palatial 
facades and join the rest of the post-palatial world' (Sherratt 2001, 237). 
Another aspect of this argument is concerned with the use of bronze and iron, 
and the continuation of interregional trade into postpalatial times. It has been 
thought that increased iron use may have been stimulated by shortages of 
bronze or tin (Sherratt 2003, 39). However, Sherratt (2003, 41-42) argues that 
in fact not only was there much more bronze in circulation from the thirteenth 
century, but also that it 'was circulating more widely, reaching social groups 
whose access to it had previously been restricted or relatively tightly 
controlled.' This devaluing of bronze may have stimulated the use of iron as 
an expensive and rare prestige substance for producing items and shapes that 
were already produced in bronze (Sherratt 2003, 43-44). Furthermore, it seems 
that international trade did not stop around c.l200 but continued into the 
twelfth century and beyond with Cyprus playing an important role linking 
Greece and the eastern and central Mediterranean (Sherratt 2003, 51; Crielaard 
1998). 
These changes in the availability and circulation of materials and goods would 
have had social consequences over the short and longer term, affecting both 
palatial and non-palatial areas. In fact, Sherratt (2003, 43) sees this reflected in 
the settlement patterns of parts of Greece, in particular the Argolic, Euboean, 
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Saronic and Corinthian gulfs, which often have eastern connections reflected in 
material culture. Crielaard ( 1998, 198-199) sees this long-distance trade as 
small scale and loosely dominated by local elites in a world of socio-political 
fragmentation, which may fit the scenario for the styles of postpalatial rulers hip 
and society (discussed in chapter 6). 
While some aspects of Sherratt's argument on the nature of the palace 
societies, particularly in regard to their militarism, lack of 'depth' and 
development over time and aterritorial nature have been questioned (Dickinson 
2006a, 36), the model of change she presents is appealing in accounting for 
palatial redundancy, with populations believing that 'they could do better 
without them' because they were offered new opportunities stemming from a 
wider access to goods and ideas (Sherratt 2001, 23 8). It is attractive to see the 
changes marked by the collapse as part of longer term processes which could 
have caused social changes that palace societies were unable to adapt to or 
control. 
Nevertheless, there are problems with this model; in particular it fails to 
explain the destructions and abandonments themselves, which feature as the 
violent and visble indicators of palatial collapse. Rutter's comments (2000b) 
on Vermeule (1960b), that the theory 'is a better response to the question of 
why the palaces were not rebuilt than it is to that of who destroyed them and 
why', also hold good for Sherratt's hypothesis. However, perhaps in this view, 
the actual destroyers and destructions, which could have happened over some 
thirty years and for various localised and specific reasons, are less important 
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than the failure to rebuild in particular locations. This failure represents the 
redundancy of the system itself, which perhaps could not be completely or 
even partially reconstructed. 
It is plausible too that in such a scenario palaces came into more direct or more 
serious competition with each other, in an attempt to assert their authority and 
control access to goods. These conflicts may have been violent and 
destructive. However, if trade routes were shifting northwards, and some 
palaces remained favourably placed, as Sherratt (200 1, 23 7) admits, it is 
unclear why they failed to do better rather than worse than before and why 
these palaces were destroyed and not rebuilt. Tiryns, for example, appears to 
do better after the destruction c.1200, expanding in LHIIIC, but it is no longer 
palatial. Dimini, on the other hand, was destroyed in LHIIIB2 and abandoned 
early in LHIIIC, in favour of Volos (Adrimi-Sismani 2006). It is unclear why 
the palace authorities in these places should have fared worse because of a 
northern shift of trade routes. Furthermore, if, as Sherratt (2001, 234) argues 
the collapse of the palaces was merely a 'cardboard collapse' why does 
Messenia, in her words, take 'on the general appearance of an underpopulated 
backwater'? 
In Sherratt's model, it is possible to see the Eastern and Central Mediterranean 
as a region of potential entrepreneurial opportunity, and the palaces, shippers 
and middlemen as competitive companies or businesspeople, vying for the 
trade essential to the maintenance of their lifestyles, and it is indeed, as she 
admits, a model appropriate to contemporary concerns (Sherratt 2003, 53). 
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The palaces, and those who ran them, are presented as rather inept 
businesspeople, who failed to comprehend the complexities of the palatial 
system, with its administrative habit, which they 'clumsily grafted' onto a 
client-based warrior society (Sherratt 2001, 238). While this view 
underestimates the capacity for cultural and intellectual development over 
some 150-200 years of the palaces' existence (Dickinson 2006a, 35-36), it may 
be right to suggest that in fact, to continue the analogy, the wanaktes and their 
fellows were bad businessmen, or were in fact largely disinterested in any 
business beyond simply producing something to exchange for the goods they 
desired. 
For example, many have argued or assumed that the palaces directly exerted 
great control and influence over the lives of their subjects and the economies of 
their territories (e.g. Betancourt 2000), but there are considerable problems 
with this view (Dickinson 2006a, 36-41). There is no evidence to suggest that 
palaces acted as a 'central clearing house for all goods and commodities 
manufactured in its territory'; pottery production may not have been directly 
controlled by palaces and bronzesmiths may have been independent, while 
agriculture seems to have remained largely unspecialised (Dickinson 2006a, 
37). The palaces may have been 'in large part dependent on the contingencies 
and activities of a surrounding world over which, fundamentally, they had little 
real control' with international trade carried out at 'arm's length' and with 
'little systematic interest in where ... goods eventually go to, or who and where 
imported goods originally come from' (Sherratt 2001, 215,222, 224). Ifthis is 
the case, the palaces, confronted with changing geo-economic realities, which 
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they may not have clearly perceived, and a reduced market for their products, 
failed to react appropriately, failing to assert themselves in trading tenns or to 
create new viable commodities. 
These economic failures were compounded by political failures, specifically 
the failure to create and exploit a new viable ideology to maintain the 
prominence of the palatial elites. It is possible to extend this scenario to 
hypothesise one in which alternative value systems would be created, in order 
to replace the traditional palatial ideology, with its reliance on some kind of 
external trade, and militarism could have been part of this. It is these values 
that may have undermined the palaces' place in society and led ultimately to 
their physical destruction and that of the system they represented. In such 
explanations, economics alone is not enough to explain the collapse. However, 
economic changes would have had effects on other parts of society, and linking 
these factors can provide interesting scope for argument. 
The second kind of economics-based collapse theory emphasises internal, 
structural problems, which caused an inability to cope, rather than outside 
forces, although external forces do play a role in these arguments and one 
might argue that palaces reliant exclusively on overseas trade were also 
fundamentally flawed institutions in themselves. The influential view that the 
palaces were the all-powerful centres of a redistributive economy and social 
system, as mentioned above, goes back to Finley's early analysis of the Linear 
B tablets, and was followed by Renfrew and others (De Fidio 2001, 15-16). 
Thus Betancourt (1976, 44) believed that 'the Mycenaean economy seems to 
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have been particularly subject to destruction' because of overspecialisation, 
which meant that it 'held the seeds of its own destruction.' Similarly, Deger-
Jalkotzy ( 1996, 716-718) has also argued for the extreme centralisation and 
specialisation of palace states and their inherent fragility. Betancourt 
suggested that this, in combination with an overlarge population led to an 
inability to cope with shocks, such as crop failures (Betancourt 1976, 44). 
Some kind of regional agricultural disruption thus initiated a 'systems 
collapse', where problems in one part of the system affected the operation of 
the whole (Betancourt 2000, 301). The population, without guidance from 
'local, disorganised forces,' would have been unable to cope, resulting in 
panic, flight and destruction (Betancourt 1976, 44-45). This was despite the 
fact that he suggested 'the economic structure was directed and administered 
by the palaces who efficiently coordinated the whole system' (Betancourt 
1976, 45). Deger-Jalkotzy (1996, 717-718) further noted that palatial 
territories were too small to cope with expenditure, particularly in the form of 
monumental architecture and their ability to support and feed 'the masses of 
dependent personnel' while the 'general population was suppressed and 
impoverished by overload of taxes and labour obligations.' 
However, there is little to suggest that the population of LBA Greece was ever 
burdensomely large or particularly impoverished, although population levels 
are difficult to estimate at any time, unless we take it as argued for by the 
occurrence of the collapse itself: a dangerous circularity. While Betancourt 
(1976, 42; 2000, 299) follows a population estimate for Messenia of up to 
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100,000, many suggest a rather lower figure of up to 50,000 (e.g. Whitelaw 
2001, 64 ), but even if a higher figure is adopted it is not clear that this would 
be beyond the carrying capacity for the land, especially if the population was at 
a similar level as in classical times (Betancourt 2000, 299). Rather than 
impoverishment, a spread of small, undefended sites might indicate 'that a mild 
degree of prosperity was spread through much of Mycenaean society' 
(Dickinson 2006a, 40). 
It is likely enough that periodic droughts, other weather events and crop 
failures will have affected Greece from time to time, but one notable factor of 
classical famines and food shortages, and indeed modem ones, is not the lack 
of food itself but the failure to use available food to feed the worst off. The 
effects of any suggested 'regional disruption of agriculture' would also depend 
on the degree of agricultural specialisation, which Betancourt (197 6, 44) 
believes was extreme, and involved mutual support between palaces 
(Betancourt 2000, 299) but the evidence for this is extremely limited (Sherratt 
2001, 218). Local specialisation seems to be a modem myth and the greater 
part of the economy, as represented by ordinary settlements, remained 
unspecialised with a range of crops and livestock (Dickinson 2006a, 3 7). 
Similarly, since the gaps in what Linear B suggests about the economy and 
organisation have been more closely scrutinised in recent years (Halstead 1992, 
1999a and 1999b ), it seems most unlikely that the palace societies represented 
anything as oppressive, totalitarian and monolithic as suggested by Betancourt 
( 1976; 2000) and Deger-Jalkotzy ( 1996). In fact, recent interpretations of the 
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Pylos polity suggest that it was not at all state-like, but rather composed of 
competing lineage units, one of which managed to rise to a position of 
dominance but that failed in, or was not concerned with, forming an integrated 
state (Small 1998; 1999). It has even been argued that Mycenaean polities 
were not truly territorial states, in the wider sense, but were more interested in 
controlling trade routes (Sherratt 2001 ). Even if the palace states were 
territorial, and had far reaching interests in small communities, the role of the 
palace need not have been negative or problematic. Palaima (2004a, 269-270) 
recently stated what is becoming increasingly recognised: 
the influence of the palatial center would be felt by most inhabitants of 
the territory only intennittently and indirectly. Most inhabitants would 
be directly affected by clan chieftains, local big men (basile is in the 
plural), or even socially and economically prominent 'aristocrats' who 
occur in the tablets without any title, by personal name only. 
In any case, the extreme view in which everything is controlled from the top 
down, and in which the population at large or even local authorities are unable 
to function at all without central direction, seems inherently unlikely and fails 
to credit individuals and groups outside the palace with any sense at all. 
Similarly, the notion that the palatial form of government, interpreted 
essentially as an 'oriental' and 'despotic' system, was 'not a suitable kind of 
government for Greeks' (Deger-Jalkotzy 1996, 728) is reminiscent of a rather 
romantic, old-fashioned and distasteful view of the inherent superiority of 
classical Greek culture and the 'Hellenic spirit'. A variety of power structures 
will have existed with much activity, economic and otherwise relying 'upon 
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traditional transactional arrangements between individuals and groups' 
(Palaima 2004a, 286). Thus it must be concluded that these kind of economic 
arguments are unconvincing. 
Environmental Explanations 
Environmental explanations of the collapse have a long history and are often 
mentioned as factors that may have triggered systems collapse or mass 
migrations or mvastons. There are three main environmental hypotheses: 
drought, climate change and earthquake and these shall be examined here after 
some brief but necessary introductory comments. 
The climate of Greece in the LBA was perhaps slightly warmer and drier than 
now with zones experiencing typical Mediterranean conditions of long, hot, dry 
summers and cooler, wetter winters (Dickinson 1994, 25). Sandars (1978, 21-
22) pointed out the 'desperate poverty that prevails and the precariousness of 
life around these shores' and characterised the Mediterranean coastlands as 
'subject to periodic drought and endemic want' though while fluctuations in 
climate and rainfall and poor agricultural years may be constant dangers, a 
degree of stability and prosperity is nevertheless attested in the archaeological 
and historical records (Dickinson 1994, 29). 
There is also a degree of local and regional variability due to the geographical 
features of Greece, which create a patchwork of microregions, including 
islands, mountains and plains. Sandars (1978, 21) notes that the plains 
experienced the danger of floods, which would have been increased by any 
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significant deforestation. Nevertheless, the population of LBA Greece were 
not passive victims of their environment and at Tiryns and possibly on Rhodes 
measures for flood defences have been found (Maran 2006, 126; Deger-
Jalkotzy 1998b, 120). Around Gla, major hydrological work was undertaken, 
presumably to increase agricultural land (Loader 1998, 101-1 09). These surely 
reflect a degree of understanding of local environmental processes and a 
capacity to deal with them through large-scale construction projects, although 
that capacity seems to have been lost in the collapse. Use and abandonment of 
exhausted land, which was then able to regenerate (Dickinson 1994, 25), may 
also be reflected in the occupation and abandonment of sites, with episodes of 
punctuated nucleation occurring. Such a settlement pattern may be difficult to 
detect archaeologically and this may affect interpretations of particular periods, 
such as the postpalatial period, where such trends could coincide with other 
evidence. 
Drought and climate change 
The drought collapse hypothesis was first cogently presented by Carpenter 
( 1966) in acknowledgement of the lack of evidence for any migration into 
Greece c.1200 and the widespread abandonment of sites as opposed to their 
destruction (Drews 1993, 77). It became an influential view, particularly in 
English language scholarship, although it has not been as prominent elsewhere. 
In this view, around 1200, a megadrought affected the southern Peloponnese, 
Boeotia, Euboea, Phocis and the Argolid while other areas, Attica, the north-
west Peloponnese, Thessaly and the Dodecanese escaped the worst. This was 
caused by a change in winter winds from wet north-easterly winds to drier 
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westerly winds and Carpenter suggests that this pattern prevailed for some 300 
years. This extended and severe drought inevitably caused crop failures and 
drove people to leave their homes and attack those places where grain could be 
stored, while later destructions could be explained by lightning strikes or 
accidents. A group of environmentalists and climatologists sought to · 
demonstrate that such a pattern of drought was possible and suggested that 
Greece had in fact experienced similar conditions in winter 1954-1955, which 
could have lasted longer than one year (Bryson eta/. 1974). 
Critics of this view have suggested that the pattern of depopulation Carpenter 
suggested does not match what would be expected if his hypothesis was 
accurate (Desborough 1972, 22: Dickinson 1974). More recent research has 
also shown that many of the areas Carpenter thought experienced extreme 
depopulation may not have done so, and increased nucleation of population at 
particular sites is a valid alternative (Drews 1993, 80). Such may be the case in 
the Argolid (Drews 1993, 80), and the Euboean Gulf region (Crielaard 2006), 
while there is also continuity in Phocis (Mountjoy 1999, 745-746; Dickinson 
2006a, 76, 179). Certainly the growth at Tiryns and renewed building at 
Korakou, Midea and Mycenae argues against the presence of any kind of 
senous agricultural or environmental problems hindering settlement 
(Dickinson 2006a, 60-61). Deger-Jalkotzy (1998a, 122) also notes that grain 
from the LHIIIC Argolid was larger and better quality than during palatial 
times. 
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Of all the regions of Greece, Messenia seems to have suffered the most 
significant levels of site abandonment and presumably depopulation, and a 
localised drought and famine could certainly have played a part in this. 
Against this, however, is that 'the Linear B texts of Pylos give no clear hint 
that there is anything wrong in the agricultural system' (Dickinson 2006a, 55). 
Rather, Drews (1993, 81) notes that quite adequate rations were being 
disbursed by the Pylos palace to its workers, while the flocks were also 
thriving. Another problem with Carpenter's hypothesis is that it fails to 
explain the destructions of sites in the north-west Peloponnese, such as Teikhos 
Dymaion and in Thessaly at Dimini and Pefkakia, outside the area of his 
drought. The prolonged nature of this drought scenario also obscures the 
postpalatial recovery and flourishing now evident in LHIIIC Middle 
(Desborough 1964; Rutter 1992; Thomatos 2006). 
Another problem has been in securmg positive evidence for the drought 
hypothesis (Dickinson 2006a, 55). Various studies have shown conflicting 
results (Drews 1993, 78). Tree rings in California, falling water levels in Swiss 
lakes and the behaviour of Himalayan glaciers have been interpreted as 
showing that there was a hotter drier phase throughout the northern hemisphere 
from 1400-900 while others have suggested a peak of dryness around 1500 
followed by a colder and wetter spell and a little ice age beginning c.1200. As 
Drews (1993, 79) rightly notes, 'the geographical and chronological frames of 
reference are here so vast that they do not help very much.' Given the regional 
variations possible just within Greece itself this is certainly the case, and, even 
if any of the suggested climate scenarios is generally correct, it is unclear what 
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significance it would have gtven the more positive picture of postpalatial 
Greece now held. 
There is some evidence for drought from elsewhere in the Eastern 
Mediterranean although how this may relate to particular regions of Greece is 
unclear. There may have been an episode of drought in west central Anatolia, 
as indicated by tree rings from Gordion dated to around 1200 (Drews 1993, 
79). This site is some distance from Greece and its location on the inland 
Anatolian plateau gives it a somewhat different, non-Mediterranean climate 
(Macqueen 1986, 11; Bienkowski and Millard 2000, 18, 230-231 ). Even if 
there was a drought here around 1200 there is no certainty that one would have 
affected Greece. 
Other evidence suggests that the Hittite homeland may have experienced 
drought, or at least that for some reason it may have come to rely on imported 
grain from Egypt and Canaan from the mid-13th century, although the precise 
nature of and reasons for this arrangement are not known (Bryce 1998, 356-
357, 364-365). Libya too may have suffered from food shortages perhaps due 
to drought towards the end of the 13th century, as the Great Karnak Inscription 
of Merneptah could be taken to imply. However, this inscription emphasises 
the wealth and fertility of Egypt, giving this as a reason for the Libyan attack, 
as well as noting the shipment of grain to the Hittites 'to keep that land alive', 
and this contrast between the wealth of Egypt and the poverty of its enemies is 
surely not accidental (Drews 1993, 79). Nevertheless, Hittite texts do suggest 
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that arrangements for grain shipments were made at a high level and involved 
the presence of a Hittite prince (Bryce 1998, 357). 
Climate change, rather than episodic drought, has also been blamed for the 
collapse in Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean (Weiss 1982; Neumann 
1993). Weiss (1982) followed Carpenter (1966) and Bryson eta/. (1974) and 
suggested that drought caused the collapse and widespread population 
movements, and he even extends this to Anatolia, where he associated it with 
the Sea Peoples' invasion of Egypt. Neumann (1993, 231), on the other hand, 
suggested that increased rainfall in central Europe caused more frequent crop 
failures and that these initiated 'major and violent migrations' from Hungary 
and central Europe towards the south and south-east as far as the Nile Delta. 
These migrants, he suggested, could be linked with the destruction of the 
Mycenaean centres. However, Neumann's (1993, 241-243) acceptance ofthe 
veracity ·of an 'age of 'great migration'' relies on older archaeological works in 
which mass migration as an explanation of archaeological change was more 
unquestioningly accepted than it is today. Indeed, the historical reality of any 
'migration of the sea peoples' must now be seriously doubted (Drews 2000). 
Migration is discussed in more detail below. 
Although the drought hypothesis as a cause of LBA collapse has been extended 
from Greece to the entire Eastern Mediterranean, its application on such a wide 
scale seems problematic in that regional variations are not sufficiently dealt 
with and there is a lack of positive evidence for drought in Greece. Both older 
and more recent studies have yet to find any positive evidence of megadrought, 
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although it is generally accepted that drought may have played some role 
(Wright 1968; Shrimpton 1987). There may be some evidence for food 
shortages in some parts of the wider eastern Mediterranean, although no cause 
is stated in the relevant texts and drought is only one possibility; labour 
shortages or too much rain could have had much the same effect in disrupting 
agriculture, as could internecine warfare (Bryce 1998, 357). Models that rely 
on mass migration are unreliable and there is no evidence for mass migration 
into Greece around 1200, whatever climatic changes may have occurred in 
other regions (see below). Drews (1993, 82-83) has also dismissed the notion 
that a starving, and in his view unarmed, populace could have caused the 
destructions of major centres, noting that there are no examples of this in 
modem or ancient times. More plausible is the idea that general unrest and 
disorder stemming from shortages could have disrupted the functioning of 
society (Dickinson 2006a, 55). Overall, the drought hypothesis for Greece is 
unconvincing on a general level as the sole cause of collapse, though no one 
would deny that drought could have played a role and was undoubtedly a 
feature of Mycenaean Greek life. 
Earthquake 
Earthquakes are normal features of life in Greece, lying as it does in an area of 
high seismicity (Nur and Cline 2000, 45). Papadopoulos ( 1996, 205) has 
argued that there is a high probability, based on observations of 201h century 
seismic data, that destructive shocks may be expected to occur at one or more 
sites approximately every thirty years, although Stiros (1996, 133) observes 
that earthquake intensity can be considerably different at nearby sites, and 
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depends on local conditions. Given that more has become known about 
postpalatial Greece, with continued habitation now known at many sites 
notably in the Argolid at Tiryns, it is not surprising that earthquakes, as 
destruction 'events', have become a popular explanation for destructions at 
particular sites, regions and also for the collapse itself both in Greece and more 
widely in the eastern Mediterranean (e.g. Papadopoulos 1996; c.f. Drews 1993, 
33). Drews (1993, 44) notes that the earthquake hypothesis fits the changing 
view of LHIIIC in that continued habitation contradicts a drought hypothesis, 
and also makes any destructive invasion seem less likely. 
Stiros ( 1996, 129) notes that earthquakes have been used by archaeologists as a 
deus ex machina for explaining destructions and abandonments7 but has 
nevertheless presented some criteria by which they can be identified and 
differentiated from other natural or anthropogenic causes. These criteria, 
relevant to the following discussion, are as follows (Stiros 1996, 152): 
1. Ancient constructions offset by seismic faults. 
2. Skeletons of people killed and buried under the debris of fallen 
buildings. 
3. Certain abrupt geomorphological changes, occasionally associated with 
destructions and/or abandonment of buildings and sites. 
4. Characteristic structural damage and failure of constructions. 
7 French (1996, 51) comments that 'archaeologists ofmy generation, who attended university 
in the aftermath of Schaeffer's great work (1948), were brought up to view earthquakes, like 
religion, as an explanation of archaeological phenomena to be avoided if at all possible.' 
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5. Destruction and quick reconstruction of sites, with the introduction of 
what can be regarded as 'anti-seismic' building construction 
techniques, but with no change in their overall cultural character. 
6. Well-dated destructions of buildings correlating with historical 
(including epigraphic) evidence of earthquakes. 
7. Damage or destruction of isolated buildings or whole sites, for which an 
earthquake appears the only reasonable explanation. 
Earthquakes at Mycenae 
Mycenae itself is situated directly on a series of fault lines and the Argive Plain 
is bounded by prominent faults (Nur and Cline 2000, 48). Earthquakes and 
seismic activity must have formed part of the normal experience of living in 
the area. An earthquake in mid-LHIIIB2 has been proposed, based on the 
discovery of skeletons found crushed under debris from Panagia House I and 
the House room north of the Citadel at Plakes (Mylonas 1977, 61 Figure 27, 
63; Nur and Cline 2000, 50). The remains of a young man, crushed under 
debris, were also discovered in the South-west House of the Citadel (Nur and 
Cline 2000, 49; French 2002, 93). Destructions at this time inside and outside 
the citadel are therefore suggested to belong to an earthquake horizon and 
changing construction techniques and strengthening measures may have 
resulted (French 1996, 51, 54). Affected areas included: the Cult Centre, the 
South House on the Citadel, the South-west House on the Citadel, House room 
north of the Citadel, Panagia Houses I, II and III, the House of the Oil 
Merchant, and possibly the Ramp House, the house of Sphinxes, the House of 
the Wine Merchant and Petsas' House (Nur and Cline 2000, 49-51). Most of 
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these buildings show structural deformation in their walls, as well as signs of 
falling debris, and some show fire damage (see Table 3.1). Even so, French 
(1996, 54) notes that there is some evidence against earthquake destructions, 
such as the survival of certain architectural features such as the Lion Gate and 
the Treasury of Atreus, adjacent to the Panagia Houses. This may be due to the 
higher quality of their construction, given their functions. 
Area Period Structural Fire Skeletons Reconstruction 
deformations damage 
and debris 
Cult LHIIIB2 Bulging of Yes No New wall built 
Centre walls near over original; 
entrance to original doors 
the shrine walled up and 
with idols; new doors and 
fallen roof windows made; 
slates reinforcement 
ofwall in 
nearby room 
Cult Later Destruction Yes; No 
Centre LHIIIB2/early and intense 
LHIIIC subsequent fire 
fire burning 
walls 
South LHIIIB2 Building Yes No 
House collapsed; 
on the south-east 
Citadel, corner of 
Room8 
shifted off 
stone socle 
South- LHIIIB North and Yes Yes-
west south walls of crushed 
House Room2 under 
on the collapsed; burned 
Citadel large pieces debris of 
of fallen collapsed 
plaster north 
wall 
House LHIIIB2 Tilted and No Yes-3 
room c.1250 collapsed adults 
north of walls and a 
the child 
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Citadel crushed 
(Plakes) under 
fallen 
stones in 
the 
basement 
Panagia LHIIIB2 Collapsed No Yes-a 
House I c.1250 doorway; middle-
south wall of aged 
Room2 woman 
leaning with skull 
outward to crushed 
south; stones in the 
and rubble doorway 
debris 
including a 
chimney pot 
and smashed 
vessels 
Panagia LHIIIB2 Wall between No No Some walls 
House c.1250 Rooms 11 strengthened 
II and 12 and renewed 
skewed with while others 
north and abandoned 
central 
sections 
buckled and 
shifted off 
foundations 
Panagia LHIIIB2 Damage No No Some walls 
House c.1250 weakening buttressed and 
III house reinforced, new 
walls added and 
a doorway 
blocked 
Table 3.1 Evidence for Earthquakes at Mycenae in LHIIIB and LHIIIC (after Nur and 
Cline 2000). 
As can be seen from the data summarised in Table 3.1, there is positive 
evidence of earthquakes at Mycenae, however, the strongest evidence of this is 
from the middle of LHIIIB rather than later. Nevertheless, a major earthquake 
has been proposed as the explanation for the destruction c.l200. lakovides 
(1977, 134) proposed that a violent earthquake, for which he saw 'firm, 
incontrovertible excavation evidence,' was responsible for the destruction at 
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Mycenae at the end of LHIIIB, although this did not disrupt the evolution of its 
Mycenaean culture, which continued. French (1998, 4) notes a 'massive 
conflagration that so covered areas of the site that the debris was not removed' 
and suggested that this marked the end of the palatial administration, although 
admitting that some areas produce no such evidence of burning. Nevertheless, 
following Kilian's (1980; 1996) attribution of destructions at Tiryns and 
Mycenae to earthquake, French (1998, 4) suggested that 'it seems probable that 
this destruction too is the result of earthquake.' In a later statement French 
(2002, 135) seems more cautious, stating that the major fire destructions 
throughout much but not all of the Citadel at the end of the palatial period 'may 
be the result of an earthquake' though 'at other centres there seems to be more 
evidence of earthquakes.' The devastation was notable in the Citadel House 
Area, where nonetheless debris was cleared into terraces and some surviving 
wall were reused, but French (1996, 135; 1999, 223) suggests that possibly 
another earthquake caused some of these walls to collapse sealing in LHIIIC 
Early (Phase IX) material. Even after this, there was further reuse and 
occupation before the area was abandoned, as in other parts of the site (Taylour 
1981, 11; Thomatos 2006, 179-186). 
Tiryns 
The classic case for earthquake destructions comes from Tiryns. Kilian (1996) 
suggested that earthquakes had caused the destructions at the end of LHIIIB 1 
and LHIIIB2, as well as earlier and later. These periodic destructions allowed 
or encouraged alterations in the site, including changes to building styles, and 
'in the aftermath of an earthquake, a natural and necessary process of 
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rebuilding and reorganisation took place' (Kilian 1996, 67). They are also 
linked, by Kilian, to changes in pottery style, with which they appear to 
coincide (Kilian 1996, 63). 
Several skeletons have been found crushed beneath walls, one in a LHIIIB 1 
house and those of a woman and child buried beneath the walls of the LHIIIB2 
Building X (Kilian 1996, 65). Two skeletons apparently killed and covered by 
debris from a fallen wall were found amongst burned wooden beams, fresco 
fragments and LHIIIB pottery (Nur and Cline 2000, 53). Building X also had 
curving walls with comers not at right angles, deformation which Kilian (1996, 
63) suggests is due to earthquake. Similar features are noted for Building VI 
where antithetic tilting of walls is present. This kind of evidence occurs within 
the Citadel (the Upper and Lower areas) and the Lower Town. One complex in 
the Lower Town shows evidence of earthquake in LHIIIC and in an earlier, 
possibly LHIIIB2 stratum (Kilian 1996, 63; Nur and Cline 2000, 53). 
Midea 
Midea experienced a major destruction, with fire and collapsed walls, 
buildings, gates, at the end of LHIIIB2 (Astrom and Demakopoulou 1996, 3 6). 
The West Gate was particularly affected, being 'buried beneath its own 
remains' over a thick layer of debris and with 'a very pronounced destruction 
layer due to fire' (Astrom and Demakopoulou 1996, 38). Evidence of burning 
was also prominent within the Citadel in the remains of buildings next to the 
Citadel wall and there was much debris, including fallen stone and broken tiles 
and pots. Many of the buildings also show signs of collapse, distortion and the 
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curvature and tilting of walls (Astrom and Demakopoulou 1996, 39). The 
skeleton of a young girl 'whose skull and backbone were smashed under fallen 
stones' was found in a room near the East Gate, and this also suggests that an 
earthquake caused the destruction in LHIIIB2 (Astrom and Demakopoulou 
1996, 39). Astrom and Demakopoulou (1996, 39) state that 'the collapse of the 
West Gate and the buildings inside the Acropolis cannot have been the result of 
war.' 
Thebes 
Several earthquakes have been suggested as causing destructions at Thebes. 
An early earthquake in LHIIIA2 has been proposed and one in later LHIIIB 1 
followed by a prolonged fire (Nur and Cline 2000, 54). Perhaps the best 
evidence, from a palatial workshop on the Kadmeia, is the skeleton of a young 
woman who appears to have been killed by a sharp blow to the head, which, in 
the context of her discovery within a destruction layer characterised by .fallen 
debris from the walls, is thought to have been from a fallen roof beam 
(Sampson 1996, 114 ). It seems that she may have been trapped on the first 
floor of a two-storey building, since her remains were some distance above the 
floor level. 
The Menelaion 
The discovery of a skeleton in the collapsed monumental terrace wall of 
LHIIIB2, indicates a sudden and unexpected destruction, which could have 
been an earthquake (Nur and Cline 2000, 55). Another building on the lower 
terrace was damaged possibly at the same time. 
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Pylos 
Kilian (1996, 65) notes that 'walls deviating from a straight line have been 
excavated in the Palace of Pylos, while in the main workshop (NE building) of 
the same complex the corners of the foundations had opened by about 1.4m.' 
He suggested that these were clear indications of earthquake. 
Kynos: Livanates 
At Kynos: Livanates there are storerooms of an LHIIIC complex, which reveal 
at least two destruction episodes thought to have been caused by earthquake 
(Dakoronia 1996). The LHIIIC complex overlies LHIIIB architectural 
remains, and these earlier buildings may also have been destroyed by an 
earthquake with fire; skeletons were also found buried under stones but it is 
unclear from the report which destructions they were associated with (AR 44 
(1998), 73). The earlier LHIIIC destruction seems to belong to the end of 
LHIIIC Early, indicated by sherds found around clay storage bins (Dakoronia 
1996, 41). The mudbrick walls shifted from their stone foundations while 
mudbricks were dislocated and some fell into the clay bins. This may indicate 
'a high acceleration event, probably an earthquake' rather than deliberate 
destruction or weakness of construction (Dakoronia 1996, 41 ). The building 
was subsequently repaired and continued in use. A second destruction with 
structural deformation accompanied by fire, less than 100 years later may also 
have been due to earthquake (Dakoronia 1996, 42). This is suggested by the a 
spread of LHIIIC Advanced/Late pottery fragments together with pebbles and 
rounded marine fossils all over the site, which may have been swept over the 
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site by a tsunami following an earthquake (Dakoronia 1996, 42). These are not 
uncommon in the area. Even so, the building was again repaired and continued 
in use into Submycenaean, and Dakoronia (1996, 42-44) concludes that 
although frequent in East Locris and destructive, earthquakes 'were not critical 
events for its settlement history from Mycenaean times onwards.' 
Other sites 
According to Nur and Cline (2000, 56), earthquakes have also been suggested 
during c.1225-1175 for Lefkandi, Korakou, Gla, Nichoria, Krisa (Phocis) and 
Kastanas (Thessaly), although the evidence is inconclusive. The destruction of 
Gla is thought to have taken place sometime in the second half of the thirteenth 
century (Iakovides 1983, 105; 1990, 610; Shelmerdine 2001a, 372). 
Discussion 
Clearly it has become acceptable to attribute destruction events to earthquakes, 
and this is only right given the known seismological character of Greece 
(Shelmerdine 2001a, 381). Nevertheless, while destructions and abandonments 
themselves may be attributable to earthquakes, and though many of them fit the 
criteria outlined by Stiros (1996) it does remain difficult to be certain of this, 
whether the wider social and political effects of the collapse can be explained 
by them, as suggested by Kilian ( 1988a; 1996) and Papadopoulos ( 1996), has 
been doubted. Stiros (1996, 143) notes the potentially catastrophic results an 
earthquake could have had on the existence of the Spartan state in 464. In that 
case, it was linked with a slave revolt and affected the internal situation and 
external relations (Powell 1988, 109-11 0), which suggests that earthquakes at 
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particular times could exacerbate an already difficult situation or even cause 
one; but this must depend on individual circumstances. No similar helot class 
seems to have existed in Mycenaean Greece, so it is doubtful that it 
experienced the same threat of social upheaval, although difficulties could have 
been caused. Ambraseys (1996, 32) warns of creating 'catastrophe theories' by 
associating what seem to be simultaneous earthquakes which occurred at some 
distance from each other, for example in the Argolid and Pylos, and even 
associating geographically close destructions to single earthquakes is 
problematic since damage may differ significantly due to local geological 
conditions, the alignment of buildings and so on. 
Shelmerdine (2001a, 375) rightly asks why it was at this point that the 
megarons of Mycenae and Tiryns were not rebuilt and why palatial 
administration collapsed c.l200 rather than after the earthquakes at the end of 
LHIIIBl. French (2002, 135) suggests that 'the bureaucratic administration 
which had been fully stretched to deal with the expansion of the first half of the 
century followed so soon by a devastating earthquake was not able to cope 
with another disaster on this scale.' She blames not the disasters themselves 
but 'rather the cumulative effect of them on an overstretched economy that 
may indeed have already been suffering from a diminution of trade or a lack of 
the raw materials sought in trade' (French 2002, 135). Others have also 
observed decline in the second half of the 131h century (Muhly 1992, 11). 
However, it is difficult to square this apparent late weakness with ability of 
palaces to engage in large-scale construction in the late thirteenth century 
(Dickinson 2006a, 42). That said, a similar situation with extensive late 
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building work occurred at Hattusas, which was also destroyed shortly 
afterwards (Bryce 2002, 256), and this indicates that the ability to perform such 
activities was no guarantee of long term stability. 
Drews (1993, 37-47) also has doubts. In discussing proposed earthquakes at 
Mycenae, Tiryns and Midea, as well as Knossos, Troy and Ugarit, he was 
surprised 'that none of the six quakes, presumably the most severe that those 
particular sites ever suffered, resulted in casualties' (Drews 1993, 39). 
However, what may plausibly be victims of earthquakes have been found at 
Mycenae, Tiryns, Midea, Thebes and the Menelaion. Although these are few, 
they match what Drews states he would expect from a site destroyed by 
earthquake, and where clearing took place, bodies could have been recovered 
(Drews 1993, 40). It has been noted that not all destructive earthquake events 
need necessarily cause excessive casualties and often this may depend on the 
time at which they take place (Ambraseys 1996, 32). Drews (1993, 40) also 
notes a lack of buried valuables, which might be expected of naturally 
destroyed palaces, but again such items as existed could have been recovered. 
More significantly, Drews questions the ability of earthquakes to destroy cities, 
which he notes was extremely unusual in antiquity, and the common 
association of earthquakes with devastating fires (Drews 1993, 38). He argues 
that towns that burned throughout history were by and large burned 
deliberately, often after looting, and cites the elder Pliny as not mentioning fire 
as a danger linked with earthquakes (Drews 1993, 39). Tacitus, on the other 
hand, did mention 'fires shining out from among the ruins' of the 12 cities in 
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Roman Asia 'shattered' by an earthquake in AD17 (Drews 1993, 39). It should 
be noted that Drews actually emphasises the lack of evidence for devastating 
'city-wide' fires, since even he cannot completely deny that fires could be 
associated with earthquakes in the ancient world. This qualification may be 
important, since as French ( 1998, 4) noted for Mycenae, burning though 
widespread was not universal. Furthermore, citadels and palaces may have 
stored quantities of oil and other flammable materials that would make them, 
or areas within them, more vulnerable to fire. Astrom suggested that oil lamps 
may have caused fires at Midea (Demakopoulou and Divari-Valakou 1999, 
214). During a recent earthquake in the ancient city of Bam, Iran, some 15,000 
people were crushed to death as they slept and 70% of the houses, as well as 
much of the 2000 year old mud brick citadel were destroyed, but fire does not 
seem to have played a role (BBC 2003). 
A further problem may lie in the relative chronology of these earthquake 
horizons. Muhly ( 1992, 11) notes that there are serious disagreements 
regarding the precise dating of particular destructions, and it certainly may be 
questioned whether apparently simultaneous destructions at a particular site 
were in fact so when some areas have revealed no datable material. Extending 
synchronisms based on pottery to destructions between sites can be even more 
problematic, even when the sites are fairly close by, as was discussed in 
chapter 1 and mentioned above. In fact there is no reason why all destructions 
in any one pottery phase should have to have coincided, since the phases can 
last for some decades, and it seems that there has rather been a tendency to 
look for a catastrophic event. Even though single catastrophic quakes affecting 
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the whole of southern Greece are unlikely, the collapse does not require such a 
dramatic scenario. As has been noted, Popham (1994) suggested the 
destructions could have occurred over some 25 or more years and Nur and 
Cline (2000, 61) have plausibly suggested that an 'earthquake storm' over a 50 
year period c.1225-117 5 could have been responsible for at least some 
destructions. This tentative claim seems to be valid, and it seems likely that 
earthquakes played some role in LBA destructions, as they have done at other 
times. Even so, the strong evidence for continuity at sites which provide 
evidence for earthquakes suggests that the collapse was not caused directly by 
them, but that there were other factors which prevented a continuation of 
palatial organisation along previous lines. 
Resource depletion 
The depletion of the environment and natural renewable resources has been 
cited as a consequence of the palatial system, one that was possibly related to 
its collapse, with 'relentless exploitation of the soils and ... excessive wood-
cutting which had been performed in order to meet the demands of the 
hydrocephalic palace centers' (Deger-Jalkotzy 1998a, 122). Deger-Jalkotzy 
( 1996, 717 -718) further believes that palatial territories were too small to meet 
the demands of the palace systems in terms of 'supporting and feeding the 
masses of dependent personnel listed in the Linear B texts,' although this view 
is highly debatable. While suggesting that agricultural products arguably 
deteriorated in quality, she notes that in the Argolid grain became larger and 
better after the demise of the palaces (Deger-Jalkotzy 1996, 718; 1998a, 122). 
Sandars ( 1978, 184, 187) also combined the arguments of overpopulation and 
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resource depletion with problems in overseas trade, suggesting a shift to 
raiding, which she suggests may have been linked with the origin of some of 
the Sea Peoples. 
However, even if the environment in Messenia, the region usually discussed in 
this context, was affected by deforestation, there were no discernible problems 
from the Linear B evidence in feeding the limited number of palace 
dependents, and in the Argolid, as in other areas, agriculture evidently 
continued as the basis of support for the population (Dickinson 2006a, 55; 
Foxhall 1995; Drews 1993, 81). It is conceivable that the wider population in 
Messenia could have been affected by problems related to the environment, but 
to some extent this depends on believing that the population was excessively 
high. It is by no means certain that all identified sites were occupied 
simultaneously in any one period, and there may have been invisible changes 
in settlement patterns related to land use. A long-term pattern of expansion and 
contraction of land use has been suggested that would see visible increases and 
decreases in total site numbers without any necessary population decrease, 
although postpalatial sites do seem generally to have been smaller and fewer 
(Dickinson 2006a, 84, 88). 
Dickinson (2006a, 81) rightly observes that 'the LBA population must have 
built up a great store of knowledge about the environment, its resources and the 
methods of exploiting them.' Despite this caveat, it is still possible that 
overexploitation could have taken place, especially if other factors, including 
social factors and those that alter the environment, were involved (Diamond 
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2005, 9-10). Diamond (2005, 421) notes a number ofreasons for this, such as 
a failure to anticipate or perceive a problem, or failure to solve it. For example, 
Janssen and Scheffer (2004) argue that what may seem to be bad decisions that 
lead to overexploitation of resources are affected by the role of sunk-costs. 
Effectively, decisions are based on past investments rather than future returns, 
leading to an unwillingness to abandon particular courses of action that may 
not or may no longer be beneficial. This is an interesting explanation for why 
seemingly irrational decisions may be made. Nevertheless, continuity of 
population in most areas suggests that serious overexploitation did not occur. 
While overexploitation of natural resources may be able to explain the 
abandonment of some sites and even areas, in itself it does not explain the 
demise of palace society despite the continuity of Mycenaean culture. It could 
be argued that, as with climate change or drought hypotheses, environmental 
problems disrupted agriculture and caused unrest, which could have resulted in 
the destructions. But, many destroyed centres show immediate rebuilding, 
suggesting there were no such major problems in those areas. Bloedow (1995) 
has explicitly questioned the role of any environmental decline in the collapse 
of the Mycenae region. This hypothesis is not convincing with relation to the 
collapse in Mycenaean Greece. 
Invasion and Migration 
As noted above, invasion and migration have long dominated discussion of the 
collapse (Dickinson 2006a, 47). To some degree, this is due to the basic 
acceptance on some level that much later Greek traditions contain an 
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extractable 'kernel of historical truth'. This is shown by the widespread and 
long accepted notion of a Dorian invasion or migration from the north, 
conflated with the Return of the Herakleidai, who led them, most recently 
supported by Eder (1998). This and associated population movements were 
thought to explain common social factors such as tribal groupings, as well as 
the distribution of dialects, in the later Greek world (Hall 2007, 45-48). The 
known historical population movements affecting the Greeks in the Hellenistic 
period and later the Romans have also been thought, explicitly or otherwise, to 
provide adequate analogues to hypothesised prehistoric population movements. 
Indeed, it is likely that these episodes, familiar to ancient historians and 
archaeologists studying the Aegean, are often unconsciously in the minds of 
those arguing for them. The influence of these factors is shown by the desire to 
find invaders into the archaeological record, despite the difficulties in doing so. 
For example, Desborough (1972, 22-23) was forced to conclude that invaders, 
'Dorians led by Mycenaean kings' from outside the Mycenaean world had 
destroyed the palaces and retreated rather than settling in Greece, as might be 
expected. 
The Dorian hypothesis 
The Dorian hypothesis has not remained static but has changed over time. 
Drews (1993, 62) notes that it was considered, until the late nineteenth century, 
that the Dorians entered the Peloponnese and Crete from the mountains of 
Thessaly in a fairly peaceful fashion. However, Maspero developed an 
influential theory of invasions and traced an invasion from the central Balkans 
into Greece, which was held responsible for the destructions at the end of the 
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Late Bronze Age (Drews 1993, 62-63). This deviates from the Greek myths, 
which in no way suggest an origin for the Dorians outside Greece; Hammond's 
suggestion that they were from Epirus has been influential, but is a purely 
modem theory (Dickinson 2006a, 4, 53). This Epirote origin theory may relate 
to the speculation that the Dorians were a pastoral people, and that this way of 
life was preserved in north-western Greece, which would arguably render the 
Dorians archaeologically invisible. Dickinson (2006a, 51) notes that a similar 
situation would hold true if the Dorians were from within Greece itself, as the 
myths suggest. It is difficult to resolve this argument. Since no traces of 
archaeologically invisible settlers or invaders would be found, the absence of 
positive evidence cannot be cited against this hypothesis. In fact, Winter 
(1977) has argued that invaders at a lower cultural level may leave no trace, 
and makes an analogy with the Galatian invasion of Anatolia and the Slavic 
invasion of Greece, known historically but not archaeologically. However, 
there are also features which are argued to provide positive evidence of 
newcomers, and these are discussed below. 
From another perspective, it has been argued that the linguistic evidence often 
cited in support of an influx of Dorians does not in any case match with the 
Dorian hypothesis. This is because the Achaeans, displaced by the incoming 
Dorians, should have had a dialect akin to that of the Linear B tablets, whereas 
it was closer to the West Greek that the Laconian and Argolic Dorian dialects 
were also related to (Hall 2007, 45). The dialect closest to Mycenaean Greek 
was Arcadian, and the myths cannot be used to explain this. Hall (2007, 45) 
notes that, in any case, there is no need to associate linguistic change with 'a 
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massive wave of immigration.' Rather the distribution of dialects in Greece 
and the Aegean in: 
three broad strips of contiguous territories stretching from west to 
east. . . raises the possibility that linguistic features shared by the 
dialects in these groups need not all be the inheritance of a proto-
dialect, originally spoken in a primordial homeland, but rather the 
product of diffusional convergence between speakers who came into 
continuous and repeated contact with one another (Hall2007, 45). 
Thus the Doric dialects of the Argolid were most likely produced by contact 
with both West Greek and other dialects (Hall 2007, 45). Chadwick (1976) 
and Hooker (1976, 173, 179) had suggested that the Dorians were in fact a 
submerged class already present in Mycenaean Greece who revolted against 
their Mycenaean masters, but this has not been widely supported and does not 
seem to be indicated by the archaeological or linguistic evidence (Drews 1993, 
63 n.47; Dickinson 2006a, 53-54). While they need not have been a distinct 
class, or even have existed as an ethnic identity in the LBA, the ancestors of 
the people who later became Dorians may indeed have been the inhabitants of 
Mycenaean Greece. In any case, 'the history of a language or dialect is not 
necessarily the same as the history of those who speak it' (Hall2007, 45). 
The best solution to the use of later Greek traditions as evidence for invasions 
or migrations at the end of the LBA, or indeed much else about the LBA, is to 
dismiss them (Hall 1997, 65 and 2007, 43-51; Dickinson 2006a, 54). This 
seems a more sound approach than favouring some stories or parts of a story 
over others for quite arbitrary reasons, adapting them, or trying to force them 
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into a narrative dictated by interpretations of material evidence. Many of the 
myths concerned with population movements probably functioned as origin 
legends and charter myths and should be seen as the active media through 
which ethnicity and identity were expressed rather than as conflicting and 
contradictory recollections of a true historical past (Hall 1997, 41 ). On the 
arrival of the Dorians and the Herakleidai, Hall ( 1997, 64) states that the 
tradition 'is best regarded as a composite and aggregative system of beliefs 
which had evolved from disparate origins and for the purposes of defining 
discrete ethnic groups.' Indeed the description of the stages of the Dorian 
wanderings before settling in the Peloponnese, as recorded by Herodotus 
(1.56.3), is remarkably similar in character to descriptions of the arrival of 
Nahuatl speakers in the Valley of Mexico, and may have had a similar purpose 
in mediating a new and successful ethnic grouping and relating them to the 
surrounding peoples. 8 The Dorian identity may have only been formed much 
later than c.1200 (Hall 1997, 65) and none of the significant Dorian centres 
were prominent in postpalatial times (Dickinson 2006a, 51). The mixed 
origins of what became Dorian populations also seems indicated by one of the 
three standard tribal names, Pamphyloi, or 'people of all tribes' although in 
some Dorian areas some or all of these standard names were not present (e.g. 
Corinth) and in others extra tribal names appear (e.g. Corcyra) (Dickinson 
2006a, 54; Hall2007, 47). 
8 Although Smith (1984) argues for the 'essential' historicity of these myths. However, he 
notes a particular cultural difference, in that accurate calendrical recording was an important 
feature in Mesoamerica (180). 
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Archaeological invaders 
Regardless of the myths, some archaeological evidence has been adduced as 
evidence for new populations in Greece, which have sometimes been thought 
responsible for the collapse and/or subsequent changes, including a possible 
later Dorian migration argued by Des borough ( 1972), who attempted to 
identify it with a new 'Sub-mycenaean culture,' and most recently Eder ( 1998). 
Rutter (2000b) has also argued for newcomers in postpalatial Greece, who 
were responsible for the destruction of the Mycenaean centres and Troy VIla, 
and linked to south-eastern Romania by their pottery. Deger-Jalkotzy (1983) 
suggested that small groups of Viking-like newcomers from the Danube 
entered Greece and other areas, such as southern Italy and Sicily, Romania and 
Troy, and may have formed the nucleus of the Sea Peoples. Popham (1994) 
seems to imply a degree of 'Italian' responsibility for the destructions c.1200 
and settlement, also identifying groups, the Sherden (Sardinians) and 
Shekelesh (Sicilians), with at least some of the Sea Peoples, on the basis of the 
similarity of the words. 
The archaeological evidence presented for these movements consists of a new 
class of handmade burnished pottery (HMB), first identified at Lefkandi, that 
does not belong in the Mycenaean repertoire, sometimes known rather 
pejoratively as 'Barbarian Ware' or even 'Dorian ware,', violin bow fibulae, 
the Naue II sword type, as well as cremation and single inhumation in cist 
graves (Hall 2007, 48; Rutter 2000b). These appear combined in a variety of 
ways, for example Deger-Jalkotzy (1983) associates fibulae, Naue II swords 
and HMB as representing one phenomenon, while Popham also associates 
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weapons and HMB pottery as evidence of an Italian presence (Popham 1994, 
285, 287, 288, 290-291, 295, 303). Rutter (2000b) notes that 'most authorities 
see no compelling reason to accept such a connection' between the three 
categories of evidence. Dickinson (2006a, 205) has noted that HMB and 
Italian bronzework in fact have different distributions, with bronzes found 
more in Achaea and Eastern Crete, suggesting that items diffused through trade 
and more complex social networks. Desborough (1964, 54-58) thought that 
bronze fibulae and Naue II swords appeared around 1200, but that the 
Mycenaean contexts in which they appeared suggested they did not belong to 
intrusive groups. 
Although the Naue II type itself may have originated in central Europe and 
northern Italy, its introduction and adoption in Greece and the eastern 
Mediterranean, eventually becoming the only sword type in the Aegean and the 
standard sword in the Near East and subsequently continuing as an iron sword 
type, does not require any mass migration (Drews 1993, 64, 194). Rather 
swords of this kind could have been used by mercenaries, as Catling has 
suggested, or arrived through normal trade and contacts (Drews 1993, 64-65). 
The violin bow fibulae may also have come from Italian types, with early 
concentrations at Mycenae, Tiryns and western Greece, but likewise require no 
mass migration to explain their adoption and development (Dickinson 2006a, 
161-162). Sherratt (2003, 41-44) in fact has argued that the increase in 'status-
defining categories of personal ornaments and weapons - fibulae, pins, knives, 
and weapons' in the Aegean, Cyprus and eastern Mediterranean from the 
second half of the thirteenth century is a reflection of the increase in bronze 
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working in the 'Urnfield' area and their distribution through maritime trade 
routes, particularly connected with Cyprus. 
It remains difficult to interpret the significance of HMB, which has now been 
found in a range of contexts in Greece and the eastern Mediterranean 
(Belardelli and Bettelli 2007; Rutter 1990; Small 1990; Dickinson 2006a, 52; 
see chapter 5 Figure 5.1la). At present, HMB is known in Greece especially 
from Mycenae, Tiryns, Midea and Korakou in the Argolid, Aigeira in Achaea, 
Nichoria in Messenia9, the Menelaion in Laconia, Dimini and Volos 
(Palia!Kastro) in Thessaly, Lefkandi, and in Crete where it belongs to LMIIIA-
B at Kommos and Khania, although it always forms only a small proportion of 
the total pottery assemblage (Rutter 1990, 36; Adrimi-Sismani 2006, 475; 
Dickinson 2006a, 52). While in central Mycenaean areas and Crete it is not 
found in funerary contexts, it is known in peripheral areas, such as Kephallenia 
and Epirus, although these may be local handmade wares, but no HMB is 
known from well-excavated sites in the Aegean islands (Rutter 1990, 36). 
However, caution has been advised in drawing any conclusions about the 
significance of its distribution as it is known so far (Rutter 1990, 36). In fact 
the classification itself may cover a variety of pottery types of different origins, 
and northern, Balkan and Italian links have been suggested (Belardelli and 
Bettelli 2007). Kilian abandoned his earlier idea of Epirote links for HMB, in 
favour of an Italian connection (Dicksinsonpers. comm.). Others have posited 
the idea that the pottery marks a return to household production, but this has 
not been widely accepted (Small 1990, c.f. Rutter 1990, 29-34). 
9 But only I piece. 
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Significantly, HMB appears usually to have been locally produced at the sites 
where it has been found (Mountjoy 2001, 92), although this alone does not 
prove Small's argument (1990) for its production by local Mycenaean Greeks, 
for as Rutter (1990, 32) states: 
if traditional Aegean peasants were indeed producers of these HMB 
pots, why did they introduce so many stylistic novelties? Why should 
these novelties have been so similar at scattered sites throughout the 
Greek Mainland and as far away as Cyprus ... ? 
It seems justifiable therefore to assume that it may represent 'trade links and 
possibly small groups of (specialised) immigrants' (Dickinson 2006a, 52). It is 
tempting, though admittedly speculative, to link these groups with the small-
scale metalworkers that Sherratt (2003, 41) envisions as part of the economic 
and social shifts in the late thirteenth century. Given the HMB present at 
palace sites, it could be wondered whether the palaces would have been 
concerned with possible competition in production or access to finished goods 
and raw materials, or whether palatial control of such things may already have 
been weakened or whether some kind of palatial control or oversight may be 
posited. 
Popham (1994) would seem to favour the earlier presence of Italians in Crete 
and the HMB from Kommos and Khania seems to have been imported, 
possibly from Sardinia and southern Italy respectively, where it is most closely 
paralleled (Rutter 2000b; Belardelli and Bettelli 2007). Italian parallels also 
seem to be closest for HMB from Tiryns, Lefkandi and Aigeira, so a mainland 
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Italian presence in palatial and non-palatial areas is possible, if the equation of 
pots and people is accepted (Dickinson 2006a, 52). Belardelli and Bettelli 
(2007) also link with Italy the presence of Pseudominyan ware (Grey Ware), 
which often occurs at Greek sites with Italian types of HMB (see chapter 5 
Figure 5.11b). Kilian (1988a, 133 and Fig. 7) had noted that Pseudominyan 
ware continued to develop on the Greek mainland in LH (in Thessaly and the 
Argolid), and was probably exported to Italy, followed by some reflux. 
Whoever made and used HMB, there is in any case no intrinsic need to see 
them as hostile, even if they were from outside the Mycenaean area, and surely 
the small proportions of this material, as well as its use in Mycenaean sites and 
incorporation into the Mycenaean ceramic repertoire, indicates peaceful 
contact. Features of HMB are used in LHIIIC pottery as well as vice versa at 
Tiryns (Rutter 1990, 37-39). Why would those who had come to live amongst 
Mycenaeans and presumably made their living through their involvement in the 
Mycenaean society and economy wish to destroy it - and in the small numbers 
that may have been present, how indeed could this have been managed? 
All of these features, Naue II swords, fibulae and HMB, began to appear in 
Greece before the collapse, and may indeed be more likely linked to economic 
changes beginning in the thirteenth century and continuing in the postpalatial 
period, as argued by Sherratt (2003) and Crielaard (1998), than to massive 
population movements. HMB is present in pre-collapse Mycenae, Tiryns, 
Midea and Nichoria as well as parts of Crete from LMIIIA and after 
(Dickinson 2006a, 52). Naue II swords are now known to have appeared 
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before the collapse and violin bow fibulae also appeared at Tiryns before the 
destruction c.1200 (Dickinson 2006a, 72, 161 ). While the movement of small 
groups and individuals, skills and ideas, seems likely enough, as it would be in 
any period, it is extremely unlikely that these features taken together or 
individually can represent any significant change in population or that this 
would have been a reason for the collapse of the palaces. 
Finally, Desborough (1972, 109-11) placed great emphasis on cist cemeteries 
as indicative of a new population from Epirus that 'fused with, and dominated, 
the surviving elements' in the second half of the twelfth century. But this view 
has never been entirely persuasive, as Snodgrass (2000 [ 1971], 314 ff.) had 
already argued for local cultural developments. Deposited pots and metalwork 
found in cist tombs also appear in chamber tombs, blurring their significance as 
ethnic indicia (Dickinson 2006a, 51). As for single burials in cist and pit 
graves, these are known throughout the Mycenaean period in central and 
peripheral areas, while they are not found in later Dorian areas such as Laconia 
and Messenia, at least until much later (Voutsaki 2000). Notable examples do 
occur in Attica and Euboea, but according to tradition these areas did not 
receive new populations (Dickinson 2006a, 51). Cist cemeteries also have 
differences between them, and so are unlikely to represent one homogeneous 
culture (Dickinson 2006a, 52). Rather than any sudden shifts in material and 
burial culture there are gradual and 'spatially uneven' changes '(Voutsaki 
2000, 232). Both Antonaccio (2000, 613) and Voutsaki (2000, 233) have 
rightly criticised Eder ( 1998) for the general attribution of changes in material 
culture or behaviour to immigrants, and this is surely correct. Neither pots, 
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swords, fibulae or burial practices are necessarily markers of ethnicity, and 
without the background of the Greek traditions themselves it is doubtful that 
this kind of model would have remained as influential as it has. 
The current status of migration theory 
Debate about migration theory itself, and its prommence m archaeological 
explanation, also leads to problems in accepting it even though it has enjoyed a 
long tenure in archaeology. Despite being a regular feature, as an explanatory 
device it has attracted criticism at least since the first half of the twentieth 
century (Renfrew and Bahn 1996, 36). In spite of its prominence 'migration 
has never been formally articulated as a general principle of historical 
explanation' yet 'it has nevertheless been invoked as an ad hoc explanation for 
cultural, linguistic, and racial change in such an extraordinary number of 
individual cases that to speak of a migrationist school of explanation seems 
wholly appropriate' (Adams eta/. 1978, 483). Typically, migrations have been 
posited as mass movements of waves of distinct groups from homelands, which 
thus leave archaeologically identifiable traits (Adams et a/. 1978, 486-487), 
and this is how they have often been envisioned in connection with the collapse 
of the Mycenaean palace societies, the postpalatial period and the occurrence 
of' Aegean' or Aegean derived material culture elsewhere in the Mediterranean 
(see chapter 5 for further discussion). 
However, it is now recognised that material culture, as well as ethnicity and the 
creation and maintenance of identity, operate in much more complex ways 
(Hall 1997). There is no simple equation between a material culture and 
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political, ethnic or linguistic groups, and those who share a political or ethnic 
identity may be diverse linguistically and culturally. Simplistic and untenable 
assumptions to the contrary, suppose 'an organic connection between social 
groups and the cultural property they disperse' (Burmeister 2000, 540). Thus 
Burmeister (2000, 540) rightly comments that: 
The conceptualisation of migration... as an mvas10n of foreign 
territories in the manner of a tidal wave (Rouse 1986, 177) ... is based 
on unfounded assumptions. Mass migrations are extremely rare, and 
the improved state of research has often made it necessary to replace 
the supposition of prehistoric mass migrations with the recognition of a 
process of infiltration that took place over centuries ... ' 
Migration theory has its origins in the traditions of many peoples, but that in 
itself does not make these traditions true, as the discussion of the Dorian 
hypothesis has shown. It became a particularly popular explanatory device in 
the nineteenth century (as noted with Maspero, above) and one factor in 
explaining its popularity, at least in the western Judaeo-Christian intellectual 
tradition, may be that it could be reconciled 'with a literal interpretation of the 
Old Testament' (Adams et al. 1978, 484). This desire to reconcile literary and 
mythical traditions, especially biblical or classical, with scientific archaeology 
is understandable. In the context of the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean, 
Drews ( 1993, 53-72) and Silberman (1998) have observed the development of 
migration theories as reflecting contemporary culture and intellectual trends. 
However, despite the constant and justified criticisms of migration theory 'not 
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only are many old migration theories still unchallenged, but new ones are 
constantly being proposed' (Adams eta/. 1978, 486). 
While it is certainly necessary and acceptable to involve the movements of 
people and groups in historical and archaeological interpretations, this must be 
achieved through the acceptance of demonstrated and well-known kinds of 
movement, rather than simply invoking mass migration as a convenient 
explanation. Indeed, these processes, while they may be difficult to identify 
archaeologically, are nevertheless well researched and widely published 
(Burmeister 2000; Anthony 1990). More plausible kinds of population 
movement are discussed in chapter 5. 
Anxiety 
Another pillar of invasion hypotheses more generally rests on the identification 
of 'anxiety' in the later thirteenth century, which it is usually argued is 
indicated by work on fortifications at major citadels, at Mycenae, Tiryns and 
Midea and the construction of Gla, measures taken to secure water supplies 
from inside citadels and the building of a wall across the Isthmus (Popham 
1994, 280-281; Deger-Jalkotzy 1999, 128-129; Dickinson 2006a, 42; Broneer 
1966). Popham ( 1994, 280) even suggests that the destruction of possibly 
walled Pylos, 10 which he places early in the thirteenth century, as against the 
more widely accepted c.1200 dating (Mountjoy 1997), was a catalyst for these 
developments in the rest of Greece. Early destructions at Thebes and possibly 
10 Recent investigations at Pylos revealing a 'linear feature' may indicate that the LBA site 
was fortified, although further investigation is required before this can be confirmed 
(Shelmerdine 200la, 337-339, 378). 
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Orchomenos have been identified as signs of 'trouble' as have those at 
Mycenae, Zygouries and Gla (Popham 1994, 280; Dickinson 2006a, 42). The 
abandonment after LHIIIB1 of the 'Ivory Houses' outside the citadel at 
Mycenae, which had some administrative function, has also been considered 
significant (Dickinson 2006a, 42). Drews (1993, 217) has suggested that 
'hordes' of 'northern Achaeans', Greek 'barbarians', attacked Thebes and 
Troy, as well working as mercenaries in the Argolid, and that it was this 'alarm 
about what was happening in the north' that stimulated increased defensive 
measures. 
As well as a sense of physical danger, some argue that there was economic 
anxiety and a general sense of 'insecurity and impending crisis' (Voutsaki and 
Killen 2001, 7). Following what may have been a boom in exports for the 
palaces in LHIIIA2, there seems to have been a decline in exports throughout 
the thirteenth century, with an increase in local production of Mycenaean style 
goods elsewhere (Mountjoy 1993, 170-175; Dickinson 2006a, 41-42). Also at 
this time, the palace at Pylos seems to have been converted into a factory for 
producing perfumed olive oil, which may suggest concerns over controlling 
production and possible economic or other problems (Dickinson 2006a, 42). 
As noted above, Sherratt (2001; 2003) sees this in the context of import 
substitution while others have conjectured that trade was being disrupted either 
by the Sea Peoples or even that Mycenaean goods may have been boycotted or 
banned in certain ports of the Near East, although this relies on the Mycenaean 
interpretation of Ahhiyawa (Bryce 1998, 343). 
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Further evidence of a military threat and perhaps a threat specifically from the 
sea has often been adduced from the Linear B tablets at Pylos (Palmer 1961, 
132-155; 1963, 147-163; Shelmerdine 2001a, 375 and n. 285). Tablet Jn 829 
records the amount of metal to be given by various parties, including religious 
figures to palace officials and this 'temple bronze' is specified as for use in 
making light javelins and spear points. However, the problem in interpreting 
this as signifying immediate danger is that it cannot be known whether this was 
a normal activity or an unusual arrangement, nor if it was, what the motivations 
for it were (Palaima 2004, 290-292). This is likewise true for the o-ka tablets, 
which appear to show the mobilisation and arrangement of forces for watching 
the coast (Dickinson 2006a, 55). Shelmerdine (2001a, 375 and n. 286) notes 
that many Linear B specialists are not convinced that the tablets can be 
interpreted as showing any immediate crisis. 
However, the interpretation of the thirteenth century as an 'age of anxiety,' is 
entirely speculative and the notion that some kind of serious military threat is 
indicated seems based upon the later occurrence of the collapse itself. A study 
of the construction of the fortifications casts serious doubt on whether they 
could have been built quickly, and the interest in access to water need not be 
considered merely as a response to the threat of siege as opposed to a basic 
improvement of site facilities (Wardle 1994, 229; Loader 1998, 65 n.16, 72-
73). Rather these developments, as with constructions in the Aegean islands in 
the later thirteenth and twelfth centuries (see chapter 5) can more plausibly be 
seen as 'expressions of power and wealth, designed to impress subjects and 
rivals and to strengthen control over territories' (Dickinson 2006a, 42). 
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Driessen (1999, 16) too has noted that 'monumental buildings ... are almost 
always constructed in critical periods of political consolidation' and this in 
itself must argue against the ineffectiveness or inability of the palaces in 
LHIIIB, although it could reflect various levels of competition. Voutsaki's 
interpretation (200 1, 205) of these, along with the apparent restricted access to 
and palatial control of prestige goods, rather argues for the palaces' continued 
ability to control or mobilise certain resources at this late stage. Furthermore, 
it was not only fortifications that were extended, but also roads, bridges and 
dams (Voutsaki 2001, 204 ). The relevance of the putative LBA Isthmian wall 
is more problematic in that it is of uncertain date and purpose, and may not 
even be a single structure (Morgan 1999, 362-365). Given this, Dickinson 
(2006a, 42) suggests that it should be omitted from the discussion. Certainly, 
undue weight should not be placed on such difficult evidence. 
To characterise palatial Greece in the period immediately before the collapse as 
experiencing an anxious or troubled time, or a period of decline, is to link 
together disparate evidence, all of which could have many other possibly more 
plausible interpretations, and to further link this with the collapse seems 
dangerously circular. While it may be a superficially attractive theory, one 
which fits often assumed notions of three-stage organic social development, 
declines are difficult to identify or quantify and their connection with collapse 
is far from assured; certainly, no decline is necessary even when a collapse 
occurs (see chapter 2). Although the factors outlined above may indeed have 
been real, and may have affected the Mycenaean world and individual polities, 
there is no unique, firm causal link between them and the collapse. 
153 
3 Theories of Mycenaean collapse 
Changes in warfare 
One problem with invasion hypotheses has been explaining convincingly how 
so many maJor sites could or should have been defeated within such a 
seemingly short space of time. Indeed, since the Mycenaeans are often 
characterised as warlike or militaristic, 11 'it would almost seem as if they loved 
strife for its own sake' (Taylour 1983, 135), it may be thought surprising that 
their cities and fortified citadels, their well-equipped warriors and indeed their 
social system could have all been destroyed by the predations of 'barbarians' of 
any sort. Hence some have suggested invasions or migrations following some 
kind of weakening internal breakdown (e.g. Sandars 1978, 186, 197). Others 
may follow a tendentious view that matured societies experience 'decadence', 
which weakens their military capacity. Drews ( 1993) however, has recently 
offered a hypothesis that links changes in weapons and military tactics with 
social changes and the collapse in Greece and more widely in the eastern 
Mediterranean, and which purports to explain how so many LBA states could 
be brought down in one 'Catastrophe'. 
Drews' hypothesis is based on the notion that LBA polities essentially relied on 
chariot borne archers and engaged in chariot warfare (Drews 1993, 104, 114, 
119, 124): 
11 The persistent idea of 'warlike Mycenaeans' may stem from early associations with the 
Homeric epics and juxtapositions with supposedly 'peaceful Minoans'. Deger-Jalkotzy (1999) 
presents evidence for links between militarism and social status, and Davis and Bennet ( 1999, 
106) argue for the importance of warfare in the rise ofPylos. While some degree of warfare 
and conflict is likely, actual militarism in the sense of an unusual propensity for warfare or 
violence should be disconnected to some degree from ideological militarism, which is not an 
unusual feature of elite self-definition (Dickinson 2006a, 36). 
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The Catastrophe came about when men in 'barbarian' lands awoke to a 
truth that had been with them for some time: the chariot-based forces on 
which the Great Kingdoms relied could be overwhelmed by swarming 
infantries, the infantrymen being equipped with javelins, long swords, 
and a few essential pieces of defensive armor (Drews 1993, 1 04). 
The archaeological evidence for these changes in weapons has been 
systematically reviewed (Drews 1993, 174-208) and unusually, Drews (1993, 
221-222) also gives a vivid description of how he views the actual destruction 
of citadels and palace sites and who he believes the destroyers were. 'Raiders 
from Locris, Phocis and inland Thessaly' may have destroyed Boeotian palaces 
while sea raiders from coastal Thessaly and Achaea Phthiotis were responsible 
for other destructions, including Koukounaries on Paras (Drews 1993, 221-
222). While suggesting that sieges may have played a role, he emphasises the 
role of thousands of 'swarming javelineers' who would allegedly have been 
difficult for chariot archers to target, and who stormed cities (Drews 1993, 
222). 
Although he has produced a wide-ranging and stimulating discussion, Drews' 
basic arguments have not met with widespread acceptance (Cline 1997; 
Dickinson 1999c; Rutter 2000b ). In the first place, Rutter (2000b) rightly notes 
the difficulty in attributing a single cause as responsible for 'a very complex 
and multifaceted combination of events that involved a very large area over a 
century or more of time.' Similarly, Cline ( 1997, 129) disputes whether 
Drews' argument actually explains why the 'Catastrophe' occurred and 
suggests rather that we 'most likely must continue to look at a complex 
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multiple cause-and-effect series of events and processes' stating that 'his 'who' 
and 'how' are ... problematic, while his 'why' is the least satisfactory.' In fact, 
the basic premise of Drews' hypothesis, the reliance of LBA polities on chariot 
warfare, is extremely doubtful as applied to Greece, and indeed other areas, 
and this seriously undermines his argument. 
Firstly, on practical grounds alone, the topography and terrain of Greece would 
effectively prevent any reliance on chariots as the main instruments of battle, 
especially in the way that Drews envisions their use as mobile carts for archers 
(Drews 1993, 119; Rutter 2000b; Dickinson 1999c, 23-24). Drews (1988) has 
argued that the Mycenaean elite were in fact originally invading chariot-borne 
Proto-Indoeuropean speakers who used chariots to maintain their dominance, 
this is not convincing for various reasons (Dickinson 1999a), but in this context 
it should be noted that early representations of warfare from the Shaft Grave 
period 'consistently present warriors on foot' and the stele with chariot scenes 
'derive important iconographical elements from the Near East' (Dickinson 
1999c, 21 ). This is supported by the predominance of hand-to-hand weapons 
as opposed to arrowheads in graves, at least early on. This may represent a 
difference between ideology and practice - between how elites thought they 
should define themselves and what was actually done in practice, and, as 
interaction between Greece and the Near East became more intense, the 
importance to Mycenaean palaces of having and being seen to have chariots 
may have increased (Dickinson 1999c, 22). But as Driessen (1999, 14) 
comments 'we may argue whether its military role exceeded its symbolic 
significance.' 
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Drews (1993, 135-163) further argues that footsoldiers played an insignificant 
role, subordinate to chariot-warfare, as skirmishers or runners and dismisses 
the postpalatial 'WatTior Vase,' with its scene of marching footsoldiers, as a 
valid example of typical Mycenaean practices. However, he also dismisses 
from the argument the earlier and thus more relevant Pylos 'Battle Scene' 
fresco (Figure 3.1; Drews 1993, 140). He suggests that the scene shows high 
status warriors from the Pylos palace, clad in boar's tusk helmets, defeating 
skin-clad 'savages', but rather than an infantry battle, he suggests that it is a 
guerrilla, a set of individual duels. This fits with his notion that 'civ ilized' 
kingdoms would use footsoldiers when fighting barbarians, usually because 
they lived in places where chariots could not operate. In fact, a Hittite letter 
from the Ma~at archive refers to the use of chariot corps and footsoldiers 
against the Kaska (Kuhrt 1995, 257). 
Figure 3. 1 Pylos Battle Scene Fresco. Source: Drews 1993, 141 Plate 2. 
Drews is unsure whether the fresco shows a contemporary scene or a legendary 
event, but surely whatever the subject matter contemporary practices would 
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affect the portrayal, as in classical renditions of myths or Renaissance or any 
number of other paintings of historical scenes. Close examination of the Battle 
Scene must in any case affect Drews' conclusion since fragment 26 H 64 
appears to show 'warriors and a chariot' advancing right and the combat frieze 
'seems to have depicted both stationary chariot scenes and combats among 
infantrymen' (Davis and Bennet 1999, 109 and n.16). This combination could 
have been necessary in a variety of military encounters, since in attempting to 
take forts and towns through siege, chariots would have offered no advantage, 
and in fighting an enemy on foot, chariots may have looked impressive and 
threatening (Dickinson 1999c, 23). The Amama Letters also show that in the 
Near East requests for archers and infantry were a priority, and in Greece hand-
to-hand weapons remained prevalent, which may reflect the practical side of 
warfare rather better than any elite ideology, which may have been more 
focussed on chariots as a form of elite expression (Dickinson 1999c, 23-24). 
The exact nature of LBA warfare remains somewhat unclear and in fact Drews 
(1993, 98) admits that much is guesswork, but it is sure to have included a mix 
of weapons and tactics, which were deployed as leaders saw fit, and these need 
in no way be accurately represented by any painting, poem or other text. As 
for the actual advantage that Drews' barbarian footsoldiers would have had 
over the forces that could be mustered by a state, this also remains unclear, 
although in chapter 2, it was noted that 'barbarians' could, under certain 
circumstances, defeat better-equipped modem armies. However, any recourse 
to numerical superiority of barbarian 'hordes' is purely speculative and we can 
also suppose a basic advantage of local knowledge and resources to defenders. 
158 
3 Theories of Mycenaean collapse 
What can be noted is that it is unlikely to have been difficult to devise tactics to 
counter chariots, even if they had never been encountered, so any sudden 
revolution in tactics is unlikely (Dickinson 1999c, 23). Further, if Drews 
(1993, 153-157) is correct that barbarian contingents were hired as state 
mercenaries, then states would have already been familiar with and able to deal 
with their tactics. Even if there was a novel element to tactics, it is extremely 
difficult to see them as remaining unknown or successful for a period of 
perhaps 50 years (Dickinson 1999c, 24). 
Overall, Drews' thesis cannot be accepted, since any sudden and devastating 
revolution in tactics is most implausible, and it is in fact a new variation on the 
theme of barbarian invasions. It is difficult to see why all those living outside 
or on the margins of more complex societies ('barbarians') throughout the 
eastern Mediterranean would suddenly wish to destroy them, even if they were 
able to, and this still relies on a rather basic and tendentious characterisation of 
barbarians (see discussion in chapter 2). For Greece specifically, Dickinson 
( 1999c, 25) states of Drews' theory: 
I feel great scepticism about his notion that warlike 'barbarians,' in this 
case 'north Greek,' populations lived in close proximity to the most 
civilised parts of the Mycenaean world in the Peloponnese and Boeotia. 
Regions like Phocis, Locris, Phthiotis, Aetolia and Thessaly may not 
have been under the control of palaces with literate administration, but 
archaeologically they look very like the rest of the Mycenaean world, 
certainly no more warlike. 
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It may be though that, taken over a longer period of time, changes in access to 
weapons and in styles of fighting could quite plausibly have been involved in 
social change. 
Plagues and epidemics 
Significant decline and movement of population is one of the most notable 
features of the collapse (Dickinson 2006a, 67, 93-98). Although it is 
impossible to be precise about the level of actual population loss, given the fact 
that in some areas populations seem to have nucleated at certain sites and some 
regions (e.g. Achaea, Eubeoan Gulf) seem not to have experienced significant 
if any depopulation, it seems to be most notable in Messenia and perhaps the 
southern Argolid, given the level of abandonment of even small sites (Eder 
2006, 557; Crielaard 2006; Dickinson 1994, 308; Van Andel and Runnels 
1987, 98). However, older interpretations of massive population decline have 
been and remain influential (Dickinson 2006a, 93), and some scholars have 
sought to explain the collapse, long term population decline, as well as the 
introduction of cremation, by suggesting that repeated episodes of bubonic 
plague were responsible (Williams 1962; Wallee 1999). 
Williams ( 1962, 1 09) linked together the collapses or significant changes in the 
Aegean, the Near East, Egypt and Anatolia, and dismissed political events, the 
adoption of iron and invasions or migrations as likely causes of such 
widespread change. He also doubted any superiority in numbers or weaponry 
that putative invaders might have had, for although he believed in the validity 
of a Dorian invasion, he saw it as taking place possibly over a century with 
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small numbers that were 'not militarily formidable' into an essentially 
depopulated land (Williams 1962, 110, 120). Wall0e (1999, 121-122, 126) 
similarly dismisses other explanations for collapse and links the Mycenaean 
and Hittite collapses, as well as other disturbances in the eastern 
Mediterranean. 
Williams (1962, 113) notes that plague is extremely infectious and often 
deadly, tends to affect large areas, can spread rapidly and linger for years and 
affects animals and humans. Indeed it is significant when considering the 
agricultural nature of ancient societies that many diseases humans are 
susceptible to are shared by domesticated animals and rodents, and McNeill 
( 1998, 69-70) observes that 'probably all of the distinctive infectious diseases 
of civilization transferred to human populations from animal herds.' Large 
numbers of sheep are known to have existed from Linear B, with more than 
100,000 recorded at Knossos and a sizeable amount from Pylas, while other 
domesticates were also known (Dickinson 1994, 48). It would seem possible 
that, with the development of large herds, some communicable diseases could 
have developed or come to affect humans more seriously. 
Williams (1962, 111-112, 113-114) provides descriptions of many historical 
instances of plague from the classical world and medieval Europe, noting its 
devastating effects on human and animal populations. The Justinianic plague 
of 541AD, for example, recurred for over 200 years up to c.761AD and is 
reckoned to have killed some 200,000 people in Constantinople, 40% of its 
population, while an outbreak in 599-600AD killed 15% of the population of 
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Italy and southern France (Naphy and Spicer 2004, 14-15). The later Black 
Death may have killed a third of the population of Europe in three years and 
half the population of Britain between 1348-62AD (Williams 1962, 112). The 
effects on population may have lasted some centuries, reducing it until 
outbreaks eventually ceased (Walloe 1999, 122). Walloe (1999, 122) also 
notes these two pandemics and suggests that a similar pattern of events 
occurred in Greece between 1200 and 700. 
These historical plagues had serious effects at local and wider levels. Famine 
is a noted short-term effect (Walloe 1999, 121-122). Another is population 
movement, with some people fleeing infected areas (Walloe 1999, 122). This 
feature is notable in England between 1350-1500AD with the abandonment of 
some 1300 villages and migration into urban centres, which were also affected, 
although there are competing explanations for the phenomenon of deserted 
medieval villages (Naphy and Spicer 2004, 35). Plague could evidently cause 
profound changes in settlement patterns and demography over time. Walloe 
( 1999, 123) notes that in the aftermath of the Justinianic plague in Italy, there 
was some movement of a scattered population to 'concentrated settlements on 
nearby hilltops or to places which were more defensible,' which can be 
compared with changes in settlement patterns around c.1200 and after in 
Greece and the Aegean, but especially in Crete (Rutter 1992, 68-70; Haggis 
1993; Nowicki 1998 and 2000). 
Walloe (1999, 123) also notes that mortality was higher amongst the ruling 
classes, perhaps because they were a smaller proportion of society as a whole, 
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while another important effect of the Black Death in England was the impact 
on trades, with apprenticeships being shortened and recruitment taking place at 
a younger age and from outside traditional groups, thus plague 'at almost every 
level of society, increased opportunity and mobility' (Naphy and Spicer 2004, 
35). If the plague hypothesis is valid, it may have affected the elite most 
seriously and this could have played a role in causing the demise of the palatial 
system and the skills and economy it supported both directly and indirectly. It 
could plausibly explain the loss of literacy, which was extremely restricted, 
presumably amongst the elite or a professional class, but could also explain the 
continuity and transformation in the artistic repertoire and the loss of certain 
probably quite limited skills in specialist craft production (Rutter 1992, 70; 
Dickinson 2006a, 72-73). 
Plague also had a noted effect on the operations of organised power both 
central authorities and at local levels, disrupting incomes from taxation as well 
as causing organisational problems due to increased mortality itself (Walloe 
1999, 123 ). Social unrest, disorder and civil war could result from this, due in 
part to the increased burden placed on the general population to create more 
revenue. Whilst the economies of the palace societies of Mycenaean Greece 
were very different in scale and complexity to those of the later Roman Empire 
and medieval England, it is easy to see that high mortality due to plague would 
similarly disrupt agriculture and the production and circulation of other goods 
and interrupt the functioning of society generally. Similar outbreaks of 
lawlessness and banditry could have occurred and Walloe (1999, 123) notes of 
Italy that the elite were no longer able to protect the population, leading to the 
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changed settlement patterns mentioned above. This lack of strong central 
power and instability seems to fit with the kind of unstable and more mobile 
society suggested for postpalatial Greece (Dickinson 2006a, 69-72). 
Furthermore, a younger society forced to adapt to new conditions and already 
dislocated might be thought more willing to engage in the mobility and 
opportunism that is suggested for postpalatial Greece (Dickinson 2006a, 66, 
71). Taken together, these changes would initiate something of a new outlook 
on life that would remember the palatial past and material heritage but 
primarily seek to deal with present conditions with existing skills and 
knowledge. 
Williams (1962, 114, 116, 122) also suggests that the rite of cremation may 
have been adopted because of the plague, as Thucydides noted occurred during 
the Athenian plague, although he also notes that it would only be possible 
'where the attack rate was relatively low'. While cremation may have spread 
from Anatolia westwards to be used sporadically in Greece, as Williams (1962, 
124) argues, it was also in use in Italy and could have been adopted from both 
regions. Nevertheless, cremations were rare and the pattern of early 
cremations does not follow the pattern of palatial destructions, with the 
exception of those at Khania (near Mycenae) and Thebes, which belong to 
LHIIIC Middle. Most early cremations occurred in the non-palatial regions of 
the western Peloponnese, Achaea, Elis and Arcadia, the Aegean Islands and 
Crete (Dickinson 2006a, 73). In the postpalatial period cremation was 
sometimes used but usually alongside inhumation and while it became more 
popular and was used in more sites in the EIA the regional trend continued. 
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Cremation only became standard in Athens in the PG period (Dickinson 2006a, 
186). It seems unlikely that the selective adoption of cremation had anything 
to do with any plague that may have affected palatial regions. 
The main problem with the plague hypothesis is the lack of positive evidence. 
Wallee (1999, 123-125) attempts to use a description of a plague amongst the 
Philistines from the Old Testament First Book of Samuel, which it is argued 
contains historical detail pertaining to the 11th century, as contemporary 'strong 
documentary evidence of bubonic plague in the same region at the relevant 
time'. But this evidence can only be analogical, since it hardly relates to the 
same region and falls too late to provide positive evidence of plague in Greece 
around 1200. Wallee (1999, 123, 125) also argues that the Philistines were of 
Aegean origin, although this not necessary to his theory, and he seems to 
suggest that plague may have been communicated between Greece and 
Philistia via ship borne rodents. It is perhaps implied that plague was carried 
from Greece to Philistia where it recurred subsequently. 
There is evidence for plagues in the LBA (probably late 141h century) affecting 
Alashiya (Moran 1992, 107) and the Hittites (Bryce 1998, 223-225), which, 
according to the texts at least, had devastating effects on the copper industry in 
Alashiya, and religion and agriculture in Ratti, also laying it more exposed to 
attack. Since there were interconnections between all these regions, it is 
perfectly possible that any communicable plague of disease could have been 
transmitted to the Aegean region. A lack of textual evidence for plague in 
Greece is not surprising, given the restricted uses of literacy no explicit 
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mention would be expected, although some of the Pylian evidence often used 
to argue for an imminent military threat could be interpreted to suggest 
reactions to plague, but that is equally speculative. 
Much about the plague hypothesis seems attractive in the way it can explain 
the changes in settlement pattern, material and social culture and long-term 
decline in population levels. The palace systems may have been unable to cope 
with any serious plague and those running them would have been directly 
affected, as would the wider population. In explaining the variability of 
collapse, it could also be suggested that if a plague entered Greece from 
outside, it would be more likely to enter and affect palatial areas with contacts 
abroad, although all of Greece was interconnected. Although absolute numbers 
are difficult to determine, palatial areas may have been more densely settled 
and thus more seriously affected, while possibly less populous peripheral areas 
may have been less affected, although it is the case that both rural and more 
densely settled areas can be affected by plague. Effects would simply be more 
archaeologically visible in palatial areas through the demise of the palace 
centres themselves. If Messenia was as densely populated as some suggest, it 
may best fit this scenario. It has been noted that the first occurrence of Black 
Death affected both rural and urban areas but in its second outbreak was more 
limited to the more densely populated places (Naphy and Spicer 2004, 34-35). 
Such a pattern could explain the prolonged decline of population in some parts 
of Greece, including those affected by the collapse but which enjoyed a degree 
of postpalatial prosperity, such as Tiryns. To explain the destructions 
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themselves, however, plague is not enough; it would have to have been coupled 
with violence, but in such circumstances that is not unimaginable. 
Warfare, internal strife and competition 
An alternative approach to a single wave of destructions was suggested by 
Mylonas, who thought that the contemporaneity of the destructions had been 
overemphasised (1966). This possibility has similarly been stressed in more 
recent approaches (e.g. Popham 1994, 281; see chapter 1). Rather than one 
wave of destruction, interstate warfare and/or internal problems could have 
been responsible for destructions at major sites at different times (Hooker 
1976, 177). This suggests that there could be a variety of reasons for the 
destructions and that different groups could have carried them out at different 
times, and mitigates the requirement for the presence of any external enemy. 
Mylonas's inspiration for his argument was the later Greek myths associated 
with Mycenaean centres such as Thebes and Mycenae and the stories of their 
ruling families. Even though the narrative and historical value of the later 
myths as relating to the LBA may rightly be questioned, they nevertheless 
suggest by analogy a plausible truth about the nature of Mycenaean palace 
society, that it may have been made up of a network of elites within and 
between regions. Palace states may have existed as 'centres of alliances and 
systems of subordination and dependence' (Dickinson pers.comm.). In the 
Argo lid, with its high concentration of major sites, this may be especially true 
but links between palace states and non-palace state areas may also be expected 
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(Eder 2007) and some palatial interest m the Aegean islands, especially 
Rhodes, also seems likely. 
Although little is known about their interrelations from Linear B, which 
contains few references, the archaeology and pottery does indicate that 
exchange took place between palaces on the mainland and between the 
mainland and Crete (Bennet 2006 201-204). Gift exchange between elites, as 
well as intermarriage and hospitality, would also have served both to link elites 
across regions, as well as to reinforce their different status within the local 
community (Voutsaki 2001, 206). However, these links need not in any way 
prevent warfare or competition between palatial elites (Driessen 1999, 19) and 
this may have taken the form of conspicuous expenditure on fortifications, 
often cited as a sign of anxiety. In fact, Tainter ( 1988, 202) has suggested the 
collapse was caused when 'Mycenaean petty states became ... locked into 
competitive spirals, each had to make ever greater investments in military 
strength and organizational complexity' leading to 'essentially simultaneous' 
collapse. 
Warfare itself has been identified as a 'most intensive way of peer polity 
interaction' (Driessen 1999, 20). The Linear B records clearly demonstrate 
that palaces had military interests, since they list military resources, weapons, 
armour and chariots, and possibly sometimes the mobilisation of forces 
(Palmer 1961, 172-182, 203 and Palmer 1963; 147-163, 314-337; Taylour 
1983, 135-141; Dickinson 2006a, 55). By analogy with the classical period, 
with its mix of independent political units, we may expect that warfare was not 
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an unusual feature in LBA Greece (Deger-Jalkotzy 1999, 124), but even when 
warfare was more usual than peace, it need not indicate a 'militaristic' or 
'warlike' society. 
Although Rutter (2000b) criticises Mylonas's hypothesis because it fails to 
explain why the palaces were not rebuilt, it could be plausible that, should a 
dynasty have been dethroned by another, the replacement, whether it be the 
conqueror or a new local elite, may have chosen to express its power in a 
different way, rather than ape its failed predecessor. This depends on how they 
wished to express themselves and arrange society. Equally, if the elite of a 
given area suffered high casualties in battle, the infrastructure supporting the 
palace and linking it with its hinterland and region may have disappeared or at 
least changed substantially. This severance or dislocation would have 
precluded, reduced or hindered resource mobilisation through existing social 
links, and made it difficult for a palatial authority to continue to dominate. 
Altered social linkages may have resulted in a failure to replicate exactly 
palace ideology with its vertical hierarchy, and the case ofTiryns, with its elite 
housing, may represent such a restructuring (see chapter 6). Warfare could 
equally cause problems through rendering areas unsafe for agriculture and local 
populations, causing flight and/or nucleation. Thus internecine warfare could 
explain the physical destruction of palace societies over a prolonged period, as 
well as changed settlement patterns. 
To these factors linked with warfare between polities can be added conflict 
within polities. This can act as a destabilising factor in itself or as an added 
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feature alongside other problems. Conflict within polities can take many forms 
and only a few will be mentioned here. Mylonas' (1966) notion of conflict 
within and between ruling families is hardly far-fetched, even if deriving from 
mythical examples. Competition within royal families and problematic 
successions can often provide destabilising factors that can lead to serious 
divisions within polities and civil war. The wars in England between Stephen 
and Matilda, following the death of Henry I, resulted in civil war, a divided 
England, revolt in Wales and the temporary loss of Northumbria (Gillingham 
and Griffiths 2000, 19-23). However, this of course did not lead to the collapse 
of England. In the Hittite kingdom, rival claims to the throne were evidently 
problematic due to the number of royal descendants and these concerns were 
expressed quite frankly by Tudhaliya IV (Bryce 1998, 332-334). In this case, 
these could have played a role in the Hittite collapse (discussed further in 
chapter 4 ). Rivals could provide alternative leadership and exacerbate existing 
problems, especially concerning the maintenance and integration of vassals 
within one overarching structure. Although we know nothing of the 
arrangements for the succession of wanaktes in LBA Greece, we may expect 
that similar situations could have arisen within any royal family. 
The presence of other leading families could also pose a threat, and indeed 
faction and competition is cited as a feature of the fonnation of palace culture 
(Wright 2001; 2006, 41). Furthermore, it seems that in the course of palatial 
expansion, there was a military aspect (Davis and Bennet 1999, 1 06) as well as 
the incorporation of local elites into bigger power structures presumably 
through other means (Shelmerdine 2001b, 127, 128; Palaima 2006, 68-69). 
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These local elites will have continued to exist and the relationship between 
them and palace elites should be seen as reciprocal. However, the existence of 
local elites would have formed an ever present potential for social cleavage and 
in the context of palatial relations with local elites, this can be seen as a real 
threat to the maintenance of stability and palatial authority. The existence of 
other leading families at the centre would have had a similar effect. 
Although the case for interstate warfare, internal strife and competition as 
causes or features of the collapse cannot be proven, they are 'eminently 
plausible' (Dickinson 2006a, 54). It is inherently likely that these dynamic 
palace polities, each containing a range and variety of individuals and groups 
with individual motivations, engaged in reciprocal relationships and balances 
of power and interest, did have the potential for instability and the breaking 
down of social structures at a variety of levels in themselves and between them. 
Local structures absorbed into an overarching hierarchy may have been more 
easily detached from it. If one polity was destroyed, and there is no need to see 
the destruction and utter failure of the polity necessarily as a conscious desire 
of the attackers, whether by a neighbour or by competing groups within it, this 
would have affected the situation in other areas. Any reactions to prevent such 
a situation in other polities, either by leading groups attempting to increase 
control, exterminate rivals or any number of other possible actions, could 
equally have fomented further antagonism thus precipitating problems that may 
not otherwise have arisen. 
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Such a situation need not necessarily have been present in all areas of Greece. 
In Carinthia, Morgan (1999, 365-366) has argued against both invasion and 
implicitly warfare, suggesting that there is 'no reason to assume anything other 
than a very gradual and peaceful transformation of community life' and 
Corinth 'gained in size and importance during LHIIIC'. However, even areas 
that were unaffected or uninvolved directly by warfare between palatial centres 
or internal problems within them, would have been affected by the general 
changes within the Mycenaean region as a whole. 
Certainly, the merits of this hypothesis rest in the active role gtven to 
participants, who engage in realistic and historically well-attested behaviours. 
It accepts a more dynamic view of societies as venues for social action, 
cooperation and competition between groups and individuals. Perhaps, in the 
way that collapse could occur accidentally from such events, it also deals with 
the motivation so often lacking in generic theories of invasion, and migration 
or barbarians. Those competing for power or influence may not have set out to 
destroy their own world on purpose and likely would not have expected it as a 
consequence of their actions, even though these actions may have disrupted the 
very foundations of their own society. These active elements ofthe hypothesis 
could easily have combined with other problems to create a very different 
postpalatial world, yet one inextricably linked to its palatial predecessor. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the major theories that have been used to explain 
the collapse of Mycenaean palatial culture, yet it is impossible to prove that 
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any single one of them is correct. It might be suggested that monocausal 
explanations are inherently unlikely, and indeed this largely reflects current 
views of collapse. Shelmerdine (2001a, 376) notes that 'it is improbable that 
all these phenomena, at all sites, could have had a single cause. Indeed many 
now agree that a combination of factors must have been at work.' The three 
most recent summaries (Hall2007, 51-55; Bennet 2006, 209; Dickinson 2006a, 
43-56) follow this reasoning and all suggest a degree of scholarly consensus 
that represents valid progress in understanding the Mycenaean collapse (see 
Table 3.2). 
Dickinson Bennet Hall 
Internal Plausible factor, Local 
warfare/strife/conflict leading to phenomena 
dismantling of directed against 
states and the palatial 
instability centres 
Economic Possible - may Importance of Links between 
involve long-distance palaces 
competition. trade in elite themselves and 
Also links self-definition - Near East were 
between Near disturbances in vital 
East and east would 
Aegean have affected 
Aegean 
System collapse Cumulative Cause and result, 
effect of explains 
disturbances, widespread 
perhaps from nature of 
local to regional colla_IJ_se 
Raiders, pirates and Instability in Effects on trade 
others Near East, routes and sites, 
though Sea but not the same 
Peoples as Egyptian Sea 
dubious. Peoples 
Raiding and 
some seizure of 
territory could 
have taken 
place 
Earthquakes Catalyst for Possibly Could have 
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trouble or affected storage 
exacerbated and otherwise 
existing caused 
situation problems, 
vulnerability and 
demoralisation 
Climate and famine Could have led Possibly- Could have been 
to civil would have present as a 
disturbances been a trigger, or an 
and conflict, not destabilising extra problem 
universal but factor 
perhaps in areas 
such as 
Messenia it 
would explain 
depopulation 
(though Linear 
B suggests no 
agricultural 
problem) 
Pla2ue/ disease Possibly_ Possibly 
Rejection of Yes Yes Yes 
('Dorian' and other) 
migration theory 
Table 3.2 Likely factors involved in the collapse, according to recent publications. 
Sources: after Hall2007, 51-55; Bennet 2006, 209; Dickinson 2006a, 43-56. 
Significantly, these three works reject migration from both the archaeological 
perspective and the use of Greek traditions. Rather than seeking to reconcile 
these two distinct categories of evidence, Greek traditions are appreciated for 
what they are and what they do and are placed squarely as evidence for how 
groups much later on perceived themselves, rather than anything to do with 
actual peoples or events at the end of the LBA (Dickinson 2006a, 51; Hall 
2007, 43-51 ). Although there may be different emphases, for example Hall 
(2007, 55) stressed the interlinked economies of the palaces in Greece and 
between these and the Near East while Dickinson (2006a, 55,56) stresses inter-
palatial and internal conflict, they both agree that many factors could have 
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played a role in triggering events or making a situation worse, and that a 
variety of individual local or regional scenarios are possible. 
The collapse of the palatial societies is best explained as a complex set of 
interlinked processes and events that occurred over a period of perhaps three or 
more decades. It involved the internal structure of palace societies and their 
links with hinterlands and local elites as well as their relationships with the 
Near East. Palaces can be expected to have been competitive both internally 
and between themselves and it is not unlikely that this was expressed in 
warfare and combat. Localised environmental factors involving climate or 
earthquakes, as well as plague or epidemics, could easily have played 
destabilising roles and the severity and timing of these will have been 
significant, since if they coincided with other problems their effects could have 
been magnified, with different outcomes possible at different times. Since the 
palace-based societies seem to have been dependent on overseas links, any 
disruption of these links, either through actions far away or through 
competition for resources at home would have reduced the ability to maintain 
society in the same way and would naturally have resulted in restructuring. 
Seen in combination, the physical destruction of any palace in such 
circumstances would make it unlikely that it could have been rebuilt in the 
same way. The physical destructions and abandonments that mark the collapse 
simultaneously make clear and obscure the changing social relationships in 
Greece at the end of the palace period and into the postpalatial period. They 
show us the results of a problem but not the problem itself. The failure to 
rebuild the palaces and carry on as before suggests both rejection and inability, 
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which identifies social and ideological, as well as economic and organisational 
changes. Meanwhile, transformations in non-palatial Greece, which did not 
have palaces to collapse, indicate the wide effect of these changes. It is often 
suggested that these regions benefited from the demise of the palaces, but the 
increasing importance in the postpalatial period of regions that had not had 
palace societies, or had been peripheral to them, may in itself suggest a 
possible cause of the collapse that only becomes visible later. 
176 
4 The processes of collapse 
4 The processes of collapse 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss some of the processes at work in other 
ancient societies that experienced collapses, in order to suggest by analogy the 
likelihood that similar processes were at work in the Mycenaean collapse. 
While Torelli (2000) notes that 'comparisons between cultures which are not 
themselves in contact are of uncertain significance and debatable value', he 
was concerned with interpreting figurative expressions1 which may be expected 
to be laden with meaning unique to the cultures that produced them. Where 
instances of human interaction, the basis of all societies, are the focus, such 
comparisons are likely to be more useful, as Scarre (1994, 75) observes, 'some 
aspects of past human behaviour are naturally much more accessible to us than 
others.' It is altogether appropriate that, in the absence of texts, analogy can 
and should be used 'to stimulate your imagination' (Hawkes 1954, quoted in 
Scarre 1994, 7 5) even if it cannot be expected to provide proof of anything. As 
has been seen in the preceding chapters, incontrovertible proof and total 
consensus in archaeology are perhaps unachievable goals. 
Nevertheless, for a non-specialist, such a task runs the risk of accepting 
conclusions in secondary sources that may be controversial or disputed, 
something for which Tainter (1988) and others have been criticised. However, 
what must be stressed here is that it is the social process and interactions that 
are the main concern, rather than the specific historical detail or conclusions 
about the ultimate causes of individual collapses. In order to avoid the 
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criticisms levelled at others for such syntheses, an effort has been made to 
make use of the most recent and authoritative research, some of which was 
introduced in chapter 2. Furthermore, there is no attempt to force this evidence 
into a single general explanation of the cause of collapse, rather the aim is to 
highlight the kind of problems that may have faced the Mycenaean palace 
states and been potential factors in their collapse. 
This approach is necessary because of the difficulties observed in chapter 2, of 
applying any generic collapse theory to specific examples of collapse, and in 
chapter 3, of understanding the exact causes and process involved in the 
Mycenaean collapse. In fact, so little is known for certain of the operations of 
Mycenaean palace societies that these analogies can also prove useful for 
developing a deeper understanding of their dynamic nature. The three 
collapses chosen for discussion are those of the Hittites, the Classic Maya 
(hereafter Maya) and the Western Roman Empire. As outlined in the 
introduction and chapter 2, these have not been chosen for direct similarities 
either in material or non-material culture, and an obvious difference between 
Mycenaean palatial societies and the Hittites and Romans is the sheer scale 
involved. This is no necessary drawback in considering essentially human 
relationships. A major difference in our understanding of these societies and 
their collapses lies in the textual evidence they have left, which allows us to 
observe with far greater accuracy actual events and processes that were likely 
contributory factors to their collapse and fragmentation, features which can 
only be guessed at in the Mycenaean context. 
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The Hittites 
The Hittite kingdom developed in the centre of the Anatolian plateau, in the 
Land of Hatti, early in the seventeenth century (Bryce 2002, 8-9; Figure 4.1 ). 12 
In the course of some five centuries an empire was created covering much of 
Anatolia to northern Syria and western Mesopotamia and extending south to 
the Mediterranean and perhaps sometimes to Cyprus. In the west, its influence 
extended towards the Aegean, especially after the destruction of Arzawa by 
Mursili II in the period equivalent to Mycenaean LHIIIA2, and some contact 
between Mycenaeans and Hittites at a variety of levels and in a variety of 
contexts is likely, or if Ahhiyawa is accepted as a Mycenaean kingdom is 
certain (Mountjoy 1998; Bryce 2002, 257-261; Niemeier 1998, 41-43; 
Niemeier 1999 and 2005), although the Hittites relations with other Great 
Kingdoms to the east and south were more significant, at least in tenus of 
international prestige (Bryce 2002, 9). These international relationships often 
had both political and military aspects. 
The kingdom was ruled by a royal dynasty, and kings who claimed equal status 
with other Great Kings, who were in contact and rivalry with each other. It 
was inhabited by many different population groups and was multi-lingual and 
multi-ethnic (Bryce 2002, 252). Although there were universal laws and royal 
officials, many areas were governed by traditional laws and practices, and the 
emphasis was 'on local communities becoming as self-regulatory as possible, 
with less and less involvement by the central authority of the state' (Bryce 
2002, 39). Like the Mycenaean palace societies, the Hittite kingdom collapsed 
12 Bryce ( 1998) is accepted by Hope Simpson (2003, 204) as the current reference work on the 
Hittites, although inevitably some specific historical points remain controversial. 
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c.1200 during the reign of the last king Suppiluliuma II ( 1207 - ?) and many 
similar reasons for this have been suggested (Bryce 1998, 367-391). 
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Figure 4.1 LBA Anatolia and the Near East. Source: Bryce 2002, Map 1. 
The Hittite kingdom offers several advantages for the study of its collapse over 
that of the Mycenaean palace societies, although any interpretation remains far 
from straightforward, and of course the Hittite kingdom existed on a far 
grander scale (Bryce 1998, 374-379). Much more about its internal structure 
and external relations, as well as specific events, is known from the many 
tablets, whole and fragmentary, excavated at the capital Hattusa, as well as at 
various administrative centres, and these fonn the main source for Hittite 
history (Bryce 1998, 416-417). These archives contain a wealth of information 
of different kinds. The archive at Ma~at, for example, is a record of 
correspondence between the kings and local officials much of it concerning 
dealings with the Kaska (Bryce 1998, 417 n.6). Also the tablets include: 
180 
4 The processes of collapse 
annalistic records relating the achievements of the kings who composed 
them, decrees, political correspondence, treaties between kings and 
their foreign counterparts or vassal rulers, administrative texts, edicts, a 
collection of laws, ritual and festival texts, and a number of 
mythological and literary texts (Bryce 1998, 424). 
A further source of information comes from the royal correspondence in the 
Amama Letters (Moran 1992), datable to the fourteenth century, and the later 
letters between the courts of Hattusili III and Ramesses II in the thirteenth 
century (Bryce 1998, 425). The prominence of texts over archaeology in 
Hittite studies is understandable, since the nature of the documentary evidence 
allows the writing of both narrative political history (Bryce 1998) and social 
history (Bryce 2002), although the two can be successfully combined 
(Macqueen 1986). Although they can never be more than analogy, the 
experiences recorded by the texts, which show the trials and tribulations of a 
LBA kingdom, are extremely suggestive for filling in the gaps that exist 
between the very limited Linear B records and Mycenaean material culture, 
since they show a range of contemporary political and social realities. These 
will be explored thematically and related to the Mycenaean situation. 
Barbarians and vassals 
As noted in chapters 2 and 3, barbarians have played an influential role in 
general collapse theories, and in theories of Mycenaean collapse, in the guise 
of Dorians, North Greeks, Sea Peoples, and as raiders, invaders and migrants. 
As such they may have been responsible for battles and expenditure, 
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destructions, agricultural problems and the interruption of trade routes. While 
certainly the evidence is unclear in the case of the Mycenaeans, the case of the 
Hittites offers a contemporary reality of a kingdom surrounded by potentially 
and actually aggressive enemies, only one group of which will be discussed 
here. 
Throughout its history, the Hittite homeland was threatened by, amongst 
others, a people called the Kaska, 'a loose confederation of mountain 
kingdoms' or tribes, located in the Pontic region north of the Hittite homeland 
(Bryce 1998, 49). Early on they were noted as attacking northern Anatolian 
cities involved in trade with Assyrian merchants (Bryce 1998, 64). The Ma~at 
letters also show that the Kaska would attack due to agricultural shortfalls in 
their own region, caused by plagues of locusts or other adverse conditions 
(Kuhrt 1995, 257). It is also likely that they attempted some degree of 
territorial expansion. The threat posed by the Kaska was very real and on 
several occasions they successfully invaded and occupied Hittite territory even 
resulting in the effective abandonment of Hattusa as the capital and the 
relocation of the court south to Tarhuntassa (Bryce 1998, 49: Bryce 2002, 17-
18, 232-233). The Hittite response was to create a buffer zone in the north-east 
and also to engage in regular warfare (Macqueen 1986, 53-54; Bryce 1998, 
49). 
Events during the reign ofMursilis II (c.1321-1295) show the persistent threat 
they represented. On his accession, the Kaska had already been attacking 
Hittite territory and the death of the governor sent to deal with them intensified 
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the crisis caused by the death of Arnuwanda II (Bryce 1998, 207). For the first 
two years of his reign, Mursilis fought punitive campaigns against the Kaska 
before having to tum his attention to problems elsewhere (Bryce 1998, 209). 
In the fifth year of his reign he was forced to deal with their continuing 
aggression and their attack on Hattusa itself in the most ruthless of ways. He 
attacked and conquered the Kaska land of Ziharriya, slaughtered the population 
and burned its city (Bryce 1998, 215). Such campaigns took up much of the 
second half of Mursili' s reign (Bryce 1998, 234 ). 
It is likely the Kaska were difficult for the Hittites to deal with for a variety of 
reasons, not least their proximity and the vulnerability of the northern 
homeland to attack from Kaska regions (Bryce 1998, 49). Even following 
defeat in battle, the Kaska were difficult to integrate as subjects because of the 
'absence of any clear coherent political structure' similar to other peoples, 
which meant that 'the Hittites had no firm foundation on which to attempt to 
build a vassal state system in the Kaska region' (Bryce 1998, 235). Thus 
treaties between the Hittites and Kaska involved communities of Kaska (Kuhrt 
1995, 257). However, while the Kaska had towns and cities and apparently 
organised themselves as a tribal people sometimes with leaders, who may on 
occasion have acted in concert, attempts may have been made by individuals to 
increase their own power and influence, and one Kaska chief or neighbouring 
dynast who had managed to become a Kaska chief, Pihhuniya, was noted by 
Mursili II as ruling 'in the manner of a king' (Bryce 1998, 215; Kuhrt 1995, 
257-258). In fact, he was able to incorporate the Upper Land, north-east of the 
Hittite homeland, into Kaska territory. An alternative policy of repopulating 
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areas wasted by constant war in order to increase the effectiveness of the buffer 
zone was also attempted, although this proved ineffective (Bryce 1998, 243). 
There were peaceful contacts also between the Hittites and Kaska, some of 
whom were recognised as allies. However, even the allied Kaska, though 
granted some grazing rights and access to Hittite territory, were banned from 
settling in Hittite towns, and this policy is likely to have created some 
resentment and tension (Bryce 1998, 272). 
In the reign of Tudhaliya IV (c.1237-1209), shortly before the collapse of the 
Hittite kingdom, the Kaska and others remained a serious threat (Bryce 1998, 
337). The subsequent short-lived kings Arnuwanda III and Suppiluliuma II 
probably continued to face this threat and Bryce ( 1998, 3 79) has suggested 
that: 
However one explains the weakened state which led to its destruction -
internal political instability - severely depleted defence capabilities -
communication networks and supply lines in disarray - critical 
shortages of food and other resources - the royal capital perhaps fell 
victim, finally and irretrievably, to an enemy who had plagued the 
Hittites from almost the beginning of their history, an enemy over 
whom they had triumphed, but from whose menace they had never been 
completely secure. 
The Kaska show the capability of neighbouring, but less centrally organised, 
peoples to defeat a complex Late Bronze Age state with an anny, destroy the 
capital of a powerful and extensive empire, displace its royal court for 
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considerable periods, annex part of its territory, and pose a long-term threat 
that diverted both attention and resources from other matters. The Linear B 
records are mute in terms of recording such enemies in Mycenaean Greece, but 
one piece of evidence could suggest that barbarians and palatial forces might 
have fought, although it is open to several interpretations, which prevents a 
definite conclusion being reached. 
The Pylos 'Battle Fresco' was mentioned in chapter 3, and appears to show 
palace warriors confronting skin-clad enemies near a river (Davis and Bennet 
1999). Some interpret the scene as depicting perhaps the foundation myth of 
Pylos or another mythical scene, but it may equally represent real enemies 
although depicted in a way that suited the palace ideology, creating a clear 
distinction in identity. There may also have been a similar fresco at Mycenae 
(Hood 1978, 80). Such characterisations of the other are familiar themes in 
self-definition and need not be accurate representations. Y alouris (1989, cited 
in Torelli 2000) has identified the battle depicted with one from the Iliad 
(7 .133-137), but even despite the major problem of accepting that the Homeric 
poems recall any specific events from the LBA, the enemy being fought by the 
Pylians, or at least their leader Ereuthalion, wore armour. While it may be 
doubted that any inhabitants of Greece would be wearing skins to battle in the 
late palatial period, or that there were particularly warlike or less Mycenaean 
people in Greece, even in non-palatial areas, some small scale local raiding 
'from the rougher or poorer parts of the Greek mainland' or conflict could have 
taken place (Dickinson 2006a, 48, 50). 
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Vassals also played a destabilising role in Hittite affairs but at the same time 
were part of the process of Hittite expansion and attempts at consolidation 
(Kuhrt 1995, 266-270). Vassalage was imposed by Hittite kings through 
treaties with individual rulers that included military and tribute obligations and 
often marriage alliance with a Hittite princess, in which she was to be accorded 
a higher status than other wives and her children were to succeed to the throne 
(Bryce 1998, 51). Treaties sought to ensure that vassals were loyal to the 
Hittite king and forbade them from concluding treaties or having military or 
political dealings with other rulers. This was especially important in 
attempting to forestall coalitions against the Hittites themselves and could offer 
some, usually temporary, stability (Bryce 1998, 52). Nevertheless, 'Hittite 
kings were often plagued by treacherous behaviour from disloyal vassal rulers 
and by rebellions in vassal states which overthrew their pro-Hittite rulers' 
(Bryce 1998, 53). The independence ofTarhuntassa sometime during the reign 
of Tudhaliya IV, where for some time the Hittite capital had been located, and 
loss of control of the port of Ura, where grain shipments were probably 
received, may have proved particularly damaging (Bryce 1998, 364). Needless 
to say, any particularly inopportune combination of uprisings by vassals along 
with attacks by the Kaska and others could prove extremely difficult to deal 
with, even more so if other negative factors were also present. 
Although the Mycenaean palace states were smaller units, their process of 
expansion into overarching power structures probably meant the incorporation 
of pre-existing local elites, and in some cases this may have had similarities 
with vassalage. When Pylas expanded its influence into eastern Messenia, 
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which became the Further Province (Beyond-Aigaleon), it seems to have done 
so at the expense of Leuktron (Bennet 1995). Leuktron may originally have 
expanded in parallel with Pylos, as a local elite/royal centre in its own right, 
only later to become subordinate to Pylos, but it is possible that there may have 
been some sort of vassal relationship between them. Other palaces may also 
have had vassal-type relationships with local centres. As mentioned in chapter 
1, Thebes appears to have had influence over southern Euboea and perhaps 
even the island of Aegina. This need not have involved direct rule from the 
palace but may have been more like a vassal relationship, with a high degree of 
local autonomy and duties to fulfil specific obligations to the centre. Although 
the interrelations of sites within the Argolid is problematic, if this region did 
seek control of or influence over some the Aegean islands, this may also have 
been similar in nature. At any rate, interrelations between elites whether 
involving vassalage, alliance or more direct incorporation could have been as 
problematic for the Mycenaean palace states as they were for the Hittites, and 
any concentration of military forces away from the centre could have been 
dangerous, leaving it vulnerable, as was the case for Hattusa. 
Plague and famine 
The texts reveal some evidence for factors that might otherwise remam 
invisible from an archaeological perspective: occurrences of plague and the 
possibility of famine. A virulent plague is known to have occurred beginning 
in the last years of Suppiluliuma I ( c.1344-1322) and to have continued well 
into the reign of Mursili II (Bryce 1998, 223). Although it is difficult to 
ascertain the damage caused by the plague or its distribution, Mursili's plague 
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prayer notes widespread depopulation and some of its effects, particularly on 
agriculture and production connected to the practice of cult, which may be 
expected to have been of interest to the gods. There would likely have been 
effects outside this sphere, and Amama Letter 35, from the king of Alashiya, 
similarly connects the death of coppersmiths and reduced production with 
plague (Moran 1992, 1 07). It is significant that in Mursili's prayer, plague is 
also linked with hostility from surrounding areas: 
The Land of Hatti, all of it, is dying; so that no one prepares sacrificial 
loaves and libations for you. The ploughmen who used to work the 
fields of the god are dead ... Man has lost his wits, and there is nothing 
that we do aright ... 
0 gods, take pity on the Land of Hatti! On the one hand it is afflicted 
with a plague, on the other it is afflicted with hostility ... Now all the 
surrounding countries have begun to attack the Land of Hatti (Bryce 
1998, 224). 
This plague may have been responsible for the death of Mursili's brother and 
predecessor, Amuwanda II, their father Suppiluliuma I, and possibly the 
governor sent by Amuwanda to deal with the Kaska (Bryce 1998, 207). 
Although there is no mention of any plague affecting the Hittites c.1200, it 
must be remembered that plague may reoccur over long periods of time and 
that the record provided by the tablets is not complete. The archives at Hattusa 
'must have suffered substantial damage and disruption' due to attacks and the 
relocation of the capital, as well as removal and rebuilding on site (Bryce 1998, 
417 -418). Any plague that may have affected one or other of the Mycenaean 
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palace states could similarly have laid them open to serious vulnerability from 
others, as well as disrupting agriculture and production and society in general, 
although it must be noted that the plague that affected Athens in 430, which 
does not appear to have spread, did not lead immediately to the loss of the 
Peloponnesian war nor indeed to the collapse of Athens (JACT 1984, 28-29). 
An increasing concern with securing grain from Egypt and Canaan has also 
been noted from the middle of the thirteenth century, leading some to suggest 
that there was long term famine, perhaps due to drought or climatic factors, 
although human interference is an equally likely cause (Bryce 1998, 356, 375). 
In a letter to Ramesses II, the Hittite queen Pudehepa referred to a lack of grain 
in her lands (Bryce 1998, 356 n.l15). A Hittite prince was sent to Egypt to 
organise what Bryce suggests were regular imports from Egypt, which must 
have come up the Levantine coast to Ugarit and thence to the port of Ura in 
Tarhuntassa (Bryce 1998, 356-357). It is difficult to ascertain how dependent 
on these shipments the Hittites became, for it seems unlikely that the 
population as a whole could have been supplied in this way. It may be more 
likely that these shipments were directly connected with the royal family either 
for their upkeep or for use as disbursements in some way. However, texts from 
the reign of Tudhaliya IV continue to refer to the importance of imports and the 
existence of shipments from Egypt 'to keep alive the land of Hatti' were also 
referred to by Merneptah (Bryce 1998, 365). One shipment of grain from 
Mukis, delayed in Ugarit owing to the lack of a ship and crew, was referred to 
in a letter to the U garitic king as 'a matter of life and death' (Bryce 1998, 3 65). 
Such imports were vulnerable to disruption at any stage on their journey and 
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any reliance on them will have been a serious risk. When control over the port 
of Ura in Tarhuntassa was lost, Tudhaliya IV and his successors may have been 
placed in particular jeopardy (Bryce 1998, 364). 
Although as in Greece there is a lack of positive evidence for any specific 
unusual drought, problems with agricultural production could have occurred 
for many reasons, including lack of human resources due to plague or war 
while internecine warfare and raiding may have made some lands unfarmable, 
and all of these were problems that affected the Hittites (Bryce 1998, 375). 
Shortage of food and security of supply was of concern at the highest levels 
and a hungry populace would have provided a real threat to stability if not dealt 
with (Dickinson 2006a, 55; Levick 1990, 109-11 0). While it is uncertain that 
the Mycenaean palace societies traded with or relied on each other in terms of 
basic subsistence foods, any localised problem could have encouraged raiding 
of neighbouring areas or attempts at territorial expansion. Occurrences of 
plague and food shortages could certainly have been destabilising factors for 
the Mycenaean palace societies and were ones that existed at the same time in 
neighbouring regions. 
Divided loyalties 
Vassalage and its downsides have been discussed above, but another potential 
problem faced by the Hittites was that of the royal family itself. Even in its 
earliest days, the issue of succession was to prove a problem with significant 
ramifications for the unity, integrity and stability of the Hittite kingdom. The 
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first instance of this is instructive, since it sets a model for similar events that 
happened throughout the history of the kingdom. 
The first Hittite king, Labarna (c.?- 1650), attempted to appoint his son and 
presumed heir, Labarna, as governor of Sanahuitta, a newly conquered city, but 
this appointment was disputed by the kings's other sons, 'his servants and the 
great men' and never took place (Bryce 1998, 71-72). Instead, one Papadilmah 
was appointed, Sanahuitta rebelled and the young Labarna may not have 
survived. The next king, Hattusili I ( c.1650-1620), attacked Sanahuitta but 
failed to topple the rebel regime or recapture the city (Bryce 1998, 74). 
Hattusili also appointed his sons as governors of conquered territories but he 
noted that 'until now no member of my family has obeyed my will' (Bryce 
1998, 90). Two of his sons rebelled, one encouraged by the local inhabitants, 
but both appear to have been put down (Bryce 1998, 90). ~other rebellion 
occurred at Hattusa, involving nobles and the king's daughter, who had male 
children. She 'made Hattusa and the court disloyal; and the noblemen and my 
own courtiers opposed me' (Bryce 1998, 90). Hattusili, having no worthy 
sons, was forced to adopt his nephew as his son and heir, but this was soon 
reversed as the nephew appears to have been overly influenced by his mother 
and family and his kingship threatened further violence and disruption. At last 
he appointed his grandson Mursili as heir (Bryce 1998, 94). 
Thus there was amongst the royal family and other influential figures a 
predisposition to intrigue, which threatened to destabilise the kingdom at any 
time. The mid-thirteenth century saw a struggle for power between Urhi-Tesub 
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and his uncle, who became Hattusili III, which divided the loyalties of subjects 
and vassals alike (Bryce 1998, 284-288). In Hattusa itself, this civil war may 
have led to looting and destruction in violent clashes between opposing sides 
(Bryce 1998, 289). Hattusili also tried to ensure that only his descendants, not 
those of Urhi-Tesub, could inherit the throne. These problems of legitimacy 
and loyalty plagued Hattusili's heir, Tudhaliya IV, in the late thirteenth 
century, and his statement is notable and worth quoting at length,for expressing 
a concern that has faced many dynasties: 
My Sun has many brothers and there are many sons of his father. The 
Land of Hatti is full of the royal line: in Hatti the descendants of 
Suppiluliuma, the descendants of Mursili, the descendants of 
Muwatalli, the descendants of Hattusili are very numerous. With 
regard to kingship, you must acknowledge no other person (but me, 
Tudhaliya), and protect only the grandson and great grandson and 
descendants of Tudhaliya. And if at any time (?) evil is done to My 
Sun - (for) My Sun has many brothers - and someone approaches 
another person and speaks thus: 'Whomever we select for ourselves 
need not even be a son of our lord!' - these words must not be 
(permitted). With regard to kingship, you must protect only My Sun 
and the descendants of My Sun. You must approach no other person 
(Bryce 1998, 332). 
However, there is some evidence that there was another coup, in which 
Tudhaliya's cousin, Kurunta, whom he had recognised as king of Tarhuntassa, 
became king for a short time in Hattusa and this probably led to the loss of 
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Tarhuntassa, which became hostile to the Hittites (Bryce 1998, 335, 354-355). 
The last king, Suppiluliuma II, son of Tudhaliya IV, also faced serious discord 
on his accession, as had his brother Arnuwanda III, who ruled for only a year 
(Bryce 1998, 361). This may well have been linked with continuing 
disagreement over which branch of the royal family should have ruled (Bryce 
1998, 362). However, in the midst of these internal problems, he was faced 
with widespread disobedience from vassals and, uniquely, the divorce of a 
Hittite princess by the son of the king of Ugarit (Bryce 1998, 363). This may 
indicate the diminished respect and authority the Hittite king could command 
at this point. 
Dynastic intrigue and opportunism was ever present throughout the history of 
the Hittite kingdom and this involved members of the royal family and the 
nobility whose support was necessary for any king (Bryce 1998, 92). If we 
assume that the wanaktes of the palatial kingdoms were kings in a similar 
sense, and members of ruling dynasties, then it is likely that they faced similar 
problems. Although we know nothing of their marriage or succession 
arrangements, it could be expected that, over time, the number of royal 
descendants would increase, and that this might cause tensions between 
competing groups who could use these figures as a focus of intrigue. 
Accepting Ahhiyawa as a Mycenaean kingdom, it seems that the king's brother 
Tawagalawas seems to have had responsibility in the eastern Aegean islands 
and coastal Asia Minor (Bryce 1998, 321), although these areas were largely 
autonomous (Gurney 1990, 40-41). Whether Tawagalawas acted according to 
the wishes of his king and brother, or acted opportunistically or in his own 
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interests, or a combination of the two, must remain speculation, but at least it 
provides a context in which there was a potential for intrigue and the existence 
of different power bases within a kingdom. Mycenaean kings may have 
similarly used family members to rule particular areas or to undertake 
campaigns or expeditions. While this could be an effective method of rule and 
maintaining the dominance of one family, there were no foolproof ways for a 
king to command the loyalty of his own family, let alone other nobles or 
subjects, and the following description of the problems that faced Hattusili I 
are generally applicable: 'without doubt his regular absences on military 
campaigns exacerbated the political problems he faced at home, problems 
which led to faction, strife, rebellion, and great loss of life and property' (Bryce 
1998, 99). 
A push too far and the failure of strong centra/leadership? 
The above discussions set in context the problems encountered in maintaining 
the integrity and existence of the Hittite kingdom. It must be said that it 
successfully survived many extremely serious situations, but past survival was 
no guarantee of future success and the kingdom of Tudhaliya IV, towards the 
end of the thirteenth century, has been characterised as 'a kingdom coming 
under mounting pressures' (Bryce 1998, 358). On top of dynastic issues, 
military threats existed on all sides of the kingdom, yet apparently Tudhaliya 
apparently chose to engage his forces on Alashiya, generally accepted to be 
Cyprus (Steel 2004, 185-186), and claimed to have made it tributary and to 
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have seized its royal family (Bryce 1998, 356). 13 If these claims are valid, this 
may be linked to an attempt to secure shipping routes that a hostile Alashiya, or 
hostile forces based in Alashiya, could have disrupted; these would have been 
important in the context of grain shipments and other trade (Bryce 1998, 357-
358). Such a campaign may have diverted Hittite manpower and resources and 
could easily have encouraged problems elsewhere. In fact, if this happened it 
may have posed a greater problem than a solution in the long run. 
Suppiluliuma II is later recorded as successfully fighting three naval battles 
against Alashiya and one land battle, which Bryce suggests also reflect a 
concern with supply routes (Bryce 1998, 365-366). Who exactly these enemies 
were is not known and other evidence combines to provide a confused picture. 
Since the Hittites are not known to have had a navy, and they had lost their 
province ofTarhuntassa and its port ofUra, it is supposed that Ugarit provided 
their naval capacity (Bryce 1998, 366). Whatever problems may have been 
affecting the relationship between Ugarit and Suppiluliuma, he was evidently 
still able to count on their aid, since a letter from the last king of Ugarit in 
response to a request for aid from the king of Alashiya notes that 'all my troops 
and chariots(?) are in the Land of Hatti, and all my ships are in the Land of 
Lukka' (Bryce 1998, 367). Suppiluliuma is also recorded as having conquered 
and annexed many western lands, including the Lukka Lands, as well as 
Tarhuntassa, although if this was the case, it does not seem to have lasted 
(Bryce 1998, 364). 
13 Steel (2004, 184-185) notes the implication, in the Hittite archives of the fifteenth century, 
that Alashiya was a tribute paying vassal state, although this can not be demonstrated 
archaeologically. The extent of real, as opposed to claimed, direct control may be doubted, 
although it may be that in the hierarchy of international relationships, the Hittites were still the 
stronger party in the thirteenth century. 
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The exact nature of Mycenaean political and military involvement in the 
eastern Aegean and western Asia Minor is unclear, although some activity 
seems likely (Niemeier 1999) and the Ahhiyawan Tawagalawa was evidently 
involved in activities to do with the Lukka Lands and thus into contact with the 
Hittites (Bryce 1998, 321 ). It is quite possible that one or other Mycenaean 
kingdoms could have become equally entangled in too many, too distant or too 
difficult projects, and that this led to a failure at the centre, resulting in 
fragmentation of the polity. Local powers and other palace states would have 
sought to capitalise on such events. This is perhaps a likely enough scenario 
even in the mainland and Aegean area itself, without necessarily having to 
accept a Mycenaean answer to the Ahhiyyawa question. 
Despite these pressures evident prior to the collapse of the Hittite kingdom, 
Tudhaliya IV and Suppiluliuma II were able to mobilise significant resources 
for construction at Hattusa and military campaigning, and it would be difficult 
to suggest that a collapse was predictable or inevitable, even under these 
strained circumstances, although the later texts may be more optimistic than 
truthful in content (Bryce 2004, 254-256). This is cautionary for those who 
seek to identify decline or to see it as a necessary preamble to collapse. As 
Bryce notes of Tudhaliya IV: 'this king has left some enduring tangible 
monuments to his reign - more enduring than those left by the kings who 
reigned in what might be regarded as the peak periods of Hittite power' (Bryce 
1998, 359). While expenditure on monumentality has been linked with the 
collapse of the Hittites and the Mycenaean palace societies, there is no simple 
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equation between excessive expenditure and collapse. What it suggests is that 
there is no clear-cut equation of the creation of monumental architecture with 
long or even short-term stability, but equally there is no clear indication that 
the creation of monumental architecture must lead to collapse. In fact, in terms 
of Mycenaean, Maya, and Egyptian monumental architecture, recent studies of 
labour requirements show that these need by no means need have placed any 
undue or unusual pressure on society (Loader 1998, 65-73; Evans 2004, 340-
341; Manley 1996, 28). 
Continuities 
It seems likely that circumstances combined to make the long-term survival of 
the Hittite kingdom extremely unlikely, despite the fact that it had managed to 
survive for so long. Although the Hittite kingdom as it had existed disappeared 
along with Suppiluliuma, with Hattusa and other sites destroyed and 
abandoned, the destructions were limited to particular areas, and abandonment 
was more prevalent, and Bittel (quoted in Bryce 1998, 381-382) stated that 
'though politically the attack by its neighbours was disastrous for Hatti, the 
loss of life must not be exaggerated.' Mobility of population rather than 
'widespread destruction and massacre' seems to have followed the collapse. 
Regions and peoples peripheral to the Hittites, such as the Lukka continued to 
develop through to the classical period, retaining some elements of LBA 
culture in the names of their gods and their language (Bryce 1998, 382). 
Tarhuntassa also may have continued to exist as a kingdom and several areas 
show continuity and 'a stable population' indicated by the retention of LBA 
place names (Bryce 1998, 383). It is even possible that 'Great Kings' named 
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Mursili and his son Hartapu continued to rule in Tarhuntassa, and that these 
were descendants of Kurunta, as may be suggested by several incriptions which 
appear datable to just after the fall of Hattusa, or that the Mursili was in fact 
Urhi-Tesub and Hartapu was his son (Bryce 1998, 386). 
A branch of the Hittite royal family also continued to rule for several 
generations at Carchemish, despite its alleged destruction (along with Hatti, 
Qode, Arzawa and Alashiya) by the Sea Peoples as recorded by the Egyptians 
(Bryce 1998, 384). One king, Kuzi-Tesub, who seems to have outlived 
Suppiluliuma II, adopted the title of 'Great King', which may indicate the 
demise of the main branch of Hittite royalty and that a Hittite kingdom of 
Carchemish survived the collapse (Bryce 1998, 3 84; Caubet 2003, 18). His 
grandsons also ruled as kings in the east and the title was retained by the kings 
of Carchemish from c.1150-1000, despite reductions in territory (Bryce 1998, 
384; Caubet 2003, 18). Bryce (1998, 384) speculates that 'particularly perhaps 
the more elite elements of Hittite society, including members of the royal 
court' could have settled there and 'created an environment not unlike that of 
the palace society at Hattusa.' Despite this continuity, which persisted in the 
creation of Hittite style monuments, sculptures and hieroglyphic inscriptions, 
the kingdom continued to fragment into smaller units and new kingdoms, 
although the region itself became known as the Land of Hatti (Bryce 1998, 
385). 
In the Lower Land, south of the Hittite homeland, a much later kingdom of 
Tabal existed, fonned from several smaller states (Bryce 1998, 387). Their 
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traditions show 'significant continuity of traditions from the Late Bronze Age 
Hittite world through the succeeding Dark Age down into the first millennium' 
(Bryce 1998, 387). Furthermore, the descendants of the Kaska appear to have 
still been present in the vicinity (Bryce 1998, 387-388). This picture ofvaried 
cultural and political continuity and change accords fairly well with that of the 
collapse of the Mycenaean palaces. 
The Classic Maya 
Some recent theories to account for the collapse of the Classic Maya were 
discussed in chapter 2, where it was noted that monocausal explanations had 
been largely discredited as failing to explain the long and varied pattern of 
events in different regions. Rather, emphasis is increasingly placed on internal, 
local and regional events and the interplay of social and environmental factors. 
Here, after a brief orientation, some specific instances of collapse will be 
discussed, since they provide likely analogues for events in LBA Greece. 
Unlike the Hittites but like the Mycenaeans, the Maya never constituted one 
unified political body, either a state or an empire. Rather, there existed a Maya 
civilization or culture zone throughout and to the south and west of the 
Yucatan Peninsula in a variety of very different regions (Coe 1999, 14-32; 
Webster 2002, 294; Demarest 2004, 10-12 and Fig. 2.2). While there is a 
degree of cultural similarity within the zone, there was much variation between 
individual sites and regions with each of the many polities 'adapted to the 
unique features of its natural and social environment' (Webster 2002, 177). 
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Figure 4.2 Terminal Classic Maya regions and major sites with approximate order of 
collapse/transitions. Source: Demarest 2004, 227 Figure 9.10. 
The Classic period (c. AD300-900) is defined by the widespread occurrence 'of 
distinctive forms of the ancient Maya writing and calendric systems in carved 
stone texts, as well as polychrome ceramics, corbelled vault or false vault stone 
architecture, the stela-altar monument complex' and the 'Ajaw complex' an 
emphasis on the 'ideology of divine kingship in art, iconography and politics' 
(Demarest 2004, 15-16). The collapse of the Classic Maya involved the ending 
of 'divine kingship, along with the elite-run social, political, and administrative 
hierarchies and economic support systems it entailed' together with a 'major 
change in archaeologically visible aspects of the lowland political and 
economic system, as well as population levels and distributions' and this is 
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now chronologically defined as the Terminal Classic (c.AD750-1050) 
(Demarest eta/. 2004b, 545, 569, 572). 
The Maya thus appear, in a general sense, to have had some similarities with 
the palatial Mycenaeans. In both cultures, independent competing polities 
existed, linked by a variety of social and economic networks, rivalries and 
alliances (Demarest 2004, 222-228). They are defined by the existence of 
particular styles of kingship, ideology and social structure, which were 
expressed materially through architecture and iconography as well as texts 
(Webster 2002, 119-136). There were extreme differences between sites: as 
well as major sites, there were a variety of smaller centres and some areas 
existed without such organisational systems, which corresponds to a similar 
variety in Mycenaean Greece (Webster 2002, 163-170; Small1998 and 1999). 
Small (1998) in fact has suggested that Mycenaean society may have been 
similar to Maya society, being based on lineage units or individual households, 
rather than forming a state, and suggests that this can explain the presence of 
extremely large central sites. 
Despite linguistic differences across the region, 'one prestige language was 
used everywhere in the inscriptions' and this facilitated inter-elite relations 
(Webster 2002, 158). This also seems to be the case for Greece, the Aegean 
and Linear B (Postgate in Voutsaki and Killen 2001, 160). Another similarity 
seems to be that long-distance trade networks in prestige-related goods or 
resources were vital for supporting elites that controlled them, while other trade 
and production may have been decentralised and not an elite concern 
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(Demarest 2004, 160-164, 173). In the Terminal Classic, these defming 
features of the Classic Maya were abandoned and transformed at different 
times for different reasons and in a variety of ways marking a 'change in the 
regional manifestation of Classic Maya civilization, particularly political 
systems and political ideology' (Demarest eta!. 2004b, 546). The rest of this 
section will examine some specific aspects of the collapse, transformation and 
continuity that suggest comparison with the collapse in LBA Greece. 
Dynasties, alliances and warfare: the collapse in the Petexbatun 
The collapse of Classic Maya political systems appears to have occurred 
earliest in the western Peten region and particularly in the Petexbatun region 
and systematic research has revealed 'a clear and consistent, albeit complex, 
sequence of events ' (Demarest 2004, 249; Figure 4.2 'Pasion zone'). In 
AD648, B'alaj Chan Kawil and his followers established themselves at Dos 
Pilas (Webster 2002, 275). He may have been the son of a king of Tikal, 
located some lOOkm to the north-east (Figure 4.2 Central zone), and probably 
had ambitions to rule at Tikal itself, since he and his successor used the 
emblem glyph ofTikal's kings (Webster 2002, 275). B'alaj Chan Kawil allied 
himself with Tikal's great rival, Calakmul, located almost 200km to the north 
of Dos Pilas (Figure 4.2 North central zone), but following Calakmul's defeat 
ofTikal in AD657 he did not become king in Tikal (Webster 2002, 276). Tikal 
subsequently attacked Dos Pilas, in AD672, driving B 'alaj Chan Kawil into a 
five-year exile (Webster 2002, 276). After he returned, relations between Dos 
Pilas and Calakmul were reinforced by mutual visits: B'alaj Chan Kawil 
attended the enthronement of Yich'aak K'ak' in AD 686 and Calakmul nobles 
202 
4 The processes of collapse 
are attested at his own court in Dos Pilas (Webster 2002, 276). Calakmul may 
have used Dos Pilas to increase its influence in the region by assisting Dos 
Pilas in the conquest of other centres, and the 'Calakmul alliance' indeed 
controlled this area, key to the exchange of prestige goods, until the end of the 
eighth century (Demarest 2004, 249; Webster 2002, 288-289). However, in 
AD695, Calakmul itself was heavily defeated by Tikal, and Dos Pilas 
'remained as the great military power' of the region, extending its regional 
influence through warfare, alliance and intermarriage (Demarest 2004, 249). A 
second dynastic seat was established at Aguateca (Demarest 2004, 250). 
Then, around AD7601761, Dos Pilas collapsed and several proximate causes 
are identifiable (Demarest 2004, 251 ). Dos Pilas itself was attacked, destroyed 
and largely abandoned, its ritual throne overturned and smashed, by the vassal 
king of Tamarindito, and foreknowledge of direct military threat is indicated by 
the rushed fortification of it and nearby sites, using material taken from 
temples and palaces and the construction of a 'densely packed siege village' 
within the walls (Demarest 2004, 251-254 Figures 10.5-1 0.8). 
However, it seems that the royal family and nobles moved to the much more 
defensible centre of Aguateca, with its deep gorge to the east and cliffs to the 
west, and this site too was hastily fortified with 5km of walls (Webster 2002, 
277; Demarest 2004, 252-253 Figure 10.7). This site lasted until around 
AD800 before it was abandoned by the 51h Dos Pilas ruler (Webster 2002, 277), 
but the palace was ritually destroyed, and the elite houses burned and 
abandonment of household objects suggest attack. What remained of Dos Pilas 
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was also destroyed just after Aguateca (Webster 2002, 277). Again it is likely 
that the surviving elite moved to other locations with which they were linked. 
Between AD761-830, the Petexbatun region 'collapsed into a state of endemic 
warfare' creating a "landscape of fear" (Demarest 2004, 253). Long distance 
trade routes and local exchange were interrupted and the population moved to 
defensible sites and neighbouring regions, as indicated by excavation and 
survey (Demarest 2004, 253; Webster 2002, 277). This nucleation could have 
produced agricultural problems through the intensive farming of defensible 
areas, and some areas of rich soil were themselves palisaded (Demarest 2004, 
253-255; Webster 2002, 277). Significant depopulation also occurred 
(Demarest 2004, 252). There are several likely causes of this situation. 
Dos Pilas may have relied heavily on the support of Calakmul, and despite 
initial successes, could have become increasingly vulnerable following 
Calakmul's defeat (Webster 2002, 277). Calakmul in fact remained influential 
until much later, but seems to have chosen to look north, rather than south after 
AD750 (Braswell et al. 2004, 190). It is likely that there were problems with 
vassals and nearby polities 'seem to act more independently in the late 8th 
century' (Webster 2002, 277). After the destruction of Dos Pilas, it is plausible 
that Aguateca, Tamarindito, Seibal and La Amelia all competed for regional 
dominance (Webster 2002, 277). By AD830, the Petexbatun had only one 
remaining major centre, Punta de Chimino, located on a peninsula in Lake 
Petexbatun and cut off from the mainland by a massive moat; however this site 
and the remaining hamlets appear to have been gradually abandoned in the 
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ninth century (Demarest 2004, 255). At Punta de Chimino and Seibal, new 
sculptural and architectural forms, based in older traditions and representations 
of new costumes and styles, may have 'been part of an experimentation with 
new legitimating ideologies' but even these were eventually abandoned 
(Demarest 2004, 261 ). 
This collapse seems to have been caused by competition for royal power, inter-
elite competition and status rivalry, and the need to acquire (or stop others 
acquiring) high status goods, thus these stresses 'were created by the K'uhul 
Ajaw system itself (Demarest 2004, 257). In tum, this led to a situation in 
which instability and warfare were endemic and evolved 'into more widespread 
conflict as the basic infrastructure of the region was disrupted' (Demarest 
2004, 257). These problems at local and regional levels were also linked to the 
formation and fragmentation of 'galactic polities', networks of influence that 
the biggest centres such as Tikal and Calakmul attempted to forge, where rulers 
might claim some paramount status over other rulers and their wars 'reflect 
vast geopolitical conflicts, not mere local squabbling' (Demarest 2004, 259; 
Webster 2002, 169). Continuity and new adaptations of older traditions 
occurred at some sites, following the demise of others, but this did not last 
(Demarest 2004, 261). 
Although the political interrelations and narrative histories of Mycenaean 
kingdoms cannot be reconstructed, it may be that, as polities of different levels, 
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some sought to dominate others, in a similar way to the 'galactic polities' 14 of 
the Maya, and this could have fostered rivalries and intense military 
competition between and in different sites and regions. It is well know that 
armies of classical times could move about Greece and fight at some distance 
from their homes and the same mobility and reach could be expected in the 
LBA. Some regions, like the Argo lid, with a dense concentration of important 
sites, could have been particularly vulnerable to conflict and competition, but 
equally Orchomenos and Thebes, and the citadel of Gla could have been local 
rivals, and deliberate destructions at various stages before c.l200 may be 
linked to this. Pylos too was part of this scene, although seemingly with no 
near rival palace, but it surely must have taken part in the supra-regional 
palatial political scene. This stretched overseas to Crete, to Knossos and 
Chania, and we should expect that rivalries would have played out on the 
mainland and at sea. 
It is most unfortunate that the texts do not record the details of alliances and 
intermarriages, which undoubtedly took place, for we would have a much more 
- dynamic and realistic vision of the Mycenaeans. It is important to note, 
however, that unlike some of these late Maya fortifications, the Mycenaean 
fortifications do not reflect sudden danger, since they were probably built over 
longer periods (Loader 1998, 65-73), nor do the citadels appear to have been 
changed into siege-type sites. It may be that there was no need to improve on 
the major defences that already existed. 
14 Galactic polities- a term for polities that could rapidly expand through warfare and other 
means into regional powers or hegemonies, in which rulers would attract the allegiance of 
'satellite' sites or regions (Demarest 2004, 216). 
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Power sharing at Copan: the failure of divine kingship 
Copan was a major centre in the south of the Maya region (Figure 4.2 South-
east zone; Demarest 2004, 215). It had relations that probably included kinship 
links and trade with the neighbouring site of Quiriga and sites further away in 
southern Belize, and was loosely allied to Tikal, far to the north (Webster 2002, 
298, 300). Copan's 13th ruler, Waxaklajuun Ub'aah K'awiil, seems to have 
been important in the region, since he oversaw the enthronement of Quiriga' s 
6th ruler in AD724 (Webster 2002, 300). However, on one visit to Quiriga, his 
religious symbols were seized or defiled, and he himself was ritually killed in 
AD738 in what may have been a coup, perhaps even involving distant 
Calakmul (Tikal's rival). 
Under its next ruler, Copan appears to have experienced a loss of prestige and 
decline, indicated by a lack of inscriptions and major construction, whereas 
Quiriga erected giant stelae celebrating their victory (Demarest 2004, 233). 
The final king of Copan, Yax Pasaj, was enthroned in AD763 and ruled for 
some 47 or more years, and during the first half of his reign at least he was able 
to undertake an impressive building program (Webster 2002, 301). Despite 
this apparent resurgence, including some renewed contacts with Quiriga, where 
Yax Pasaj carried out a ritual in AD81 0, divine kingship at Copan seems to end 
with him, or a short-lived successor (Webster 2002, 318). Some time later, 
some parts of the royal palace was burned, its precincts abandoned and public 
construction ceased and this appears to have been followed later by significant 
depopulation (Demarest 2004, 265; Webster 2002, 308, 319, 321). Quiriga 
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also collapsed slightly after AD81 0, when the last monument was raised 
(Demarest 2004, 265). 
The power of the kings at Copan appears to have been significantly decreased 
by the killing of Waxaklajuun Ub'aah K'awiil and it appears that non-royal 
elites took advantage of this loss of prestige to assert their own positions 
(Webster 2002, 304). There are several indications that the power of the king 
had been reduced and that of the nobles increased. A council house dated to 
the mid-eighth century decorated with lordly toponyms suggests that the king 
was forced to very publicly recognise the power of the nobles and their local 
domains (Fash et al. 2004, 264; Demarest 2004, 233; Webster 2002, 304). 
Outside Copan, elites used 'ajaw' glyphs (usually indicative of kingship or 
supreme rule) to demonstrate their status as rulers and this has been taken as 
indicative of their claimed independence or assertions of power (Fash et al. 
2004, 266). Fash (et al. 2004, 267) suggests that there was increasing 
competition for offices by eligible candidates from a burgeoning elite and this 
too will have increased competition, faction and instability within the polity. 
In fact, the centre of Copan was surrounded by two residential areas that 
housed 20 noble families and their courts, some with royal connections, with 
others located elsewhere. Some of these, such as the House of the Bacabs, 
were impressive structures, rivalling royal compounds, and even had elaborate 
thrones or benches, some decorated with hieroglyphics, of the kind usually 
associated with rulership (Webster 2002, 303). 
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It seems unlikely that the Copan collapse was caused by the kind of warfare 
and strife that affected the Petexbatun region (Webster 2002, 319). The palace 
of the last king Yax Pasaj suggests that he was unable to command labour in 
the second half of his reign, since waste began to accumulate in several areas 
(Fash et a!. 2004, 272). Specific rejection of his rule may also be evident in 
deliberate and localised destructions of royal buildings, in particular those 
associated with his lineage ancestors (Fash et a/. 2004, 272). Also, an altar 
bearing his name was pushed off the top of a building (Fash et a/. 2004, 271 ). 
However, while royal rule seems to have been specifically rejected, several 
elite families seem to have survived for perhaps 150-200 years. A workshop 
for prestige items has been dated to the second half of the tenth century and 
ritual deposits continued to be made around stelae and altars but then elite 
activity ceases (Webster 2002, 311). Through a loss of status of rulers, the 
population may have become attracted to other leaders elsewhere. 
In the collapse of the Mycenaean palace societies, there was a rejection of the 
specific forms of palatial rulership, defined architecturally by the palaces and 
Linear B, although it is argued in chapters 5 and 6 that there was often 
continued activity at former palace sites, and rulership and elites of some kind 
existed in the postpalatial period. These changes, especially with regards to 
Tiryns, where the material is most clear, are discussed in more detail in those 
chapters. What can be said here is, that it is possible that, as at Copan, 
Mycenaean nobles also competed for a limited number of palatial offices, and 
may also have benefited from central elites' overambitiousness and even 
changing access to prestige goods, which may have been strictly controlled by 
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palaces (Voutsaki 2001, 207). Evidently, such difficulties could reduce the real 
power and status of rulers and possibly their influence over the general 
population, which may have increased their willingness to become more 
mobile, and this could have led to a consequent rise in the relative status of the 
nobility. 
Changing trade networks 
Webster (2002, 231-233) rejects the notion that disruption in long-distance 
trade networks could have played a part in the Maya collapse, however, this is 
problematic. Although he accepts that prestige goods used in gift-exchange 
were important for 'the construction and display of elite identity' he suggests 
that they were not vital for the mass of the population (Webster 2002, 232). 
Furthermore he doubts that royals or elites ever managed complex commercial 
trading operations and notes that trade is not mentioned in the texts (Webster 
2002, 232). However, in a prestige economy in which certain goods underpin 
elite expression or social practices, the goods circulated need not be those vital 
for subsistence, such as food, but rather those items invested with social value. 
The inability to appropriate or control these would have a consequent social 
effect. Furthermore, the absence of concern with trade in texts, common to the 
Maya and the Mycenaeans, does not mean that elites did not rely on the 
acquisition of certain goods, neither does their apparent failure to manage such 
systems. It simply may not have occurred to them that such normal features of 
life could be seriously disrupted or brought to a halt. 
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Changes in trade patterns appear to have led to the flourishing of northern 
Belize during the Terminal Classic (Masson and Mock 2004). While many 
southern Maya centres were collapsing this 'was arguably the period of 
greatest florescence in northern Yucatan' (Demarest 2004, 268). It is likely 
that these developments in the north will have affected trade routes and local 
and regional politics, and as noted above, the important centre of Calakmul 
appears to have shifted its interest northwards around AD750. Masson and 
Mock (2004, 372) suggest that, while some collapses occurred in north-eastern 
Belize, there are no indications of population loss and that this was because of 
the region's participation in trade networks with the north. In fact, it may be 
that the region attracted migrants from other areas (Masson and Mock 2004, 
400). However, the participation of smaller communities in maritime exchange 
may have 'directly undermined the economic foundations of older, inland 
regional capitals' which 'culminated in the social transformations of the 
Terminal Classic period and the emergence of loosely centralized provinces 
that may have been conducive to the amplification of commercial exchange' 
(Masson and Mock 2004, 367). These changes involved the presence of new 
architectural and ceramic styles, which have been used to argue for the 
presence of new ethnic groups, but this may owe more to internal social 
changes and new forms of expression (Masson and Mock 2004, 377). It seems 
that some formerly peripheral areas, by actively engaging in local and long-
distance trade networks, may have contributed to the demise of some Classic 
style polities, even attracting new settlers, and that these areas were able to 
thrive through the Terminal Classic period (Masson and Mock 2004, 400-401 ). 
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The Western Roman Empire 
Some brief comments on current trends in the interpretation of the collapse of 
the Western Roman Empire have been made in Chapter 2. Like the Hittite 
kingdom, this empire was far larger in scale than Mycenaean palace societies, 
although some useful parallels can nevertheless be adduced. 
Centres and elites: the importance of reciprocal relations 
The city of Rome, and the Mycenaean sites that became palace states, 
expanded their influence, and absorbed pre-existing local elites. To ensure 
stability, reciprocal relations between the centre and these elites had to be 
maintained to the satisfaction of both. Heather (2005, 33, 139-140) notes the 
importance of the elite Roman landowning classes, who paid the taxes which 
supported the state and participated in its governance, and comments on the 
delicate balance the centre had to maintain in order to ensure 'the willingness 
of these same landed classes to pay up.' Any overburden could have led to 
landowners opting out of the system to which they were vital, while any failure 
to maintain the security of them and their property could equally have resulted 
in their 'search for another agency that could perform the same role' (Heather 
2005, 140). Local elites defined themselves to some extent by their 
participation in imperial institutions, which offered them status, legitimacy and 
a privileged position, and relied on protection from the centre (Heather 1995, 
21 ). Also, 'the centre relied on a mixture of constraint and reward to focus the 
loyalties of landowners' (Heather 1995, 38). Periodic secessions of regions 
from the empire should be seen as 'quite simply a way of making sure that a 
satisfactory slice of the imperial cake was distributed in their own comer of the 
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As noted in chapter 3, trading patterns may have been shifting in the Aegean in 
the later thirteenth century. If this was the case, it might be expected to have 
social and political consequences, including changing settlement patterns and 
the collapse of older centres. Some areas might have suffered, as has been 
suggested for Pylos, while others could be expected to survive or even thrive, 
as seems to have been the case in the Aegean islands. Trade and exchange 
should not be expected to have remained static factors, and it is likely that 
people could have opted into and out of systems, in an opportunistic way, 
although we need not expect that they had anything like a modern economist's 
view of how these systems operated or a global understanding of them. 
However, exchange was key, and if palaces did gear their own production, or 
channel other manufactured goods for export, they may not have controlled the 
visiting traders whom they relied on. In this context, import substitution at 
final destination markets, or other places, could have played a key role in 
making them less important destinations. It could be suggested that mainland 
interests reached across the Aegean to key trading places like Rhodes in order 
to play a larger role in controlling this, although basic political and internal 
motivations for attempted expansion would have also been important. Any 
change in trade networks can have a significant effect on the functioning of a 
society; in the modern world, the imposition of economic sanctions as an 
instrument of coercion or punishment demonstrates this clearly. In the ancient 
world, with a much more limited global perspective on the operation of 
exchange, even relatively small changes could perhaps have been much more 
significant, especially if elites relied on them in any way. 
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Empire' and demonstrate the potential for the fragmentation of an overarching 
socio-political system (Heather 2005, 66). 
The breakdown of this relationship is quite evident in the later Western Roman 
Empire. The presence of new and powerful military groups inside the empire 
caused losses of revenue and prestige for the emperors and forced local elites 
to cope with a new situation (Heather 1995, 27). Early in the AD410s, local 
elites in Gaul supported the Goth Athaulf, presumably seeing this as the best 
way to protect their own interests (Heather 1995, 22). In contrast, British and 
Armorican ·elites asserted themselves, taking responsibility for their own 
defence (Heather 1995, 22). Despite attempts from the centre to halt it, 
increasing fragmentation ensued with more groups discarding loyalty to the 
imperial centre, which eventually 'no longer controlled anything anyone 
wanted' (Heather 1995, 35). In the Roman case, the failure to maintain balance 
between elites and the centre happened because of the presence of other 
militarily strong groups within the empire. But temporary secessions had 
already occurred in various provinces, indicating that other factors could cause 
a breakdown between the centre and elites and lead to regrouping and changed 
loyalties. 
Despite the political collapse and the failure of central control, 'in many areas, 
despite some expropriation and loss, Roman aristocratic families continued 
wealthy and influential under Germanic rule' (Ward-Perkins 2005, 67). 
Despite the real and widespread violence that had occurred as new. population 
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groups15 entered Roman territory, some accommodation was inevitable since 
the newcomers 'in order for their regimes to operate smoothly ... needed and 
wanted Roman aristocratic administrators and supporters' (Ward-Perkins 2005, 
13-24, 66). Indeed, the Romans themselves had adopted such a policy in their 
expansion, adding an extra tier of governance while maintaining local power 
structures where it suited them. Roman rulership and practices were often 
imitated, although Roman rights could be forfeited to the advantage of 
newcomers (Ward-Perkins 2005, 68-71). There were also obvious linguistic 
continuities in continental Europe, as well as discontinuities in Britain. 
However, the Roman way of life eventually disappeared in these new 
circumstances, though to different degrees at different paces in different areas 
(Heather 2005, 437-438). In these circumstances the empire that had been 
could not function as before and neither could local elites, and it is in this 
context that the formation of new identities, albeit with inevitable continuities, 
must be seen. 
In essence, the collapse and transfonnation as presented above, hinged on the 
relationships between power groups and the arrangements made by groups and 
individuals to facilitate their survival and success. New accommodations were 
forced by the arrival of new powers, although rearrangements, including 
secession had already been experimented with. These differed in their 
consequences for identity only because of the presence of new groups with 
non-Roman identities. The same essential relationships would have existed in 
the Mycenaean palace states, albeit on a smaller scale. Nevertheless, any 
15 Todd (200 I, 14-15) notes that these were complex events, which involved 'the emergence of 
ethnic and other units, in some cases based on earlier groupings and in others evidently new. 
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failure to maintain an equitable balance by the centre, could have resulted in 
similar opportunism or dissatisfaction by local elites. While the collapse of the 
Mycenaean palaces did not lead to any immediately visible changes in identity, 
except the loss of particularly palatial forms, as represented in material culture, 
which may suggest that non-Mycenaean power groups were not involved in the 
collapse, such fragmentation could nevertheless have encouraged the formation 
of new corporate identities over time. 
Discussion 
The preceding discussion of factors at work in the collapse of the Hittite 
kingdom, the Classic Maya and the Western Roman Empire reveal that a wide 
range of processes was at work and that these interacted and combined with 
particular events. The expansion into and maintenance of overarching systems 
of rule, including territorial expansion and the imposition of influence 'often 
creates internal problems: the prizes to be gained from wielding power are that 
much greater, the consequences of not sharing in the profits that much more 
devastating' (Kuhrt 1995, 244). The inevitability of collapse in all these cases 
is unproved and quite debatable and it seems that the stability and survival of 
particular polities owes much to chance and inopportune coincidences. In itself 
this is shown by the different effects of similar occurrences at different times, 
the ability to cope at any time was defined by specific and contemporary 
factors. This conclusion should be extended to the Mycenaean collapse 
(Dickinson 2006a, 43 ). Tainter ( 1988, 86) largely rejects the chance 
concatenation of events as a suitable explanation for collapse, suggesting it has 
some 'logical failings', however his intention was to produce a generalised 
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theory 'for a global understanding of a recurrent process'. Tainter's task may 
indeed be impossible and undesirable since it reduces dynamic human action to 
motiveless structure. 
The role of 'barbarians' as outlined by Bronson (1988, discussed in chapter 2) 
seems to have some clear validity in the case of the Hittites. The Kaska and 
other groups evidently preyed on the Hittite kingdom throughout its existence, 
causing destructions and serious problems for the king to cope with, entailing 
his attention and expenditure. They disrupted trade, caused destructions even 
in the Hittite homeland and at its capital and annexed territory. However, the 
Hittites were usually able to deal with this, and did so successfully for 
centuries, although the danger posed by the Kaska and others increased when 
the king faced other problems. A similar situation can be envisioned for the 
Western Roman Empire, in which military incursions disrupted the economy, 
diverted resources and led to the fracturing of relationships between affected 
elites and the centre. Whether such a scenario applies to the Mycenaeans, as 
Drews (1993) suggests, is doubtful according to Dickinson (1999c, 25). 
However, with Mycenaean polities being much smaller in scale, hypothetically 
any troubles with barbarians or raiders may have been more problematic for 
their survival and success. 
Perhaps more relevant for the Mycenaean collapse are the problems apparent in 
coping with vassals, as faced by the Hittite kingdom and amongst the Maya 
polities. Although in the Hittite case, the scale is again larger than any that 
would have been experienced by the Mycenaean kings, vassalage and attempts 
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at hegemony amongst the smaller scale Maya polities attest to similar 
difficulties. Attempts at dominance and power relations may have played a 
similarly important role, perhaps especially between the many important 
centres in the Argolid, whose relationship is uncertain, but also more widely 
between palace sites and non-palatial regions, perhaps especially the Aegean 
islands. Hittite and Maya vassals could refuse to approve central rule, act in 
their own interests or otherwise cause problems, which often coincided with 
other difficulties elsewhere. Rejection of central authority by vassals could 
lead to difficulties in maintaining the centre and its eventual failure. 
Inter-state conflicts, often involving geographically distant Maya polities were 
common, as the situation in the Petexbatun makes clear, and these could 
intensify and cause localised collapse and attendant problems for local 
communities and the rejection of the existing system. Again, it is possible that 
this became a reality in parts of Mycenaean Greece. Such conflict would likely 
result in the destruction of elite centres and elite groups and be accompanied by 
abandonment of other sites and areas. Large-scale conflicts associated with 
other problems late in the Hittite kingdom also seem likely to have been major 
factors involved in its collapse. These could also cause divisions at home, even 
amongst royal dynasties. Such conflicts can have many causes, either rooted in 
rivalry, competition for resources, or environmental changes. 
Internal conflict either between a king and nobles or within royal families has 
been seen as a prime cause of instability. At Copan, the power of the king was 
restricted by powerful families, and royal authority and its symbols were 
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rejected. This symbolic rejection of former royal ideology also seems to have 
occurred in Mycenaean Greece. Dynastic problems and difficulties with 
succession were major flashpoints for the Hittite royal family. Problems at 
Tikal seem to have led to the foundation of an alternative royal centre at Dos 
Pilas and the intensification of rivalries and war involving Tikal's enemy 
Calakmul. The possibility of civil conflict and even regional war stemming 
from these instabilities was an ever-present threat. Another side of this can be 
seen in the breakdown of mutually advantageous relationships between elites 
and centres, as in the Roman collapse. This led to changing loyalties, the 
collapse of central authority and the transformation of the political landscape. 
Such a scenario is plausible in Mycenaean Greece, where local elites could 
have opted out of palatial systems, causing them to fail. 
Changing patterns of trade could also affect the power of elites to reinforce 
their status visibly and through reciprocal giving, especially if they did not 
actively control it. The growth and decline of particular regions could affect 
and be affected by this and some formerly peripheral areas could successfully 
opt into the system, leading to the success of their areas, as seems to have 
happened in north-eastern Belize. This could stimulate the movement of 
people to growth areas. This is also a plausible reason for changing settlement 
patterns in postpalatial Greece, to be discussed in chapter 5. 
To all of these factors may be added those caused by other stresses, such as 
climatic or localised weather events causing disruption to agriculture, 
population problems, plagues and epidemics. While ancient societies evidently 
219 
4 The processes of collapse 
could and did cope with these phenomena, when combined with other 
problems, such as those discussed above, collapse must be seen as a possible 
outcome. It is likely that the palace societies of Mycenaean Greece 
experienced similar social and other stresses to the Hittite kingdom, the Classic 
Maya polities and the Western Roman Empire in terms of maintaining their 
integrity as systems. While their collapse was not inevitable, and indeed they 
succeeded for some time, a variety of factors made it a not unlikely occurrence. 
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